Blood on the road to change

Events are evidence that waiting for change is more costly than fighting for change, and that fleeing from confrontations to avoid strife only results in more bloodshed

One year has passed since the Karbala-like clashes at Mohamed Mahmoud and blood is still being spilled – voluntarily or by force – for the sake of change.
The assault on protestors came on the heels of a million-strong demonstration on 18 February 2011 – although it did not block any roads or obstruct any movement – which triggered a crisis that escalated as thousands came to defend them and excessive force by the army and police killed dozens.
Demonstrators demanded that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) resign immediately and its members prosecuted.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and a handful of other groups refused to participate in the protests or support demonstrators for the sake of “stability” and to avoid “strife”, in the belief that it would be impossible to combine both the electoral process (the creator of alternative legitimacy) and protests (restricting military legitimacy). This negatively impacted forces advocating change and not all their demands were met, so they settled for an exact date to hold presidential elections.
For the sake of “stability” and “ending bloodshed” the military remained in power for a while longer during which they killed more people – some in clashes (such as the events at the cabinet headquarters and Mohamed Mahmoud 2), but most without confrontations such as the martyrs of Port Said whose numbers exceed all deaths during clashes with the military from Mohamed Mahmoud until the residents of Al-Qorsaya Island last week.
The Assiut train tragedy came as no surprise but a rather commonplace occurrence when viewed from three angles. First, historically because the accident was a continuation of (more than 20) train accidents that were less catastrophic in the past four months, and a continuation of a longer series of neglect by state institutions resulting in death.
Also, the failure of the bureaucracy to perform its primary tasks resulting in the sinking of a ferry, the Upper Egypt train accident, the burning down of cultural palaces, carcinogenic fertilisers, El-Deweiqa, an earthquake, terrorist attacks, the Shura Council fire, and others. Those in power did not probe these incidents or attempt to change the structures that caused these failures because this necessitates a confrontation with those who benefit from the status quo. The state avoids this to prevent bloodshed, but in actuality this evasion results in more spilled blood.
Second, is the social angle that reveals the link between this incident and strikes in the health sector and especially transportation sector. Strikes in the transportation sector demand revising wage structures and decreasing work hours (demands that were proven necessary and urgent in light of the accident since long shifts and low pay compel workers to seek extra work elsewhere). Also, the maintenance and reform of railway structures (another demand proven necessary in the absence of a means for protection and insurance).
The sit-in by doctors demanded more spending on the health sector to make hospitals more humane, a condition that was highlighted at the hospitals were the injured were taken for treatment.
The state continues to frown on strikes under the pretext of stability which it is seeking by placating more powerful actors (doctors did not demand wage increases that would burden state resources, but instead restructuring wages based on what the state already spends – which is almost all entirely spent on close advisers). The state claims lack of resources and thus, by seeking economic stability, is squandering what is more valuable than the economy.
The third angle is the political/administrative one in the absence of defined standard criteria for choosing officials. An example is how the governor of Assiut was chosen, since his only administrative qualification is that he is a member of the president's party but with no previous experience in political administration or local government. This job requires experience and qualification in management, and understanding the structure of the state, and there are already many party candidates in this governorate who are more active in politics (in the last parliamentary elections alone they won 12 seats). Thus, the party preferred to choose those it trusts instead of those who are qualified for the sake of calm and stability – yet it is another reason for bloodshed.
On foreign policy also, national independence requires Egypt to revise its actions to end its usefulness as “Israel's strategic treasure” and US hegemony so that decisions – foreign policy or others – are an expression of the will of the nation. One manifestation of independent foreign policy is changing the posture towards Palestine by adopting positions that champion Palestinian rights, Egyptian national security, as well as the resistance and their agenda. This is something the government avoided for months to avoid upsetting stronger powers on the regional and international stage (the US, Israel and their allies in the Gulf) to avoid their wrath from destabilising conditions.
The state did not take a neutral position but participated in weakening Gaza by continuing the barricade and attacking the tunnels and Sinai groups that sustain them (it did not make a distinction between groups that want to undermine the security of the country and those who back the resistance and protect Sinai which – because of Camp David – remained vacant of any army presence to protect it).
The state also allowed the passage of weapons shipments to Israel through the Suez Canal (according to a report published in Haaretz newspaper on 30 October). The outcome of these policies is that Israel found circumstances favourable for a massive military assault on the Gaza Strip where blood flowed – and continues to spill – in rivers.
In the face of war, the state was forced to try to shed covert understandings behind closed doors and was forced – albeit slowly – to go against the powerful, by beginning to revise its policies and extend some support to Gaza after the Gaza Strip paid a price higher than lives.
Thus, maintaining noxious conditions is far more costly than changing them and any desire to sustain hazardous conditions is impossibly delusional since these conditions are what triggered the revolution.
Efforts for change are based on society's fundamental rights and cannot be neglected, and a price must be paid to focus attention on them either voluntarily, through protests or demonstrations or sit-ins or strikes or changing policies, or forcibly by continuing to practice detrimental policies that pick victims at random even if they do not oppose it. The price of voluntary confrontations is lower than waiting passively.
Tamim Al-Barghouti wrote a poem after Gaza's previous victory over Israel and its steadfastness in the face of the assault in 2009. It reads: ‘War is calling on us; The warrior has survived as did those who in turnkilled; Yes, this is the will of God but; perhaps they would have all survived if they were all warriors'.