Most of the discussions on Ethiopia's move to divert the Blue Nile in order to construct the Renaissance Dam have focussed primarily on three dimensions. One is the potential effects on Egypt, which are numerous and dangerous. The dam not only threatens to reduce Egypt's annual quota of Nile waters (55.5 billion cubic metres), it will determine the quantities and dates of their arrival, all of which will have an impact on electricity, agriculture and other sectors important to development in Egypt. The second facet concerns Ethiopia's motives, which are also numerous and which involve both developmental and political objectives. The third rests on a form of conspiracy theory that sees the machinations of certain international or regional powers, foremost among which, Israel. The approach has some valid elements related to the convergence of interests among various international players. All three facets are integral to a thorough and accurate understanding of the issue. To omit any one of them would fail to portray the full contours of the interplay — whether of a cooperative or an adversarial nature — involved. Unfortunately, this shortcoming has characterised most of the analyses that have sought to produce viable solutions to the problem, or at least to calculate the potential political costs and benefits of available solutions. Clearly a multifaceted approach is called for. It is therefore essential to establish the links between Ethiopian motives as shaped by internal developments and the changes in the regional and international climate surrounding the water question that have driven Ethiopia to undertake measures that violate Egyptian rights (such as the right to advance notification and water quota rights) in a manner, moreover, that appears indifferent to the Egyptian reaction.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION — COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES: The question of resource management, particularly with respect to transnational rivers, has acquired increasing international strategic significance over the past two decades in tandem with the increasing extent to which this question encroached on areas of the national sovereignty of the countries that shared a particular river. This dimension augmented the sensitivity and potential dangers of the question, especially when it involved matters that fostered competition and conflict, as opposed to cooperation and integration. The change in patterns of international interplay in the post-Cold War era and the growing part that international agencies played in the push for water resource management policies that supported technical and economic programmes had a definite impact on the “linkage between water and development”. This applied particularly to developing nations that had to deal with the scarcity and poor distribution of water resources, or what experts would term “allocation efficiency”. With respect to the Nile Basin, as balances of power in this region shifted as international parties swarmed into the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, a panoply of security related issues became increasingly intertwined in the question of national development. This factor led to a change in perspective on the natural division of the Basin that was originally founded on the notion that fate allocated agriculture and rainfall to downstream countries and electricity and livestock to upstream countries. Although it is largely true that the upper riparian countries are only marginally dependent on the Nile as their source of life (unlike Egypt and Sudan, which depend on it for 95 and 15 per cent of their water needs respectively), some countries at the sources have begun to develop agricultural irrigation systems. This trend has fed the ambitions of those governments to possess both water and electricity, regardless of the detrimental effects on Egypt. The trend has been fed by European, Israeli, Saudi, Qatari and other Arabian firms that have been scrambling to purchase land and to stake out shares in the production of vital energy.
NEGOTIATIONS — BETWEEN STAGNATION AND DEAD-ENDS: Negotiations over the Nile waters have given rise to a sharp rift between the six signatories to the Entebbe Agreement (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), on the one hand, and Egypt and north Sudan on the other. Nor can Egypt and Sudan put much stock in the remaining countries, that are torn between conflicting pressures. Indeed, it appears that South Sudan has determined to join the signatories soon. Most countries of the upper Nile Basin have played on the time factor, which works in their favour. This applies in particular to Ethiopia's handling of the Renaissance Dam with respect to which project it stepped up its drive to secure economic and development assistance while, simultaneously, trying to keep its relations with Egypt on an even keel. Therefore, Ethiopia's negotiating approach was to adopt a moderate rhetoric that urged cooperation while, simultaneously, disengaging the water question from other Egyptian-Ethiopian bilateral issues. Its motive for appearing flexible was to ensure the continued support of donor nations while banking that the time factor would pressure Egypt into accepting the new formula embodied in the Entebbe Agreement, or at least reduce Egypt's scope of maneuverability in altering the current equations. Meanwhile, negotiations bogged down over a number of controversial issues (the definition of water security, the question of advanced notification on water-related projects, the voting system) with the result that talks, now, currently revolve over a consensual formula for achieving a minimal level of (technical) cooperation as the most appropriate option for the current phase.
THE INTERNAL DIMENSION — POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL UTILISATION: Ethiopia's decision to press ahead with the construction of the Renaissance Dam and the bid on the part of the majority of Nile Basin nations to force the Entebbe Agreement on Egypt are consistent with the internal political contexts in those countries where there are significant segments of opinion opposed to, or sceptical about, issues related to cooperation with Egypt in water resource management. For the governments of those countries, the political costs of accommodating Egypt's demands were too high in the face of the pressures on the part of political opposition groups that rejected Egypt's historical rights to Nile waters. It was not just that there were few political forces to countervail such pressures, such as an effective Egyptian presence in those countries or lobbies with enough weight to press effectively for the preservation of Egyptian rights and welfare. There was strong resistance to any agreement that would perpetuate the efficacy of treaties or agreements that these governments and societies believed impinged on their sovereignty. Since independence, these countries have declared their refusal to recognise all treaties that had been signed during the colonial period. Staunch opposition to the Egyptian stance on the Nile waters was a winning card in the political contests in most of the Nile Basin countries. This would become tangibly apparent in the results of Ethiopian legislative elections in 2010, during which campaigns, the issue of water cooperation with Egypt was one of the most heated topics. Many international reports attributed the electoral success of former prime minister Meles Zenawi and his party to his populist handling of this question. The trend in opposition to the existing formula of cooperation with Egypt had begun to climb since 2003 when the parliaments of three Nile Basin nations (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) voted to withdraw recognition from the existing water cooperation agreements with Egypt on the grounds that these agreements infringe on their national sovereignty as they render their development plans contingent on Egyptian approval.
CONNECTING THE DOTS: When we connect the dots between the domestic, regional and international situations, it becomes apparent that Ethiopia's escalatory moves towards Egypt at this time are based on a vision in which the Renaissance Dam is only a part. Addis Ababa is capitalising on a moment in which Egypt appears to lack many of the ingredients of a strong and regionally influential state in order to impose a de facto reality conducive to its development plans and its political ambitions to leverage itself as a regional power capable of promoting the interests of international powers and attracting large amounts of foreign investment. This moment, moreover, marks a critical juncture with respect to future cooperation over water resource management among the countries of the Nile Basin. In going ahead with the diversion of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia has effectively declared the end of the phase of exercising pressure on Egypt (through the interplay surrounding the Entebbe Agreement) and the beginning of a phase of imposing de facto realities on the part of upper riparian countries. This policy is ominous for the future of Egypt's share of Nile waters and the mechanisms of cooperation over water resource management, especially in light of recent reports that Uganda and Kenya are also planning to press ahead with dam construction projects. When we contemplate this picture as a whole, it becomes clear that the upper riparian countries of the Nile Basin are not just seeking to free themselves of the Egyptian “restriction” on their development projects, they are also determined to retain the support of the donor agencies and sponsors of the Nile Basin Initiative in order to secure funding and attract investments. In other words, they are playing a zero-sum game in which they get everything and Egypt gets nothing.
The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
