Rows over electoral alliances have focussed new attention on the Iraqi Shia. Can their post-Saddam revival now be saved, asks Salah Hemeid The bickering within the ruling Iraqi Shia parliamentary bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), continued this week with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's Daawa Party insisting on having a larger say in the UIA's strategy, a stance that has been strongly opposed by its main rival, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), led by ailing cleric Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim. The UIA is a broad-based bloc of Shia groups dominated by the SIIC, which won 128 seats in the 2005 parliament and has empowered Iraqi Shias to have a majority in the 275-member legislative council and in the government. The empowerment of the majority Shias after decades of marginalisation by the country's Sunni minority was a strategic coup at both national and regional levels. The simmering rivalries within the bloc are now raising questions not only about whether the Iraqi Shias can maintain their political gains, but also about whether they can maintain the dynamism of their revival in the face of enormous challenges. They also highlight the fragility of the sect-based political arrangements that have been in place in the country since the 2003 US-led invasion, which have brought neither security nor democracy to Iraq. After spending weeks in closed negotiations, the Shia groups have failed to meet deadlines set for the alliance that is expected to fight the Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq's second free parliamentary poll after the collapse of the Saddam regime. On Wednesday, the UIA said it had delayed until 24 August the announcement of which parties will be on its list for the 16 January elections, a new deadline which it is believed it will also miss. Differences between the two sides centre on the type of alliance they might form and the distribution of candidates. While Daawa claims it wants a broad-based alliance that includes secular Shias and Sunnis joined to a political programme that has a national appeal, the SIIC wants it to be first and foremost a Shia-dominated coalition. The SIIC also wants one quarter of the candidates for itself and another quarter for partisans of radical Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, with the rest evenly distributed between Daawa and independent candidates. According to information leaked by the negotiators, Al-Maliki wants the leadership of the Shia alliance for himself and a greater role for his party in the next government, conditions which the SIIC opposes. Al-Maliki has vehemently rejected the SIIC's undeclared intention of keeping the UIA a Shia-only bloc. He told Egyptian reporters who accompanied Egypt's minister of investment, Mahmoud Mohieldin, on a visit to Iraq this week that he would no longer be part of a sect-based coalition. "A non-sectarian, non-ethnic alliance should be formed under our leadership," Al-Maliki said. "If such an alliance is not formed, we will go to the State of Law Coalition," he added, referring to the political coalition his party backed in January's provincial elections, which came first in Baghdad and in many provinces. Such gains have come at the SIIC's expense, and they have emboldened Al-Maliki, causing him to seek overall leadership of any new Shia alliance in next year's parliamentary elections. The two groups' rivalry is deep-rooted and dates back decades before their respective leaders returned to Iraq from exile after the US-led invasion. The Islamic Daawa Party, or "Islamic Call Party", is believed to have been set up in late 1959 as a militant Shia grouping aiming to establish an Islamic regime. Al-Maliki was elected its leader in 2006 after he was named prime minister. He was re-elected to the post at a three-day party conference this week, with the result being seen as a seal of approval for his strong leadership and non-sectarian approach. The SIIC, previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), on the other hand, was founded by exiled Iraqi Shia groups in Iran in 1980 with help from the Iranians in order to fight against Saddam's regime in the war that raged in the 1980s between the two neighbouring countries. Historically, Daawa is believed to be a grassroots party, especially influential among middle-class Shias, and it advocates a moderate Islamic ideology and a national agenda. At its 15th Conference, held this week, delegates focussed on developing a vision for a strong and united Iraq, as well as on calls to end sectarianism and promote political reform in the country. The SIIC is a smaller and more conservative group that revolves around the Al-Hakim family and the Shia religious authorities in the holy city of Najaf, known as Hawza, or the seat of Shia theology. The group also follows the ideology of Iran's vilayat-e faqih, or rule of the supreme religious leader, and it receives support from Tehran. The last four years have highlighted the deep suspicions that reign on each side about the intentions of the other and reinforced beliefs that the two parties cannot work together. However, many observers caution that Al-Maliki may be at risk of overreaching himself in his present strategy because the security and political situation in the country remains fragile and a power struggle with his Shia allies could make him vulnerable to pressure from both Arab Sunnis and Kurds. He might also be gambling with his party's future if internal Shia political divisions cost it seats in January's parliamentary elections, especially in key areas where Sunnis, Shias and Kurds live, such as Baghdad and the provinces of Diyala and Babil. Disagreement among the Shias also comes at a time when the Americans are increasing pressure on Al-Maliki to redress imbalances with the Sunnis, whom the Americans think have been marginalised and discriminated against by the Shia-controlled government. These American pressures and reports that US officials have already opened talks with insurgents have encouraged former Baath Party members to regroup in Sunni provinces such as Al-Anbar, Mosul, Diyala and Tikrit and began functioning again despite the ban imposed on the party. Unlike in the last election, the Baathists are expected to play a key role in choosing Sunni members for the parliament and in steering Sunni groups away from their former alliances. If the Baathists succeed in leading the Sunnis into forming a large and effective bloc, this will most certainly be at the expense of Shia domination. Moreover, the Shia split could encourage radical Sunni insurgents, such as members of Al-Qaeda, to step up attacks against Shias, triggering retaliation from militant Shias such as the Mahdi Army, plunging the country into further civil strife. In recent weeks, Sunni extremists have begun a new campaign of bloody attacks on Shia mosques and civilians in a bid to reignite sectarian warfare. Part of Al-Qaeda's strategy is also to foil Al-Maliki's plans to strike up partnerships with Iraq's powerful Sunni tribes as part of efforts to bridge the sectarian divide that has marred politics and security since the 2003 US-led invasion. Meanwhile, several new Shia political groups have emerged, vowing that they will fight the next election independently. The Al-Fadila Party, a Shia group that won 15 seats in the last election, has said it will not rejoin the Shia UIA, and nor will it join the grouping around Al-Maliki. A group of 40 political parties and tribal leaders announced on Monday that they were forming a "Coalition of the Iraqi Masses" to participate in the elections in the central and southern Shia-populated provinces. Wael Abdel-Latif, a key Shia lawmaker who joined the UIA in the last election, has announced the foundation of a "People's Solidarity Front". Ghanim Al-Beidani, a senior leader in the Badr Corps, the armed wing of the SIIC, has also said that he is forming his own bloc. These splits might be seen as positive developments, shaking up the sectarian policies that have accompanied the years of Sunni-Shia bloodshed that followed the US-led invasion and paving the way for possible secular rule. However, the unfortunate reality that will confront all those seeking the latter objective is that Iraqi society today has become so entrenched in sectarianism that any new attempt to shift the balance of power may only increase the divide and plunge the country into further turmoil.
