No impartial analyst can disregard or minimise the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the Palestinian cause ever since this issue appeared on the Arab and Islamic political horizon. This applies especially to that period that coincides with the first two decades in the life of the organisation founded by the Imam Hassan Al-Banna in 1928. From then until the 1948 war, the Palestinian cause was central to the Muslim Brotherhood's thinking and to its political practices and actions. There were many religious, political and geostrategic reasons why the Muslim Brothers attached such importance to this cause. As the land of the prophets, the city of Jerusalem the first of the two qiblas, and the home of Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third of the noble sanctuaries, Palestine occupies a large place in the system of the Islamic creed. Politically and morally, like other peoples of the region, the Muslim Brothers were moved by the plight of the Palestinian people that was brought on through the complicity between Britain, France and other Western colonial powers to promote the Zionist project in Palestine following the Balfour Declaration, leading to the establishment of Jewish settler colonies which would lay the underpinnings of the state of Israel and displacement of the Palestinians. Geostrategically, Palestine was the gateway to the defence of Egypt's national security along its eastern border and a crucial link between the Levant or the Mashreq, and North Africa or the Maghreb. For all these reasons combined, the Muslim Brotherhood's support for the Palestinian cause was genuine and consistent with the general ideology this society had espoused from the outset. Then, as now, it was a comprehensive proselytising political organisation that called for the liberation of Islamic lands from colonialist and foreign control. Palestine was one of the loci of colonialist activity and, therefore, the Palestinian problem was not merely a local or even an Arab cause but also one that concerned all Muslim peoples. Numerous declarations, statements and documents from this period confirmed that, in the eyes of the Muslim Brothers, this cause was and would remain an Islamic cause par excellence. They held that liberating Palestine through jihad and resistance against the Zionist enterprise was a holy duty incumbent upon all Muslims. This is evident in the writings of Al-Banna himself, and of many of those who succeeded him to the Brotherhood leadership until recent times. In actual practice, the Muslim Brothers, like other nationalist forces in Egypt, actively engaged in the struggle against the Zionist project in Palestine. The involvement occurred as early as the Palestinian riots of 1931, continued through the Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936-39 and increased following the UN partition resolution of 1947 and the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 following the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel. At all phases of the Palestinian national struggle, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt used all means at their disposal to serve the Palestinian cause. They held conferences and seminars, delivered sermons in mosques, contributed articles to the press to acquaint public opinion with the tragedy of Palestine and the nature of the Zionist movement and how to fight it. In addition, Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen and preachers lashed out at colonial powers for conspiring with Zionism and at the US for its early recognition of the Israeli state, while Muslim Brotherhood leaders sustained continual contact with Palestinian leaders, such as Amin Al-Husseini, and appealed to Arab governments to come to the rescue of Palestine. Some Muslim Brotherhood brigades managed to infiltrate into British controlled Palestine in order to take part in the fighting. In their efforts to defend the Palestinian cause, the Muslim Brotherhood pursued two courses of action. One was to pressure Arab governments to declare holy war against Zionism in order to liberate Palestine and force the Jews who had migrated there following World War I to return to their original homelands. The second involved active support for armed resistance, which included appeals to Arab governments to allow Islamic resistance forces to cross the border into Palestine to take part in the struggle. In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did not exclude Christian Arabs in their mobilisation drives and kept in contact with diverse patriotic forces and institutions. The Palestinian cause remained strongly present in the Muslim Brotherhood consciousness, even if the Arab nationalist and liberationist tide spearheaded by Gamal Abdel-Nasser took the lead in the Arab and Islamic worlds in the fight against colonialism and Zionism. Then, during the three decades that preceded the 25 January 2011 revolution, the Palestinian cause remained a platform for the Islamist and national opposition against the policies of the former regime, which inflicted grave damage to the Palestinian cause and served as a cornerstone for US-Israeli strategies to dominate the Middle East. The question today is whether the Muslim Brotherhood, following its resounding rise to power in Egypt, can sustain its policy towards the Palestinian cause. In other words, can the Muslim Brothers link their present with their past; their current position in the seats of government and responsibility with their history in the opposition and their record of defending the Palestinian cause? After all, surely being in the opposition affords greater freedom of movement and greater leeway to escalate the tenor of rhetoric, while being in government imposes a gamut of restrictions and pressures on policies and discourse. Certainly, too, the demands of power and government would seem to compel away from ideological absolutisms and ideals and towards pragmatism, flexibility and moderation in policies and decisions. Accordingly they would require at least a partial shift away from the strategies of demagoguery and mass mobilisation and towards a more rational weighing of options and priorities. However, another crucial development occurred since the 25 January Revolution, which is the entrance of a new factor into the contest between government and the opposition. The Egyptian people and public opinion are now active players in the field and cannot be ignored. Will these forces be able to pressure for change in pre-revolutionary policies with respect to the Palestinian cause and Israel, or will the Muslim Brotherhood government succeed in containing and/or circumventing popular demands with respect to these issues? The evidence so far suggests that Egypt is in a transitional phase with respect to foreign policy and policy towards Palestine and Israel. Policy cannot be said to be the same as it was before the revolution, at least in degree. But nor have the contours of a new phase in strategy or outlook coalesced. Egypt immediately withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv when Israel unleashed its latest attack on Gaza. It opened the crossings into Gaza in order to let in humanitarian relief and it allowed Egyptian and other Arab officials into Gaza to meet with Hamas officials. Egypt also mediated a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. However, in spite of all such measures, Egypt has still not entirely shed the mantel of the former regime with respect to the handling of this cause. Above all, it has yet to develop a new strategic outlook for the Palestinian cause and the settlement process in the framework of a drive to revive its regional role. Nevertheless, it is still premature to assess Egyptian policies on this crucial issue. I therefore counsel patience before passing judgement, even if, as the proverb has it, tomorrow looms closer to those who look ahead.
