There are some people who think the United States should attack Iran, or at least attack the country's nuclear infrastructure because it may be building a weapons program. In offering such advice, one might want to consider that there are 70 nuclear facilities spread throughout Iran, and that some are near oil and gas fields, population centers, and other areas that may cause serious problems for any attacker. One wonders what threat Iran would pose even if it had a nuclear weapon. Could Tehran use them? Would Iranians leaders not expect the total destruction of their country to follow? Would this not be the most irrational of acts? Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa stating that nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. If one looks into the law of war in Islam, nuclear weapons, given that they are so indiscriminate, are un-Islamic. So would Iran's leadership take a decision that might obliterate their own country, but also contradict the teachings of Islam? Iran is a much larger country geographically than Iraq. It has a population of over 70 million, and has been around as a "national concept for thousands of years. As soon as the first foreign boot hits the ground, or the first bomb hits a home, the vast majority in the country will turn against whoever attacked them and their allies. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has warned that Iran would respond "worldwide. That wouldn't be surprising; it has the capacity to wreak havoc in many places. What about the idea of American neoconservatives that the US can replace the regime? That didn't work so well in Iraq, so how does Washington do so in Iran? What is the equivalent of de-Baathfication? De-mullahfication? What would the world's Shiites think? Then there is the obvious question: Who will replace the regime? Iranian expatriates - the source of most intelligence for those favoring regime change? Some of those expatriates have not been in Iran since the 1979 revolution. There are others who argue for a "price attack. This argument revolves around increasing fuel economy standards for automobiles, lowering oil prices and hitting Iran where it hurts most: in its pocketbook. This view is based on the alleged success of introducing such standards in the 1970s and 1980s, which are said to have damaged Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec). In reality, that's not how it worked. The economic difficulties Saudi Arabia and the rest of Opec faced in the 1980s came from the combined effects of stagflation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, a worldwide recession, new laws in the OECD on oil use, a move toward nuclear energy and natural gas that was already in progress before the oil shocks, and increased oil production in non-Opec states. Moreover, Opec producers did a good job of damaging themselves through netback contracts and quota cheating. Many oil-producing states also developed unsustainable welfare states based on short-term revenue bursts. In examining what to do with Iran, we must also consider the increasing importance of China and India. Both are trying to set up major oil deals with Iran. The Indians are considering a natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan, while China (along with Japan, South Korea, Italy, France, and some African countries) relies on Iranian oil imports. How many of these countries would agree to impose sanctions on Tehran? More importantly, is it to Washington's benefit to organize a multinational, full-scale attack on oil demand? The drop in oil revenues among the Opec states and other oil producers in the past has led to economic difficulties, provoking internal instability and violence in some countries and an increase in terrorism. The US would harm some of its allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Russia, Norway and others. There are no "smart price attacks, much as there are no "smart sanctions. Price attacks are blunt instruments, often insufficient, and can be counterproductive. They are also based on false political, economic and historical premises. Is there a better way out of the present crisis, other than yet another military and political earthquake in the region? There better be, because the next major conflict could help start off something much larger than what the Middle East has seen up until now. That's why invading or bombing Iran would be a strategic error of epic proportions. The deaf cannot be allowed to lead the blind off the cliff into another major war. Paul Sullivanis a professor of economics at the National Defense University, an adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, and an expert on the Middle East and on energy issues. The opinions expressed are of the author's alone. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
