Tunisia's head of the Supreme Authority for Elections speaks to Karem Yehia about general elections due Sunday and steps taken so far in the country's transition to democracy How can you prepare for important elections, such as the general elections for the National Constituent Council in less than five days, where Tunisians will vote for the first time since the 14 January 2011 Revolution, inside the country and abroad? And what is the plan of the first independent authority charged with restoring confidence in elections after 55 years, where previously all referendums and elections were under the control of the Ministry of Interior? The Independent Supreme Authority for Elections of the Constituent Council (ISAECC) is the Tunisian body formed by executive order of Interim President Fouad Al-Mobzie to oversee the country's first post-revolution general elections, to be held on 23 October. The resulting Constituent Council will be responsible for writing a new constitution for Tunisia. ISAECC convened its first meeting on 18 May, after one month of disputes over choosing its 18 members and electing its chairman. When it realised it could not hold transparent multi-party elections on the previously set deadline of 24 July, intense controversy erupted. The media and political forces went on the attack, accusing it of holding back the transition to democracy and extending the first interim phase that ends with electing a new president and forming a new government.ISAECC Chairman Kamal is a prominent Arab human rights activist and an opponent of deposed President Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali, who has visited many Arab capitals, including Cairo, to meet with intellectuals and members of civil society. He lived in exile for nearly 17 years and was banned from returning home or renewing his passport, but although he could not enter Tunisia until Bin Ali left, is very popular among the younger generation. Why was there such intense controversy over postponing the elections? On 20 May, two days after the first meeting of ISAECC, we declared in all honesty that we would not be able to guarantee transparent multi-party elections on the previously arranged deadline (of 24 July). At the time, they said it was a catastrophe and we were accused of being responsible for lack of security, irresponsibility and ineptitude. In reality, it was impossible to organise elections within two months that for the first time would not be manipulated by the Ministry of Interior, because we had to prepare new correct voter lists that did not include hundreds of thousands of dead people. At the same time, there was no true administration in the country; previously it was basically the Ministry of Interior sponsoring a false celebration, nothing more. So our first challenge was creating authentic voter lists; the second was to create an independent administration for the election process. We were intensely criticised for postponing the elections, including by the interim government itself, but on 8 June when we announced the new election date, work began right away. Were you assisted by the state or did you face obstacles? The state was helpful, but not as much as we wanted. In the beginning, just finding a headquarters for ISAECC with a capacity of 100 offices was a problem. We also had trouble finding staff once we realised that all those who were qualified in the administration were members of the Constitutional Party that was dissolved. (They are estimated at two million out of the country's population of 10 million). How did you resolve this problem? We divided Tunisia into 27 electoral districts as well as six districts overseas, and created a branch electoral office for each district. We spent an entire month composing this structure to ensure that we have picked qualified, unbiased people (378 out of 4,300 applicants for membership of these branch offices). For example, we hired 4,000 unemployed university graduates to register voters and opened 800 computerised registration offices. Once this was completed on 12 August, more than four million voters were registered out of an estimated seven million eligible voters, as well as 300,000 voters abroad. How did you decide on the electoral districts? Political consensus inside the Supreme Council for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution resulted in adopting party, coalition and independent election lists and the division of electoral districts. (elections will not be contested based on individual seats). Each seat will represent 60,000 voters, and according to the administrative map of the country, there are 23 governorates and each represents a district with the exception of three governorates [Tunis, Sfax and Nablus] which will be represented by two electoral districts. The seats in each district vary from four to 10 seats depending on the number of voters, adding up to 199 seats inside Tunisia and 18 seats abroad. How do you work in tandem with the administration? The administration has nothing to do with the electoral process except for what is mentioned in the decree forming ISAECC that stipulates that the administration must assist us. It is a role of assistance when needed. The most important government bodies we have called on for assistance are the ministries of education, foreign affairs and justice. We also met regularly with officials from the ministries of interior and defence to ensure protection for 4,500 centres and 8,000 ballot stations across the country. How were the people who will oversee the balloting process chosen? What are the criteria to ascertain their impartiality? We wrote up the criteria that would guarantee objectivity and professionalism, including not having participated in organising any previous fabricated elections and not being a member of any political party. The problem is that we needed nearly 30,000 chiefs and assistants for ballot stations, which is a large number needed to run the elections. We trained them and primarily chose teachers and we were assisted in this task by the Ministry of Education and unions. What is the basis for the electoral system on 23 October? There is no pre-prepared model; in actuality we began at square one. We do not have a notable heritage of elections that can be applied. The decree creating ISAECC and defining its mission presented us with a challenge to sever all ties with the past. We looked at practices in other countries and sought the advice of experts who came to Tunisia, including ones from the UN, EU and specialised international and non-governmental organisations. In the end, each election process has its own characteristics, and there is no single model that is ideal for us. More importantly, we needed to gather data in the field and prepare qualified staff in the field. There is a dispute about the list system. Many Tunisians claim that this is a structure designed so that no single party is able to win an absolute majority of seats. Yes, that is correct. This structure was specifically designed for that purpose. We do not want to return to a system of giving one person absolute power or allowing one party to monopolise power. The system that was issued by presidential decree is based on a proposal by the Supreme Authority for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution headed by Ayad Bin Ashour -- election by partial lists in a number of districts, not by making the entire country one district. If one partial list wins 30 per cent of the seats across the country, on the district level this does not give you more than 20 per cent of the seats. The remainder encourages smaller parties. In this way, the electoral system was designed to encourage these parties and all formations, as well as women to participate in politics. I expect that the percentage of women in the Constituent Council will be around 20-30 per cent. There is concern that allowing all 111 parties to participate, and with so many lists, voters will be confused and create a Constituent Council that reflects a very fractured political reality. The percentages on the electoral lists are as follows: 50 per cent parties, 45 per cent independents and five per cent party alliances and coalitions. Only 15 parties submitted nominations that cover all districts. I agree that the large number of parties that were issued licenses by the Ministry of Interior after the revolution will create a form of "political fluidity", and this may have been done on purpose. The irony is that political life is being recreated according to the same law [of 1992] under the supervision of the same people [a committee at the Ministry of Interior] who applied Bin Ali's previous law of starving party life. How will you impose a boycott on Bin Ali's men in these elections, and how can you guarantee that it will be properly enforced, especially since there is a legal suit asserting that 46 new parties are founded by members of the former ruling party, whether they be Burqeba or Bin Ali's men? The decrees issued after the revolution ban government officials and leaders of the Constitutional Al-Tajammu Parties over the past 23 years (Bin Ali's rule) from running in the elections, which includes those who were in charge of small cells or sections. Anyone who called on the deposed president to renominate himself for another presidential term is also banned from running. Has a list been issued with the names of those who are banned? We wrote up a list of tens of thousands of names. What if some of them are added surreptitiously to an electoral list? Anyone who disobeys this rule is subject to six months in prison and cancellation of his candidacy. Are mosques and places of worship being used for election campaigns at a time when the Islamic trend is expected to receive the largest number of seats? The decree regulating these elections bans the use of houses of worship as venues for party and election campaigning. According to the political party law, several parties were denied a licence because they said they have "a religious agenda", such as Al-Tahrir Party. There is much controversy about political funds in these elections. There are accusations against various parties that they are being funded by the US, France, Gulf States or even local businessmen who were closely connected to Bin Ali's regime. The authority I'm in charge of has no mandate on political funds, according to the decree that created it. Our mandate pertains to the ceiling of campaign spending and the necessary supervision of this, and therefore we decided, for example, that the state will grant each of the smaller districts of 200,000 voters 35 Tunisian dinars (about $25) for each voter, at a total cost of about 10 million dinars across the country. We decided that maximum campaign spending cannot exceed three times the amount the state will grant to each electoral list. Do you have any way of monitoring that these rules are obeyed? We have the authority to oversee this process and we rely on the Ministry of Finance, but there are problems, including the fact that we were unable to prevent political commercials in the media before the official launch of election campaigning on 1 October. What will happen to anyone who violates the ceiling of campaign spending? There are degrees of penalties starting with a warning, removing campaign publicity and finally legal action. Does the decree creating the election authority deal with campaign bribes? No, it doesn't. This issue has not been discussed by the authority. Perhaps this is an oversight on our part, but I want to make it clear that bribes were never an issue in Tunisia's elections in the past except by the regime itself, simply because there was no real competition between candidates. Back to the controversy about foreign funding of elections... Just because there are parties with many offices this does not mean that they receive funds from abroad. We could keep tabs on foreign money if it came into the country through normal channels such as banks. We only hear rumours; what is certain is that this money did not enter the country through traditional channels. This does not mean that these foreign funds do not exist, but we don't have evidence or documents to prove it. What is certain is that there are businessmen supporting specific parties. Are concerns about the Constitutional Tajammu Parties exaggerated? These are many and divided parties that lack a united leadership and coordination. They have nothing to offer to the people of Tunisia. Naturally, there are those who want to revive the Burqeba doctrine, but perhaps the remnants of the dissolved ruling party have a domestic network on the level of families, clans and tribes. They will be represented in the Constituent Council, but will not carry much weight. Is there disagreement inside ISAECC or outside agencies about allowing foreign monitors during the upcoming elections? This issue was settled since the beginning by consensus inside the Authority for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution. There is consensus among the public also about allowing local and foreign monitors during the election. We believe that this step is one of the guarantees that the electoral process will be successful and ensure its transparency, integrity and democratic character. We issued a [charter] modeled on ones in other countries. What about previous opinion polls that suggested postponing the elections? Many observers warn against this. I too do not believe that they have a scientific basis or credible methodology. These are only indicators, nothing more, and in no way should we make assumptions on their results. As for the steps we took, we banned the publication of any poll results once the campaigns were launched on 1 October. What are your expectations for voter turnout on 23 October? I expect extensive participation and a 60-70 per cent turnout. What is your view of this Tunisian event as part of the Arab world? It is difficult to evaluate this step so early on. We are turning over a new leaf and writing the first letters on a blank page. This experiment is dependent on domestic economic and security conditions as well as regional circumstances. We thank God for developments in Libya; Gaddafi was a threat to our revolution. Meanwhile, we have another neighbour that has their own views about Tunisia's transition to democracy. So far, we cannot claim that Algeria has any political intentions opposing the 23 October elections. Today I found out that Algeria will allow Tunisians there to vote. In general, as Tunisians we are aware of the anticipation around the world about what is taking place here; it is perhaps a pioneer experiment in the Arab world, but we must remain modest. These elections will place Tunisia on the threshold of the second interim phase after the revolution. This phase is rooted in legitimacy through elections and it could be used as a model for comparison, nothing more. In no way are we presenting a ready-made model to export to the Arab world despite the common factors we share. Naturally, there are specific issues pertaining to culture, political history, social composition and socio-ethnicity. Luckily, for example, Tunisia does not have any minorities. In the end, the Tunisian experience is the outcome of Tunisians themselves and conditions in Tunisia. This does not prevent any other Arab people from viewing it with approving or critical eyes.
