Remarks made by Abul-Ela Madi on 24 March, during the Wasat (Centre) Party's monthly cultural salon, stunned public opinion and ignited anger and suspicion among the ranks of Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS). Madi, who heads the Wasat Party, claimed that GIS had established a secret group of around 300,000 paid thugs that was handed over to the control of the now-defunct State Security apparatus seven years ago. These thugs, he said, were involved in the acts of vandalism and violence that occurred in front of the presidential palace and other places where anti-government demonstrations have taken place. To make matters worse, Madi said he learned the information on which his remarks were based from President Mohamed Morsi himself. Facing a barrage of criticism and calls for his prosecution Madi then insisted his remarks had been taken out of context though video footage of Madi speaking leaves no shadow of a doubt that he directly linked the gangs of thugs that he claimed were formed seven years ago to the political violence happening now. Yet Madi may have been the subject of more heat than was actually his due. He is not the originator of such ideas or the first to utter them. A number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders have issued statements or comments with similar substance. During a formal session of the former People's Assembly Mohamed Al-Beltagui, who is currently secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), proclaimed that the “intelligence apparatus of Hosni Mubarak” was the third party in ongoing political violence. More surprising is a recent statement by Hossam Badrawi, chairman of the dissolved National Democratic Party, insisting that fulul, or remnants of the old regime, are not behind the current security breakdown. While they may have the money, he argued, they lack the necessary information. Badrawi went on to suggest that both domestic and foreign security operatives are playing a part. The National Council for Human Rights had already issued its first report on the “Battle of the Camel” — the organised attack by pro-Mubarak forces against protesters in Tahrir on 2 February 2011 — prior to Badrawi's statements. It concluded that a special branch of the security apparatus did indeed employ thugs to trigger violence and foment chaos. The report echoed statements issued by Minister of Justice Mohamed Abdel-Aziz Al-Guindi shortly after his appointment, as well as allegations levelled against gang boss Sabri “Nakhnoukh” Helmi who was arrested last summer at the prompting of Al-Beltagui. A source close to the presidency told Al-Ahram Weekly that many relevant files were turned over the presidency after President Mohamed Morsi was sworn into office. The source did not confirm whether Al-Beltagui or others outside the president's office had access to these files. However, he did reveal that two months ago Morsi held a meeting with Al-Beltagui, Hatem Azzam and Essam Sultan during which the relationship between the security apparatus and the presidency was discussed at length. According to the source, Morsi voiced concern that the security apparatus was not being as cooperative as it should be, though he did not specify how. He stressed that the GIS, like the army, had been entirely above suspicion until, during mass demonstrations in front of the presidential palace, assistant director of the Office of the Presidency Asaad Al-Sheikh had lashed out against a GIS officer over his assessment of the situation. The source added: “I believe that the president alluded to that incident, but indirectly.” In an interview with the Weekly General Hossam Kheirallah, a former deputy director of GIS and head of its information and assessment department, said that in the course of his many contacts with colleagues last week he learned how deeply they resented the “irresponsible” remarks attributed to the president and individuals associated with the ruling party and parties close to it. Kheirallah had a palpable sense of the “disgruntlement caused by having to work in one of the country's most sensitive agencies in this type of climate”. According to Kheirallah, the GIS would not issue a statement in response to the remarks. He did, however, argue that the president should either hold officials who issue such statements to account or his office issue a statement clarifying the situation. If not, the head of GIS should tender his resignation. “In truth, though, I do not think things will reach this stage. The head of GIS is of high moral standing, a political man of the first order though he does not have claws.” With respect to Madi's allegations, Kheirallah said, “the GIS is a first rate intelligence agency. Nothing like this occurred during my more than 35 years with the organisation.” He pointed out that it would take up to 3,000 officers to control a 300,000 army of thugs and that the Central Security Forces, which has around 118,000 troops, were unable to prevent Black Bloc groups from paralysing the country. The very idea of an army of thugs “does not stand to reason”, he insists. Kheirallah stressed that it is not in the interests of the president to make remarks that could jeopardise national security to his associates. “Why didn't he bring up his concerns during his visit to GIS offices a month ago? He is opening up an opportunity for Egypt's enemies by working to undermine one of Egypt's most important agencies. It is the agency [GIS] that should serve as his guide, not the [Muslim Brotherhood] Guidance Bureau. By acting in this manner the president is helping to undermine an agency with a long record of patriotism. How can the agency continue to cooperate in the future with a presidency that remains bent on assassinating the agency in this manner?” The allegations against GIS have been perceived by some as part of a Muslim Brotherhood bid to seize control of the intelligence services and bend them to its own ends. Kheirallah holds that any attempt to “Brotherhoodise” the agency will inevitably fail because the army will not permit it. He said that during the first post-revolutionary interim period Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, as head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, issued a directive stating that the head of GIS had to have a military background. Retired General Sameh Seif Al-Yazal, a GIS official best known to the Egyptian public for his role in Raafat Al-Hagan's saga spying on Israel, shares Kheirallah's views. “There is a systematic operation targeting the GIS and its history,” he told the Weekly. “The Muslim Brotherhood is behind it. Their aim is to dissolve the agency or restructure it. They are working to shatter the trust between the agency and the people. But they have forgotten the respect and esteem the people have for the patriotic history of this agency.” Problems have arisen before due to the overlap between GIS's domestic and external functions, as have accusations regarding foul play at home. A notorious case arose under President Gamal Abdel-Nasser when the head of General Intelligence was Salah Nasr, one of Nasser's fellow Free Officers and a close friend of General Abdel-Hakim Amer. Although Nasr achieved unprecedented success in unearthing spies that worked for Israel and in spite of the fact that he had overseen the practical business of establishing, organising and equipping the intelligence agency, he ended up behind bars and the agency he structured was overhauled. General Seif Al-Yazal notes that GIS is legally prohibited from handling domestic issues that fall under the jurisdiction of other security agencies. Nevertheless, it is well known that the last chief of the GIS under Mubarak, the late General Omar Suleiman, did engage in domestic issues. He was certainly involved in government dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood, a file that he may have been personally in charge of. Other parties to the negotiations are still with us today and include current Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, former supreme guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef, Khairat Al-Shater, Saad Al-Husseini, Mahmoud Ezzat, Mahmoud Hussein and Mokhtar Nouh. “Suleiman,” says Seif Al-Yazal, “felt that he could persuade the Brothers to desist from politics for four years in exchange for the offer to take the place of the Salafis in the field of proselytising.” Selim Al-Awwa presented the proposed deal to Muslim Brotherhood leaders in prison but they turned it down because they felt that by remaining in prison they would gain more sympathy from abroad and more support for the candidates they fielded in parliamentary elections. According to Seif Al-Yazal the Muslim Brothers remain deeply concerned that records of these dealings and others are available to the GIS. Their anxiety increased when former minister of foreign affairs Ahmed Abul-Gheit announced that Suleiman had begun writing his memoirs, of which some 70 pages were dedicated to the Muslim Brotherhood. Another senior intelligence officer told the Weekly that while Suleiman had worked for Mubarak this did not mean that he was a yes-man. “On the contrary, Suleiman would often act to open Mubarak's eyes on various issues. In many meetings we would voice complaints to Suleiman who was always heedful of our opinions. He saw his role next to Mubarak as a professional duty and patriotic function. No one would be able to remain in the agency if they were found guilty of the simplest delinquency.” There have been other attempts to cast aspersions on Egypt's intelligence agencies. Some have argued that every foreign policy file in which GIS superseded the Foreign Ministry ended in failure. Others have pointed to the relationship between Egypt's intelligence agencies and their Israeli counterparts, Mosad and Aman, often citing Point of No Return, written by the Israeli Wernen Brogman, which speaks of the “strategic embrace” between the two countries' intelligence communities that began following the aborted assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Yet Israel, which mourned the passing of the Mubarak era, never mourned the death of Suleiman, though he was often photographed in the company of Israeli leaders. Remarking on this anomaly an intelligence officer who visited Israel many times in the company of Suleiman said that his boss had never trusted the Israelis. “He was determined to do his duty. That he sometimes intervened in the role of the Foreign Ministry is sometimes cited against him. But the fact is that we were performing our role indefatigably. At the end of the Mubarak era diplomatic channels were partly blocked yet everyone trusted Suleiman.” With regard to allegations such as those mentioned by Madi another GIS official told the Weekly: “We are not interested in responding to such remarks and we don't want to get into a debate over whether or not to call the president to account. What most people are not aware of is that the president of the republic is the head of the National Security apparatus, which is the only agency that works directly with the office of the presidency. It is true that the remarks by the chairman of the Centre Party were irresponsible and offensive to the agency. However, it is equally true that the Egyptian people know the true nature of this agency and appreciate its record of service to the nation.” The intelligence official went on to note that the agency was currently working with the president and that the relationship between the two had improved considerably since the beginning of the president's term. He also stressed that regardless of the difficulties it faces or the trials it is forced to endure GIS will never be diverted from its duties or flag in its responsibilities to the nation. General Fouad Allam, former deputy director of State Security, told the Weekly: “What surprised me was that it was Madi who made these remarks. I have the greatest respect for Madi and regard him as one of the most astute political figures. He has always worked to restore calm to the political climate, not to aggravate it. I asked myself, how could he treat the history and role of the agency in such an illogical way?” Allam added that there was not a grain of truth to the allegations. “If there is, then let them show us documented evidence. They control the institutions of government now and if anyone tells us otherwise we won't believe them. If we had a criminal organisation of thugs of that size they would have overthrown the revolution and the government and seized control of the country in 24 hours.”
