Twelve questions for 2012: Assem El-Kersh quizzes out a cross-section of politicians and commentators about the future of the revolution Ezzeddine Shoukri I fundamentally disagree with the statement that it was a year of lost opportunities; 2011 was the best year for Egypt in decades. This year will go down in history as the year when the New Egypt was born. It is a difficult year, but births are always difficult. You lose blood, effort, precious time, and money, but you gain a life. The people became a political player for the first time; they feel empowered. Politics and freedoms became a fixture of public life. Authoritarianism is receding. Gamal Mubarak and his cronies are in prison — at least some of them, at least for now. The military sector is increasingly getting scrutinized. A new culture, more free, rational, egalitarian and modern, is making itself felt. On the negative side, the mismanagement of the transition is making its pains harsher. Islamists are showing less tolerance and restraint than expected, and therefore threatening those whose support they will need. The revolution is fledgling, though. Very few of its demands has been met so far. But the revolution is not going to come to an end until they are. This can happen in a quicker and more organized fashion if SCAF manages the transition well. SCAF's mismanagement is responsible for a good part of the delays and failures we see. But of course there are real and determined enemies of the revolution: those who stand to lose if authoritarianism is defeated. The revolutionaries made, and continue to make, a serious mistake: focusing on the immediate and neglecting the more strategic objectives. Sharaf's government's mistake was to agree to serve as a cover for SCAF while clearly having no impact on its decisions. SCAF is guilty of monopolizing decision-making in a context where they no longer had monopoly of power. They should have been more realistic and shared decision-making with other political forces in the country. My advice to the revolutionaries is to look beyond their feet. To Sharf is to enjoy retirement. And to SCAF is to give up politics and leave the transition to a strong national unity government. Almost all of the Mubarak regime remains, just without him and his immediate family. As for the Egyptians' focus on accountability, this is both normal and legitimate. Reconstruction never begins until a credible process of accountability is underway. The so-called Tahrir culture has not disappeared. The adherents of this culture are probably the ten million or so who took to the streets in January and February. Add to them another ten million sympathizers. But after that the remaining 65 million, who were blissfully staying home, came out on the streets. When the “new Egyptians” assume leadership of this country, those 65 million will eventually adapt their behavior. This is how social change takes place. The Islamists are part and parcel of the revolutionary forces. But these election results reflect the weight of political forces under Mubarak. This is like giving a feverish person Tylenol and then immediately measuring the person's temperature. We ought to wait until we can truly measure the weight of the new Egypt's political forces. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. I think it is impossible to tell. The coming struggle will be literally a struggle for the soul of Egypt. But nobody knows how this struggle will unfold. Best scenario: SCAF reads the writing on the wall, dismiss Ganzori's cabinet and hands power to a national unity government which will re-design the transition — through a genuine dialogue with other political forces. Worst scenario is: SCAF sticks to its guns, hastily drafts a constitution and organizes presidential elections which will inevitably lead to Islamists dominance. This will lead to an authoritarian backlash, Islamist or military, and a deep rift in society. All of the conflicts you mention will take place. This is inevitable, unless these groups suddenly shift gear into a cooperative mode — which they are showing no sign of. Yes, I believe SCAF want to give up politics and will do that. But they will want to retain a measure of independence and assurances about the general orientation of the country, which I think could be done in a reasonable way. What is needed – a national unity government led by a credible political figure, that will negotiate with the main political forces and social partners, a political road map, an economic stabilization and recovery package, and a security sector reform plan. *Egyptian writer and academic ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ahmed Maher We lost an opportunity to bring true change to the political and economic system of our country. We lost it because of the trust some of us placed in SCAF and because Tahrir Square was largely abandoned after 11 February. The most important change for the better was that the barrier of fear was broken and a new awareness has spread in various ways. Although this has not brought change, it holds the promise for true change in the long run. Politically, it has become difficult to install another Mubarak as president or another Adli as minister of the interior. However, the regime remains fully intact, with its old constitution, its cliques and its networks of interest. The economic system has not changed. Nor does SCAF have the slightest intention to change or reform it. Social and sectarian problems are still rife. It will take a bold leader with an innovative approach to solve their root causes. The revolution has not failed. It may have stalled and run up against obstacles, but it has not failed. A revolution is not a single moment in time. It is a series of phases or waves that rise and fall, surge forward and recede. Change is a long and ongoing process that requires sustained commitment on the part of decision- makers. What the revolution lacks is someone in a position of power to express its aspirations and promote its demands in a serious and effective way. SCAF has been instrumental in obstructing the revolution. It has no serious desire to change the regime. The enemies of the revolution are the members of the old regime who are trying with all their might to abort it. These range from some business tycoons to some members of SCAF. The revolutionaries failed to preserve their unity and some went off in pursuit of parliamentary gains. The Sharaf government refused to respond to the demands of the revolution. At the time, the revolution sought radical changes in the shape of government, in administrative posts and laws. The Sharaf government did not even begin to set that kind of change in motion. If their hands were tied by SCAF they should have resigned and said why. SCAF was hostile to the revolution and the revolutionaries. From the outset it sought to preserve the Mubarak regime and the Mubarak managerial style. The liberals' mistake was that they failed to organise themselves properly and make contact with the people. The Muslim Brothers, for their part, are guilty of political opportunism and breaking ranks in pursuit of their own ends. In there turn the Salafists attempted to turn the revolution to their own ends despite their disgraceful position before the revolution when, having accommodated themselves to the regime, they were afraid of voicing the slightest opposition. Before, during and after the revolution, the Salafists served as a mouthpiece for authority regardless of its nature, sanctifying its actions and behaviour, for the sole purpose of making political gains. Their guiding principles were "ends justify means" and "warding off evil takes priority over promoting good". The media is guilty of looking for the sensational, the journalistic bombshell, the hottest newsflash, regardless of how this may have hurt the revolution and or damaged the reputation of some people. Some news outlets contributed to manufacturing political stars out of individuals who played no part the revolution while they overlooked many true freedom fighters. Reporting and commentary were frequently short on credibility and professionalism. The Mubarak regime remains intact, complete with its constitution, laws and regulations, and with its business tycoons holding the strings. The regime has to be purged and reconstruction should be set in motion at the same time. The morals of the square continue to exist and will reassert themselves in times of crisis. Changing mindsets and morals takes time. It also takes the promulgation and stringent enforcement of new laws. For there to be real change there has to be a new and rigorous system of government that encourages healthy values and severely penalises anyone who violates its rules and principles, regardless of his or her status or position. The rise of political Islam was only natural after 80 years of building itself up organisationally and in strength and facing considerable hardship in the process. The results of the polls reflect the competitors' organisational strengths and parliamentary experience, as well as some electoral chicanery. But the elections aren't over yet. There may be some modification in the results after the end of the third round. I am extremely optimistic. Regardless of the problems it faces and the difficulties that arise, the revolution will succeed. However long it takes, we will have true change and Egypt will become a developed nation. SCAF will continue with its ruses as it searches for pretexts to remain in power. However, with sustained pressure it will eventually relax its grip. I predict that January 2013 will be much better than January 2012. A year from now, many facts will have come to light, the civil [as opposed to Islamic] parties will be stronger, and new principles that have long been lacking in our society, such as respect for diversity in opinion, will become more widespread. There will also be some reduction in the invective against "traitors," a tactic that relies heavily on ignorance. I foresee tensions between the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists, a power struggle between the Islamists and SCAF, and many showdowns between the people and SCAF over the powers of the military under the new constitution. The conflict between liberals and Salafists will continue because they are natural adversaries. However, the Salafists' invective against liberals as "heretics" will eventually abate, especially once they begin to interact more closely with other political forces. I do not trust SCAF one bit. Were it not for SCAF the revolution would have succeeded in a much shorter time. I believe that we are going to have to repeat the Turkish experience with the military. However, here the confrontation will be less acute and the military will eventually relinquish its powers. My recipe for salvation: SCAF should respond positively to the demands of the revolution. It should relinquish power as soon as possible; All revolutionary forces should agree on a set of priorities; We should begin to construct a new system of government that truly upholds the principles of freedom and social justice, abolstered up by new legislation and the stringent enactment of the law. *Activist and 6 April leader ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Youssry Hammad If man won his freedom, what opportunities could he lose? For each opportunity lost since the revolution, we had lost 20 before it in a society that was better at words than deeds. Once we bear in mind that the former regime was bent on ruining the country economically, politically, touristically, and even morally, and that there was no proper system for managing any developmental in Egypt, we can be sure that, far from losing anything, we have won our country back. What we can do now with some planning and organisation is to promote progress and administrative order. With a long-term strategy that sets clear goals and priorities and by mobilising the entire nation towards the realisation of these ends, we can achieve something far greater than anything we accomplished during the past decades. After the revolution, Egyptians have started to rediscover themselves. A real dialogue began between the different political and religious groups and coalitions in order to restore the image of Egypt, which rests on fixed principles that were undermined in the previous era. Egyptian foreign policy is gaining new ground every day and Egyptians have the right to criticise the state's foreign policy. The Egyptian people believe that their foreign policy must reflect their country's leading status in the region and the extent of its influence on the world as a whole, and they reject the type of foreign policy of the former regime which was dwarfing Egypt politically. The country does not yet have a clear economic policy. Instead there is considerable inflation and poor economic performance as reflected in low levels of foreign investment and the lack of new horizons for investment, particularly in the realm of basic and vital industries. I believe that we are still in the process of revolution. Freedoms are not won through handouts or a government's drip policy. The people of Egypt, of all factions, refuse to allow anyone to abort their revolution. SCAF, which has assumed control in the current phase, was expected to rise to the level of the people's aspirations and to begin to put the demands of the revolution in effect immediately after the former regime fell. But apparently, some persons had other political calculations. I believe that the freedom we experience today and the attempt to hold free elections are among the most important gains of this revolution, even if some members of the old regime and some persons who claim to be revolutionaries do not like the election results. Many of those who have risen to prominence in the political arena and in the media wanted to form an alternative to Mubarak and his party, and marginalising all other political forces. Some, for example, made it clear that they were disturbed by the unexpected intensity of the Salafist presence in Egyptian society and others rejected their participation in the political process and sought to distort their image. The media lumped all bearded men together, claiming that they subscribed to a single vision and approach on all issues related to Islamic law. It also confused politics with the theological opinions issued by proselytising groups and attributed them to the Salafist parties. All parties should try to present their ideas as effectively as possible, without attempting to infringe on the rights of others to express their views and opinions clearly and freely. The media should present all views objectively and impartially, towards which end it should desist from all deliberate distortion, vilification and alarmism. I think that only Mubarak and his sons have gone. Perhaps some of those currently holding the reins in government were hoping to restrict change to the head of the regime while keeping the the state, the ruling party government institutions intact. Proof of this can be found in the fact that changes that have taken place since Mubarak stepped down were achieved after immense popular pressure and mass demonstrations. I believe that clashes between the police or the army and the people have an end, which is to obstruct a political transformation. The shape of the state we want is not clear yet, although it appears that some want to change the state in ways that do not reflect Egypt's original identity. This has contributed to the rise of religious polarisation we have observed recently. When people are bound by a national project they overlook their differences and learn how to work together. I believe that a national project that sets the wheels of development in motion quickly and opens a new page in our history will revive society and marginalise disputes. The Islamist movement is the mainstream that reflects Egyptian society and its true identity. It is not an alien product or the fruit of satellite television networks or the media. It offered free services to the poor and marginalised segments of society at a time when other movements were concerned with themselves. The revolution and revolutionaries are a temporary phenomenon and are not capable of mobilising society around a single vision or method. Therefore, once the revolution ended society rallied around the only force that most of the people believe has the capacity to bring change and realise their aspirations without fear of it becoming an extension of the corruption of the previous regime. Restoring security and stability, reviving the economy and improving the educational system are the greatest challenges at this stage. I am optimistic about the Egyptian people's ability to overcome the crisis and to collectively take the country forward. I believe everyone will be keen to work together to bring about the country that we all dream of. I hope that the forthcoming People's Assembly and the presidential elections will be the life-raft that will steer the country towards the choice of the Egyptian people at a time when hidden forces are systematically seeking to obstruct the transition. I think that the Salafists and the Muslim Brothers are intelligent and rational enough to prevent a confrontation between each other, or between them and SCAF, unless such a confrontation is of SCAF's choosing. As for the question of SCAF giving up power as scheduled, I only place my trust in God Almighty. I believe that the choice of the people is what will tell SCAF to step down in fulfillment of its pledges. I believe that everyone wants the army to have a special place in the national constitution, but not as a guardian of legitimacy or a force that determines the orientation of the state. It is time for all sides to set aside their disputes, which are fuelled by the media, and to abide by the choice of the people. On this basis, everyone - rulers and opposition alike - should join forces to save the country and take it forward. I believe that building a government that implements the law with effective institutions manned by Egyptian experts from all outlooks and disciplines will prove the key to the start of a new era in which all belong and all feel respect for themselves and for others regardless of outlook. *Media spokesman of the Salafist Nour Party ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ibrahim Eissa We lost hope, energy, joy and time. We lost the next few years by going down the wrong path, after which we'll have to start from scratch again, and perhaps by then it will be almost too late. We lost an entire revolution which turned into a semi-revolution and gradually into a reform movement. Why? Because SCAF was a horrific political failure, handling things it didn't understand with total determination and confidence in spite of its ignorance; because the Islamists decided they wanted power rather than the revolution; because the civil forces were organisationally weak and their leaders lacked imagination and dynamism; and because Egyptian society has become intensely sectarianised. These things have changed: freedom of opinion and expression has expanded, but unfortunately with a shrinking sense of responsibility; religious parties are rising to power, which threatens Egypt's future; the Egyptian people demonstrated their ability to continue to coexist peacefully in spite of the breakdown in security; the angry generation managed to control its anger; it became clear that the level of awareness and intellectual standards of large segments of the populace have had declined to such a degree that they are now ready to believe the incredible, circulate the unsustainable, and vote against their own interests. The revolution has had some great successes but even greater failures. It succeeded in forcing Mubarak to step down, but not his regime. This is the crux of the crisis: the regime has not fallen. What is needed is for the revolutionaries to be at the helm of their revolution, while what has held the revolution back most of all is the consistency with which SCAF has adhered to its anti- revolutionary political cluelessness. The revolution's main enemies, at home, are certain persons in charge of managing the country and, abroad, Zionist forces and some Gulf countries. Naturally, since he has already left, I have no advice to offer Sharaf, apart from telling him not to start writing his memoirs. SCAF has remained deaf to thousands of pieces of advice, so why should anyone think it will start listening now? The revolutionaries' mistake was that they did not become politicians so as to defend their revolution and promote the implementation of its principles. The backbone of the Mubarak regime remains alive and well; it will remain capable of undermining anything new, as long as the mentality of hypocrisy and loyalty to the ruler, not to the people, prevails. That the people were inclined to destruction is a natural phenomenon after any revolution. The real problem is that they were destroying because they didn't know how to build. In the dark era of Mubarak, Egyptians could never develop an awareness that would enable them to understand their own interests, let alone to realise how to defend and achieve them. The morals of Tahrir were confined to Tahrir. Outside of the square there was and remains a deteriorated educational system, cultural decline, and a superficial and ostentatious religiosity. In order to overcome these problems, we have to build anew. The rise of the Islamists is a product of: 1) the Mubarak regime's suppression of the Egyptian intellect, 2) poverty and want, 3) educational and cultural decline, 4) lack of opportunities for political expression and involvement, 5) huge sources of funding for Islamist groups. But the youth of Egypt make me optimistic, the geriatrics' continued grip on decision-making makes me pessimistic. Whatever scenario occurs will be the people's choice, which makes it good, even if turns out to be a disaster. I doubt there will be clashes. But there will be occasional friction and intense competition. If the Muslim Brothers handle the game cleverly, they will take pains to lower the temperature of friction between all parties. In my opinion, SCAF wouldn't know how to continue even if they chose to do so. The role of the armed forces is to serve as a modern national army, whose function is to protect our land against our enemies. Right now, my recipe for national salvation would be to hand the Muslim Brothers, as the majority party, the task of forming a cabinet and for them to appoint Mohammed ElBaradei as the prime minister of a national unity government. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Kamal Zakher The people's revolution of 25 January was on opportunity for real change. With the fall of the old regime, the revolutionary impetus could have been channeled into the proper reconstruction of the state and the realisation of true development. Unfortunately, radical forces pounced on the revolution and turned it to chaos and confusion, sending terrifying messages to investors. At the same time, a totally unjustifiable security breakdown gave way to the sway of thugs. The upshot was that tourism, industry, the stock market and exports plummeted drastically, to the extent that donor institutions and lending agencies foresaw the immanent bankruptcy of our economy. Meanwhile, SCAF's performance in administering the country and in crisis management has proven well below standard, in large part due to the lack of specialist advisors and SCAF's own bias for the Islamist faction. Because of this combination of incompetence and partiality, the country was plunged into a long dark tunnel of accommodations, starting with the disgraceful constitutional amendment and continuing through the catastrophic parliamentary elections. Changes for the good include the end of the ruling clique, a halt to its rampant corruption, in the hope that reform will continue; the rehabilitation of the voice of the street and a restraint on the power of the ruler, paving the way for effective grassroots political participation through various constitutional channels; a powerful resurgence of authentic Egyptian values, most notably the value of national integration, though it was not long before counterrevolutionary forces attempted to undermine these values and void them of their substance; the huge turnout to exercise the right to vote and, contrary to expectations, the lack of severe violence, clashes or disturbances at the polls. Changes for the bad include the security breakdown, the spread of chaos, and thuggery; the economic deterioration with drops in tourism and the stock market, a halt in production and trade strikes, further compounded by ad hoc, reactionary rather than proactive responses on the part of the authorities; the resurgence of sectarian tensions, exacerbated by the authorities' lack of resolve in handling them and the unhampered rise of sectarian radicalism; the lack of a political vision for steering the country, which helps to explain why crisis management has been ad hoc and reactionary. Because the revolution descended into chaos and fell hostage to the conflicts between conventional political forces and nascent political forces, with certain opportunistic forces in between seeking to hijack the revolution, the revolution was prevented from following its course of natural evolution from the street to the institutionalised state. If the revolutionary youth do not act to set the revolution back on track, the country will regress to a situation that may prove worse than the previous regime. If poorly managed and in the absence of true dialogue between the various political forces, that situation could lead to the eruption of civil war along various religious, class and political divides. The only revolutionary demand that was achieved was the fall of the head of the old regime. The regime itself still exists. If the revolution is to succeed, we must resolve to make the transition from revolution to order, which entails restoring the sovereignty of law, reestablishing security and discipline and setting the wheels of production back to motion. Those at fault for stalling the revolution are: 1. The revolutionary youth, by virtue of their lack of a strategic vision, their impatience for results, belief that they could derive strength from chaos, infighting, and personification of the revolution's goals; 2. SCAF, because it had no clear idea of how to manage crises and decision-making processes, and because of its hesitancy and lack of resolve in the face of diverse and conflicting political pressures; 3. The Islamist currents, which are conspiring to hijack the revolution and to steer the country in a direction opposite to that of historical evolution, towards the realisation of their dream of reviving the Islamic Caliphate, and exploiting religion in a blatant exercise of political opportunism in the process. The enemies of the revolution are: the conventional reactionary forces, those with vested interests in the old regime, who lost their privileges with the revolution, regional powers that seek to usurp Egypt's regional role and influence, and regional powers that fear the export of the Egyptian revolution. To the revolutionaries I say: the time has come to translate slogans into practical demands and to transform yourselves into institutionalised political entities, giving up the tactic of sit-ins so that you do not lose the impetus of popular support. And to SCAF I say: open proper channels of communications with political forces of all shades and turn the conclusions reached through dialogue into effective programmes and procedures; overcome your fear of the strident voice of the Islamist currents, who are twisting your arm. The Mubarak regime still exists. The system of local administration is the same, even if it has been dismantled in theory. The state security apparatus is still intact, even if it is keeping a relatively low profile. The laws that allowed corruption to run rampant under the old regime are still there. It is true that we have succumbed to the culture of revenge and settling scores. This is why the revolution has so far brought about virtually the opposite of the slogans it proclaimed. As to the morals of Tahrir, a single moment cannot possibly be expected to change value systems and mores that had grown entrenched over many decades. This is all the more true given that there was no attempt to build on that moment which, instead, was left prey to predators bent on hijacking the revolution. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this phenomenon was the sectarian attacks that sent shockwaves through the country within two months of the outbreak of the revolution. Sectarian tension resurfaced in a slightly modified form in March when the referendum over the constitutional amendments was turned into a confrontation over sectarian divides, the effects of which continued to reverberate through the parliamentary election campaigns. The chaos, thuggery and rise in organised crime was part and parcel of this process. Change begins with the rehabilitation of the state, the restoration of discipline under the rule of law, and the revision of the mechanisms that shape our collective conscience and intellect, such as the media, the educational system, and cultural institutions, in accordance with the criteria for the construction of the modern civil state. While the revolutionaries were waging revolution, the Islamists crept into the rear lines and began to manipulate the revolution to their own ends. The Muslim Brothers did so through careful planning and organisation, and the Salafists through intimidation; both found the support of opportunistic political forces, such as the Wafd, and they enjoyed enormous financial support from regional powers lurking on the sidelines -- Saudi Arabia in particular. Working to their advantage was SCAF's lack of vision and political acumen, and its failure to appreciate the extent of their danger. While not marked by violence, the elections (so far) were marred by flagrant breaches of electoral regulations, by the Islamists in particular. Among the most salient traits of the electoral process were material bribery and religious blackmailing, which yielded results that seriously distorted the actual weight of the political forces. The lack of transparency and obfuscation pose the greatest challenges to progress in the coming year. Tension between SCAF and revolutionary forces remains a time-bomb that can explode at any moment, while friction between the remnants of the regime and its beneficiaries, radical Islamists, and the revolutionaries, combined with attempts on the part of various regional and international powers to meddle, will heighten the risk of violent clashes that could threaten national security and stability. Nevertheless, I side with the optimists on the grounds that the Egyptian people are peaceful by nature and able to endure hardship. I hope the revolution succeeds in traversing the distance from street to institution, that its principles are translated into reality, and that it be more wary the types of forces that seek to lure it into conflicts and disputes intended to void it of substance. My worst prediction is that factional clashes will erupt across the ideological divide between the civil state and the theocratic state. Because it will be a struggle for survival, the clashes could be severe. However, they could be contained or averted through resolute intervention on the part of SCAF. Judging from the election results and the lay of the land on the ground, clashes are likely on several fronts: civilian versus military, secularist versus Islamist, modern youth versus conventional forces. What brought the country to this stage was the inversion of the logical order for establishing the state, putting parliamentary elections before the creation of a constitution and the election of a president. This, as we have seen, was a recipe for disaster. As regards SCAF, I believe that the most likely scenario is a repetition of the 1952 experience. In light of the mounting conflicts between the various political forces and the steady escalation of sectarianism and the theocratic voice, in particular, SCAF might feel compelled to remain in power or, at least, in a position to have a veto power. My recipe: The resolute and stringent rehabilitation of the rule of law; The determined adoption of democracy as the best means to regulate the interplay between diverse political forces, enforced by a set of regulations to prevent democracy from being overturned; Empowering the government with effective authority to enable it to confront political disorder and inspire confidence in the economy; Restructuring the Ministry of Interior, which should be granted the power to fight organised thuggery and crime, but simultaneously compelled to operate under the rule of law. *Head of the Secular Copts Group
