An era draws to a close with the assassination of America's nemesis. Americans, seconded by their Western friends, bask in revenge by a government itself steeped in the ways of terror, while Muslims reflect on yet another example of Western callousness, as the world ponders, "What next?" The easy part is over: Regional implications of Bin Laden's death The death of the world's most wanted man is a huge success for the American president but will it bring about a change in American policy, asks Graham Usher For many Americans Barack Obama's announcement on 1 May that Osama Bin Laden had been killed by United States Special Forces in Pakistan brought to a close the long and bloody decade begun on 11 September 2001. But whether it opens a new era will depend on the president seizing the chance thrown up by Bin Laden's death to forge a foreign policy based less on wars and intervention than peace and political negotiation, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda was born and flourished. That -- far more than the "almost certain" response by Al-Qaeda to Bin Laden's death -- will be what defines the next decade. For now Obama is basking in the warm glow of "the most significant achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat Al-Qaeda". He also said that "our counter- terrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding". But the US raid brought collision with Islamabad, not cooperation. CIA helicopters from Afghanistan flew purposely low to avoid detection by the Pakistan air force, which scrambled jets to intercept them. Nor were any Pakistani soldiers present during the 40-minute commando raid that saw an unarmed Bin Laden shot in the head "while resisting arrest". Four others were killed, including a woman. CIA Director Leon Panetta explained the secrecy: Pakistan authorities were not informed, he told Time magazine on 3 May, for fear they would "alert the target". It was not an ungrounded fear. Bin Laden was "hiding" not in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas on the Afghan border. He was in Abbottabad: an affluent town an hour drive from Islamabad and residing in a $1 million, heavily fortified compound a short walk from Pakistan's premier military academy. In 2003 the Pakistan's premier military intelligence force, the ISI, had raided the compound in search of Abu Faraj Al-Libi, Al-Qaeda's operations chief, who was wanted for the attempted assassination of Pakistan's former military ruler Pervez Musharraf. The ISI also say they have shared intelligence with the CIA about the compound since 2009. Yet they admit "extreme embarrassment" that Bin Laden's presence in the house "was not on our radar". This is inconceivable, says retired Brigadier Shaukat Qadir. "It is simply not possible the ISI did not know he was there." Just about every other analyst, Pakistan or foreign, agrees. Qadir's theory is the ISI lured Bin Laden to Abbottabad to "betray" him to the Americans. But this doesn't square with accounts by John Brennan, White House counter-terrorism chief. He said on 3 May Bin Laden may have been living in the compound for five years. Since no one -- least of all the Americans -- thinks the ISI is incompetent, this leaves only one explanation: the ISI was sheltering Bin Laden either to use him as a card among competing jihadi groups in the tribal areas (some of which are attacking Pakistan) or as leverage to use against the US, a state several in the ISI are convinced wants to denude Pakistan of its nuclear weapons at the behest of India. Whatever the cause, Pakistan's discomfort is acute. Congressional voices are already demanding cuts in the $2.5 billion in annual civilian and military aid Washington doles out to Islamabad. Others believe the successful strike on Bin Laden should pave the way to similar raids on the Haqqani network, an insurgent Afghan faction based in Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, widely believed to be sheltered by the ISI in Quetta or Karachi. Pakistan has already said the CIA's "unauthorised unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule," warning that "the event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US." It's not an idle threat. The Pakistan army and ISI can take the shame caused by the discovery of Bin Laden on their turf, say Pakistan analysts. They have long defined Al-Qaeda as an enemy and captured several of its leaders. But they would not accept US strikes against allies like Omar and the Haqqanis: it would cause a major crisis in US-Pakistan relations. An American rift with Pakistan may be one consequence of the killing of Bin Laden. Will another be the beginning of a new US policy in Afghanistan? Some 100,000 US soldiers are fighting there to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al-Qaeda network", says Obama. Yet according to the CIA there are less than 100 Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. And the movement's most charismatic leader has just been killed in Pakistan. In other words, it is clear that the US is now battling an almost wholly Afghan insurgency. It is also obvious to many in the US administration and even more among its NATO allies that the war won't end without some form of political negotiation with the Afghan Taliban. Obama didn't broach a political solution to the Afghan war in his address on 1 May. But others in his administration are doing so. Ten years after the US ousted the Taliban for giving Bin Laden safe haven, on 2 May Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on the Pashtun guerrilla movement to "abandon Al-Qaeda and participate in a peaceful political process". The next day US Special Envoy Marc Grossman -- in Islamabad to mend a few fences -- said the US is to put "more diplomacy behind an Afghan-led reconciliation process and... the regional effort to support a safe, secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan". Everyone knows what "more diplomacy" means. It would require a political process in which the Afghan Taliban agrees to share power with other Afghan forces and break all ties with transnational jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda. In return the US and NATO would have to agree to a timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan. As for a renewed regional effort, that would have to include India-Pakistan peace negotiations, especially over the divided territory of Kashmir. Fear of Delhi's expanding influence in Afghanistan is the main reason Pakistan uses the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and, it seems, Al-Qaeda to fight the pro-Indian government in Kabul. Iran would also have to be involved in any regional settlement on Afghanistan, or it may prove as disruptive to American efforts as it has been in Iraq. These would be epochal breaks in America's foreign policy. Only when they are made will America's long and bloody post 9/11 decade truly be as dead as Bin Laden.
