WASHINGTON, DC: The war against the Taliban is passing the nine-year mark and NATO forces are waning in their commitment to a never-ending counterinsurgency war. Is time ripe for negotiating a deal with the Taliban? If so, what does negotiating with the Taliban mean? With over 150,000 troops in Afghanistan, another 30,000 American troops on their way later this year, and a 40 percent increase in Taliban attacks against civilians and military targets in the past four years, it is uncertain whether pre-talk conditions for negotiations are in order to build confidence, diminish mutual mistrust, and institute a structured sustainable dialogue system for mediators. Recently, General David H. Patraeus, commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces, held a closed-door political and military strategy session with representatives from 12 other Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Internationalizing the responsibility of Muslim-majority nations is an important step toward stabilizing Afghanistan because it strengthens their roles as stakeholders in creating a stable and functional Afghanistan. In 2008 Saudi Arabia laid down the foundation for negotiations when the Kingdom hosted key Taliban leaders and Afghan officials at a private meeting to discuss a cease-fire and end to the insurgency. In the past five years the Afghan government has taken bold steps in recognizing the need to reconcile with Taliban foot soldiers through Afghanistan's National Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Law enacted in January 2010, and most recently the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which aims to strengthen security and civilian institutions of governance while enabling the reintegration of former insurgents back into their communities. For too long policymakers and military strategists connected to the war in Afghanistan have viewed religious actors as either obstacles to peacemaking or the source of conflict. However, the reality is much more nuanced. We have seen religion as an influential factor in peace-building and reconciliation processes. Given the malicious enmity between Taliban leaders and Afghan government officials, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's pro-Western alliance, negotiations with the fragmented Taliban will be even more challenging. It is clear that three main Taliban factions — the Quetta Shura, which is the Afghan Taliban's top leadership council, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani network tied to Pakistan — are unable or unwilling to come to the negotiating table together with one voice, so it is worth investing in those groups who have indicated that they are willing to talk. Although according to Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president from 1992 to 1996 and current head of the United National Front in Afghanistan, a coalition of several Afghan political parties, there have been discussions to open communication channels to the Quetta Shura and Hezb-e-Islami by Mullah Zaeef, former Taliban Ambassador and spokesperson, for several months now. Mullah Omar, the spiritual father and charismatic leader of the Afghan Taliban, has repetitively demanded to deal only with non-corrupt officials, and to hold a tribunal for Afghan government officials who have been explicitly tied to the illegal torture and killings of civilians and suspected insurgents. In this context, there are several multi-layered variables involved in negotiating a deal for Muslim religious actors to make the transformation from insurgents to civilian power-share holders. This ultimately requires that other stakeholders consider the Taliban's worldviews from a religious narrative. Though some may consider their religious narrative as contradictory or counterproductive, it must be understood in order to grasp the raison d'être of the 21-year-old Taliban movement. Negotiations with Taliban mediators will raise issues implementing an action plan for reconciliation, enforcing a program of accountability and developing a practical roadmap for the reintegration of former fighters into society without humiliation. Most importantly, third-party mediators will need to guarantee the power-sharing agreements and a specific timeline for implementation. Fostering a culture of peace during negotiations and afterwards will require the synchronized work and involvement of individuals and organizations that are trained in sustainable development, transitional justice, trauma healing, peace-building, conflict transformation and sustainable economic and social development. Qamar-ul Huda is a scholar of Islamic studies and Comparative Religion, as well as the Senior Program Officer in the Religion and Peacemaking Program at the United States Institute of Peace. This article is written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) in partnership with Global Experts. http://www.globalexpertfinder.org.
