As the Palestinian leadership travels to New York to request membership in the United Nations on September 23, the familiar outlines of a future negotiated peace deal have been endlessly debated by op-eds writers, regional experts and government officials in the halls of power in Washington, Jerusalem and Ramallah. Most analysts and Middle East watchers believe the most intractable issues of the conflict are the fate of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the schism between Hamas and Fatah and the fate of two large Israeli settlement blocks—Ariel and Maale Adumim. One area of almost unanimous agreement is that any future Palestinian state must be demilitarized. Most argue that it is necessary for Israel's security. Yet Israel can easily maintain its qualitative military edge over any Palestinian army due to its innovative tactics, outstanding offensive capabilities and continued Western aid and support. In fact, a Palestinian military would ensure Israel's security. It would fill any power vacuum created in the West Bank or Gaza, strengthen the borders of a Palestinian state, foster security cooperation and trust between Israel and Palestine and promote a Palestinian unity necessary for any sustainable peace. “A Monopoly on Violence” In “Politics as a Vocation” German sociologist Max Weber argues that one condition of statehood is the retention of a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” and that to prevent anarchy, violence must remain a “means specific to the state.” It is imperative for the government to maintain legitimate sovereignty over the land and for the people to obey its authority to ensure order. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the modern Middle East. The state does not possess a “monopoly on violence” in Lebanon with disastrous results for its security and stability. The presence of foreign soldiers, armed militias and extremist groups in Lebanon perpetuated its civil war from 1975-1990 and was a major factor in the disastrous Israeli invasion in 1982, which led the rise of Hezbollah and greatly destabilized the wider region. It also enabled the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians by Christian militiamen in Beirut's Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in August 1982; an incident extremely harmful to Israel—its soldiers did not participate but surrounded the camps—whose perceived indifference to the slaughter severely damaged its image in international public opinion. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the country's feckless military, was unable to control southern Lebanon after Israel's withdrawal in 2000, which facilitated Hezbollah's dominance of the area. Hezbollah's hegemony over southern Lebanon led to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, which was destructive for both Lebanese and Israelis. The current chaos in the Sinai Peninsula provides another example of the importance for the state to maintain a monopoly on violence. The withdrawal of the Egyptian military in February after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak created a power vacuum filled by al-Qaeda inspired extremist organizations and other irredentist groups. The erosion of security in the region resulted in the deaths of seven Israelis and six Egyptian soldiers in an August 18 border incident. The episode provoked the ire of the Egyptian public and severely strained Egypt-Israel relations, currently at their lowest point in more than 30 years. Preservation of Palestinian Borders The greatest contemporary security threat to Israel is not posed by a large army massing on the Syrian, Egyptian or Jordanian border—as it was on the eve of the Six-Day War in 1967—but is presented by extremist and terrorist groups operating in the hinterlands of neighboring countries. Coincidentally, these groups also represent the gravest challenge to Palestinian stability and sovereignty. The absence of a Palestinian military would create porous borders and permit the infiltration of extremist groups into a nascent Palestinian state. It would endanger Israel's security by bolstering the influence of destabilizing actors like Iran—unlikely to open productive relations with Israel even after a comprehensive peace—and also compromise the sovereignty of Palestine by allowing regional powers to operate in its territory. A capable Palestinian military would preclude all of these outcomes and serve Israeli and Palestinian interests. The current security situation in Iraq offers a cautionary tale for a future Palestinian state. Iraq's military is unable to defend its airspace and borders or inhibit the inflow of men and materiel from Syria and Iran. This provides extremist groups free reign throughout Iraq, violates its sovereignty, prejudices its stability and weakens its position vis-à-vis neighbors like Iran. A similar situation in Palestine would be devastating for the security of Israel, Palestine and the wider region. Security Cooperation The creation of a Palestinian military would serve as a mechanism for Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, which would promote the trust, transparency and interdependence necessary for the success of any peace initiative. Increased separation between Israelis and Palestinians has diminished daily interactions between both peoples and fostered the cycle of mutual suspicion, dehumanization and violence that drives the conflict. Cooperation between the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, and the Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank has been crucial in the decline in attacks against Israel, increased stability in the West Bank and greater support for the Palestinian national cause in the international community. It has created an environment for robust Palestinian economic growth—the West Bank boasted a 9.2% GDP growth rate in 2010—and the political space necessary for the Palestinian Authority's non-violent movement against the Israeli occupation. Continued cooperation is imperative to maintain peace in the months and years following the creation of a Palestinian state. Israeli and Palestinian extremists are likely to take retaliatory measures to disrupt peace and manipulate raw emotions on both sides. Open communication and shared action by Israeli and Palestinian militaries would greatly diminish the likelihood of catastrophic events that would reignite the conflict. Moreover, Israeli military dominance of Palestinian borders, land and airspace will continue to fuel anger and resentment among the Palestinian people and in the Arab world writ large. A Palestinian military with control over its territory will serve as a source of pride for the Palestinian people and extinguish the shame and resentment that fuel the fire of extremism. Palestinian Unity Militaries are unifying institutions. They promote discipline, a collective national ethos and promote understanding and trust among people of different ethnicities, classes and religions. Of the many mistakes the United States made after its invasion of Iraq in 2003, the dissolution of the Iraqi military was the most egregious and harmful to American soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2—the American directive that disbanded the Iraqi army—excluded well-trained, well-armed veteran fighters from a productive role in the reconstruction of Iraq and facilitated their movement to insurgent groups and sectarian militias. It eradicated the only indigenous security force in Iraq and perpetuated the belief that the United States military was an occupying—not liberating—force. If a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse is reached and Hamas renounces violence—a prerequisite for any viable deal—the marginalization of former Hamas militants would quickly disrupt any negotiated peace. Co-opting them into a fledgling Palestinian military would allow for centralized control and observation of their behavior and would preclude the creation of any independent extremist groups or alternative centers of power. Additionally, while the ethnic and religious cleavages that plague Lebanese and Iraqi society do not exist in Palestine, the population of a Palestinian state will consist of many disparate groups—residents of the West Bank and Gaza, liberal secularists and conservative Islamists, refugees from camps in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and Palestinians from the diaspora. A military would serve as a unifying force in Palestinian society and would bridge the divides extant from more than six decades of displacement and instability. A New Approach Nearly twenty years after the Oslo Accords, Israelis and Palestinians are no closer to a comprehensive peace agreement. With negotiations paused and Arab revolutions overturning the regional order, hackneyed recommendations and conventional modes of thinking should be replaced by novel paradigms and innovate proposals for ending the conflict. The creation of a Palestinian military is such an idea and would serve Israeli and Palestinian interests and promote the stability, cooperation and unity necessary for a just and lasting peace. BM
