Did the recent elections halt the revolution? Not if it is seen as a process of ongoing change, writes Ahmed El-Tonsi* Everybody saw it coming, yet not with such a degree of success. This was basically the majority's comment on the victory of the Political Islamic trend in the People's Assembly elections in Egypt. This victory should not be viewed as a surprise because everybody inside and outside Egypt was expecting such a leading position for the Political Islamic trend, though with varying estimates of the number of voters and the trend's nominees. However, surprise has now come to the political landscape, including the winners in the elections, at the way the latter have become intoxicated with the results. There have been reactions ranging from apprehension to phobia among a great section of the population and among commentators. The media has intensified these feelings and attitudes, but the real surprise would nevertheless have been if any other trend had won in the elections. Neither a highly dispersed liberal trend, nor an ill-defined left, could have hoped to have won against a social movement that has been superbly institutionalised, has a national following, and has a large political appeal. In fact, a landslide victory for the Islamist trend was inevitable. Many seem to have forgotten that of all the contending parties the Muslim Brotherhood was the second oldest, second only to the Wafd, and it is the only political group that has actively existed for more than 80 years, despite the various setbacks it has experienced under the different ruling regimes. History tells that in many democratisation experiences the opposition to the former or ousted regime has usually won in the first free elections after that regime's fall. In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was the most sizable opposition group to the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak, and it was even able to assert itself against the former regime in the 2005 legislative elections, when it won 88 seats despite all the counter measures employed by the then ruling regime. The poor performances of the other political forces look unavoidable, in as much as they could not understand the realities of the political scene. Such poor performances both before and during the elections by the country's other political trends added much to the success of the Islamist trend. The reasons behind the other parties' poor performances are numerous, including the nature of these parties, their leadership, membership, finance and their lack of connection to the masses. The elections exposed the multiple inadequacies of the non- Islamist parties in Egypt, particularly those established prior to last year's Revolution. Many of these parties were not fully- fledged political parties in the western sense of political movements appealing to certain societal segments or interests and having a well-differentiated ideology or programme. The relatively high participation rate in the elections, compared to previous elections, would be less impressive were it to be compared to the higher turnouts in other recently democratised countries, such as in the Eastern European countries after the fall of Communism. Such initially high turnouts in the ex-Communist European states, particularly in the first free elections, were attributed to euphoria at the new democracies, resulting in a mean turnout of 70 per cent in six newly democratised countries, with the mean for established democracies being almost 81 per cent. In Tunisia's elections in late October last year, there was an extraordinary turnout of more than 90 per cent of registered voters. In other words, the turnout in the Egyptian elections should have been higher, even as the negative impacts of hindering factors, such as unstable security conditions, have been shown to be exaggerated. Yet, the initially high turnouts in the ex-Communist countries fell in later elections, something that has been ascribed to tightening economic conditions calming the initial euphoria. In Egypt, such euphoria has not been consistent through the various rounds of the elections, or even through the entire transition period. It is unimaginable that almost half (46 per cent) of eligible Egyptians should not have cast their votes in the most important elections they had seen in their lives thus far, had they really been euphoric about democracy and the Revolution. The relatively low turnout may have been due to the fact that some people may still have been concerned about the path being taken by the political transition and the ability of elections to yield more favourable security condition, political stability and more egalitarian economic conditions. Egyptians in the early days of the revolution were euphoric about its objectives and its ability to bring about social justice. However, since then very limited progress has been achieved, something that has added to the frustration of the masses, as well as to that of the revolutionaries. Sweeping popular disenchantment with the achievements of the revolution may be a major reason for the relatively low turnout. Moreover, the elections reflected a shrinking level of national consensus from the high levels seen during the 18 days of the revolution. It is not necessary to recall the three original partners of the revolution -- the young revolutionaries, the masses and the army -- in order to see that mutual mistrust and confrontation have now replaced consensus. The three partners have mixed attitudes towards each other, towards the Revolution, and towards the future. In such an atmosphere of mutual accusation, with allegations of conspiracies, killings and foreign hands doing the rounds of all three, it is a hard task to maintain precarious national cohesion. As a result, for many among the masses the Islamist trend may well have looked like the last, if not the only, alternative to the status quo with its growing complexities and uncertainties. This may also partially explain the sweeping success of the Salafis, who have only recently entered the political arena, sensing the near bankruptcy of other political trends or forces. Statistical analyses of the demographics of the voters are of great importance in identifying the age groups that refrained from participating in the elections. However, the demography of Egypt, with its characteristic and explosive youth bulge, may also be a possible explanation for the relatively low turnout. In other words, it could have been guessed at that many young people would not vote in the elections, probably boycotting them, particularly in their final rounds. It is obvious that many youthful voters refrained from casting their votes because they sensed that the Islamist trend's victory was inevitable. This boycotting of the elections by sections of the country's youth was evident in the elections for the upper chamber of the parliament, when the turnout was at the same low level as before the January Revolution. Such disaffection may also explain the antipathy expressed by the youth in their last Friday demonstration, when many denounced the Muslim Brotherhood for what they said was the group's "betrayal" of the revolution. Such antipathy may reflect frustration at the path the Revolution has been taking and the way in which the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been managing the transition period, helping to achieve the "containment" of the revolution and the victory of the Islamist trend in the legislative elections. In a country's first free elections in which 60 per cent of the population is under the age of 30, such low turnouts signify declining enthusiasm for elections as a way of achieving the revolution's goals. More important still is the fact that some young people may now not identify the People's Assembly as the only source of legitimacy, a development that will lead to the continuation of contentious politics in different forms. This will add to the pressure on the newly established legislature and will be a source of potential conflict between the two major political blocs of the Islamist trend and the youth. The Islamist trend has concerns about the continuation of the Revolution and the actions of its adherents, and it will do its best to contain and even to outlaw calls for its continuation, as expressed in the different forms of protest. Have the elections marked the end of the revolution? No is the straightforward answer to this question. The revolution has not concluded, if one sees it as a process of transforming the former regime into a new and democratic political system with a more egalitarian economic order that is more responsive to the needs of different social classes. This transformation cannot be achieved in a single year, or with the completion of a single step, regardless of its importance, since there are other overlapping political, economic and societal paths that need to be taken into account. For the moment, these other paths, economic and societal, have been left almost untouched. In other words, the main causes of the revolution have not been adequately addressed. As a result, these causes are now adding momentum to the continuation of the revolution, rather than allowing it to finish in the establishment of new political institutions. Nevertheless, recent events, including the calls for civil disobedience and a general strike that mostly went unanswered by the masses, do reflect the declining clout of the revolutionaries as leading agents of change. The revolutionaries have not been able to devise consensus-building slogans that can mobilise the masses. Moreover, they have not been able to develop forms of political action that can act on their newly adopted slogans. Instead, they have identified a different historical event, that of March 1954, which took place in an utterly different context, recalling it for a different end. One might have expected the same kind of analogy to be used by the politicians of the former regime, who also had a kind of déjà-vu orientation. The revolutionaries' devising of an analogy between the two different events is absurd. By entangling themselves in the web of political forces that has grown up since the Revolution they have obviously exhausted themselves as effective revolutionary leaders. Instead of thinking outside the box, they have rendered themselves prey to other political forces. Free-riding on the revolution and the revolutionaries has become common practice, and many have benefited from the rising revolutionary tide. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries have worked as an interest group, trying to influence the ruling SCAF into taking decisions in response to revolutionary demands, their main political activity since the ousting of Mubarak. While this strategy had yielded results to the extent that the SCAF has on occasions preemptively endorsed the requests of the revolutionaries on the eve of their Friday demonstrations, this role of acting as an interest group rather than anything more has deprived the revolutionaries of the initiative of leading the masses. Instead of acting as a leader, the revolutionaries have become reactive, not pro- active, in responding to the demands of the political forces, whose policy has been to try to mobilise the masses. First tacitly, and then relentlessly, criticism has been directed towards the revolutionaries, almost ending the national consensus that had been built around their emancipatory role during the 18 days of the revolution. Gradually, some parts of the now-radicalised masses have distanced themselves from the revolutionaries and found themselves embroiled in tragic confrontations with the army and the police, starting from the Israeli embassy incidents in September last year onwards. The revolutionaries' march on the SCAF in July last year marked their gradual loss of control over the masses. Put differently, some revolutionaries have reached a critical juncture at which they feel they cannot continue further without taking unavoidable risks. Equally, others have felt they cannot retreat back to past strongholds when many other forces are already escalating their protests in reaction to the Revolution's unfulfilled demands to levels beyond the control of the revolutionaries. This was evident in the series of incidents culminating in the Mohamed Mahmoud Street clashes, when the revolutionaries looked on at the actions of the protesters. Some revolutionaries were unsuccessful in convincing the protesters to move back to Tahrir Square, where they first made the revolution, something that starkly illustrated the declining influence of the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries accordingly are left with no other option but to unite and to find their own political platform. They should learn from their own short past to do this alone and to shy away from free-riders. The contribution of the current generation of young revolutionaries has been unparalleled in the history of Egypt, at least in recent centuries. Helping to emancipate the masses from the old model of governance through a truly popular movement from below has been the most important change brought about by the youth. This has been the most important transformative change that has happened in Egypt in centuries. It was the work of the youth, and nobody can deny that the youth has written a new chapter in Egypt's history. Another major contribution made by the youth has been the formulation of the revolution's slogan of "change, liberty and social justice," which crystallised the aspirations of a nation yearning to find its deserved place under the sun. This slogan has something of the same power as the famous slogan of the French Revolution of "liberty, equality and fraternity." It represents a new basis for Egypt's soft power that will inevitably impact its sphere(s) of influence and its role in the contemporary world. This fact has been carefully noted by many powers on both the regional and global levels, some of them fearing the repercussions of events in Egypt on their own outdated regimes. Many people have read history, yet few of us can recall similar moments of change in Egypt's fortunes and in its regional and global geopolitical position. In spite of all the uncertainties currently casting their shadows over the political scene, the new generation will eventually triumph. Despite the many tactical difficulties the revolution has passed through, it has nevertheless been a strategic success that has changed Egypt. * The writer is a political commentator.
