Crucial battles are currently underway in Iran's religious and political establishment, away from the reach of the television cameras, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The final days of 2009 brought a dramatic shift in Iran's domestic equation, creating a situation very different from the one that had prevailed only a few weeks earlier. New sets of rules have come into play on the Iranian political scene, which has been transformed into a three-sided dynamic consisting of grassroots activism, competition in the religious establishment and the power conflict at the upper echelons of the Iranian state. As the world followed the scenes of the mass protests that swept Iran's major cities last year, media hostile to the Iranian regime proclaimed its immanent fall, while pro-Iranian media shrugged off the demonstrations as the work of "outlaws" and "agents of the West". If one side was vulnerable to an excess of optimism unsustained by realities on the ground, the other was gripped by a spirit of denial that ignored the political meaning of the demonstrations. In both cases, prejudice outweighed objectivity and one- dimensional media images overshadowed details that combine to create a much more complex picture. As the pro- and anti- Ahmadinejad camps clashed over the import of the scenes taking place in front of the television cameras, they also lost sight of the other two legs of the Iranian political triangle. Two other crucial battles are unfolding more subtly, away from the eyes of the cameras, in the religious and the political establishments. One is the contest over moral and spiritual authority being waged by Grand Ayatollah Youssef Sanei. The other is the struggle for survival in the upper echelons of the Iranian political and decision-making structures. The chief protagonist here is Hashemi Rafsanjani and his success or failure will to a considerable extent shape the future of domestic power in Iran. MOUSAVI AT THE CROSSROADS OF AN IMPASSE: Former Iranian prime minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi was thrust to the fore of the Iranian political stage following the 10th presidential elections. The official results of these elections, in which Mousavi presented himself as the reformist candidate, triggered widespread protests among reformists against alleged electoral fraud and the "forging of the will of the electorate." Refusing to cave in to pressure to bow before the official outcome of the polls, Mousavi succeeded in sustaining his protest against the proclaimed winner, Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards behind him. Over the following months, the Iranian president adamantly persisted in ignoring the demands of the demonstrators, formed an ideologically uniform hard-line government and lashed out at the reformists as traitors amidst tightened security measures. Up to December last year, the opposition had been reduced to weak and sporadic outbursts. However, the funeral ceremonies for the late Ayatollah Hussein Ali Muntazari and the commemoration of Ashura in the same month afforded opportunities to make its presence felt. The Iranian opposition has various weak points, foremost among them the lack of a charismatic leader capable of rallying widespread mass support. Mousavi's popularity pales next to that of Ayatollah Khomeini, and beyond this there is an organisational problem. Both the Khomeini and Mousavi opposition movements availed themselves of the technology of the age -- cassette tapes conveyed the exiled Khomeini's voice and views to the people before 1979, while the Internet and Facebook were Mousavi's means of connecting with supporters in 2009. Mousavi also has had the advantage of modern technology to mobilise demonstrations on days when mass assemblies are possible in Iran, and these are quite frequent in the autumn and winter. Demonstrators prepared themselves to take advantage of the ceremonies surrounding Ashura in December, just as they had geared themselves up for Students' Day in October and Jerusalem Day in September. And already the government is taking precautions against opposition rallies during the week-long commemoration of the Iranian revolution in February. However, it will be several months before such an official occasion presents itself again, and they will have to wait until the commemoration of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini himself in June. This need to rely on state holidays in order to express its demands raises doubts over the opposition's ability to sustain its impetus. A third problem is that unlike Khomeini Mousavi is not leading a revolution and only wants to introduce reforms. Mousavi is not selling an ideology. Unlike Khomeini, who broadcast his appeals from Paris, Mousavi is in Tehran and within the reach of the Iranian authorities. Thus, in addition to its lack of a sufficiently charismatic leadership and its incapacity to sustain itself organisationally, the opposition also lacks a sufficiently radical agenda, and its leadership lacks manoeuvrability in pressing for its demands. However, the climate in Iran today cannot be compared with the massive revolutionary tide that prevailed in pre-1979 Iran. In his final years, the Shah had lost contact with the Iranian people, and the welfare and security of the regime rested solely upon a narrow class of business magnates and an even smaller coterie of senior army officers. Today, supporters of the Iranian regime number in their millions, whether they are drawn by the Shia Islamist ideology of the regime, or have vested interests in it as state employees, who in themselves number in the millions. When the regime's proficiency in securing the satisfaction of broad segments of the populace by channeling a significant chunk of the country's huge oil revenues into subsidising essential goods is added, the dynamic in Iran today becomes even more apparent. This is not a case of a regime that is isolated from its people and faces opponents who have massive popular support. Rather, it is the case of an opposition drawn from certain strata of society against a regime that enjoys massive support among other strata of society, and this poses complications for the opposition's mission. Moreover, on top of its millions of supporters, the regime has another important asset to draw on, which is its military might as embodied in the Republican Guards. That the regime has not yet had to resort to this army in itself is significant and signifies that its dilemma has not yet reached the magnitude of an existential crisis. Today's Iranian opposition has not been able expand into a broadly-based civil-disobedience movement or even to attract new segments of society into its ranks. Nevertheless, Mir- Hussein Mousavi's five-point initiative issued in the wake of the violent suppression of the latest round of protests demonstrates an acute awareness of the opposition's weak points. In addition to the points above, the opposition also lacks an explicit ideological framework. Although it largely draws its support from the urban upper-middle classes, it still consists of a relatively loose mosaic of different age groups and political outlooks. As such, it cannot afford to hamper itself within an ideological straightjacket, and Mousavi's initiative has struck chords that can win the broadest possible unanimity without leading to a splintering of this mosaic. Mousavi has therefore insisted that the executive, parliamentary and judicial authorities should assume responsibility for the suppression of the demonstrations. He has also called upon the government to ensure free and transparent elections, to free political detainees, to guarantee the freedom of the press, and to acknowledge the people's right to freedom of opinion. As ideologically broad as these initiatives are, they nevertheless raise the tenor of the opposition's challenge. This applies especially to the first demand, which was clearly intended to sustain the opposition's impetus, for the three branches of government could not possibly accept responsibility for the consequences of the violent suppression of the demonstrations without handing the opposition a clear victory. Naturally, the prospect of such an eventuality is very weak in the light of the current domestic balance of power. The other four demands, while popular, offer little that is new or particularly defiant. Nevertheless, when the former conservative presidential candidate Mohsen Rizai took this statement as proof that Mousavi did not pose a challenge to the revolutionary order, the editor-in-chief of the conservative Kayhan newspaper, Hussein Shariatmadari, who is close to the Office of the Supreme Guide, lashed out vehemently at what he saw as an attempt to mediate between the protesters and the government. Although the regime's rejection of Mousavi's initiative could have been expected, it is interesting to contemplate what it might have accomplished had it acted otherwise. For one thing, if the regime had engaged the opposition in dialogue, even under certain stipulated conditions, it would probably have succeeded in exposing the contradictions in interests and outlooks among the diverse groups that make up the opposition camp, while simultaneously preventing any further deterioration in its image in the region and abroad. The opposition's major strengths, therefore, have been its ability to embarrass the regime abroad and to dent the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad presidency at home, even if the demonstrations have done nothing so far to shake the regime's grip on the key instruments of power. More importantly, however, with the end of the era of an establishment that embraced "conservative" and "reformist" wings and the drawing of the battle lines between "the system" and "the opposition," a domestically based opposition movement has become a factor in Iran's internal political equation. This is the opposition's chief accomplishment so far. GRAND AYATOLLAH YOUSSEF SANIE AND THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT: Religion has such a pervasive influence on politics in modern Iran that it is virtually impossible to separate the two. This applies not just to the post-revolutionary era, but also to the country's modern history throughout the 20th century. So closely are religion and politics intertwined that the balance within the religious establishment is a prime indicator of the balance within the political establishment as a whole. The reform movement found in Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Muntazari a unique and powerful spiritual authority with which they could arm themselves ideologically against the fundamentalist hard-liners. Muntazari, who spent 20 years under house arrest from his falling-out with Khomeini in 1989 until his death in 2009, was a vehement opponent of the regime, but his opposition rested on a theological basis. With his death in December, the reformists lost a major spiritual and political symbol and felt that they had suffered a moral setback in the face of their adversaries. Although the Grand Ayatollah's son Said Muntazari declared that Mousavi should replace Ahmadinejad as president in order to restore calm to the country, his support did not furnish the opposition with the same spiritual and political immunity as his father's had done earlier. The opposition therefore turned to Grand Ayatollah Youssef Sanie to fill the gap left by Muntazari's death. Had the latter's followers transferred their allegiance to Sanei, Sanei would have become one of the most influential ayatollahs in Iran and elsewhere. In Shia tradition, an ayatollah's disciples and followers entrust a fifth of their profits to him for use in religious education and other religious affairs, and they look to him as their guide and mentor in all matters, both spiritual and mundane. Upon an ayatollah's death, this allegiance is transferred to another religious authority. Born in 1937 in a village on the outskirts of Isfahan, Grand Ayatollah Youssef Sanei was born into a family of clerics. His grandfather, Ayatollah Hajj Mulla Youssef, was a devout and widely respected cleric of his time, who had been tutored in philosophy by the eminent Iranian philosopher Jahangir Khan and in Islamic jurisprudence by Grand Ayatollah Mirza Habibullah Rashti. Sanei's father, Hujjat Al-Islam Mohamed Ali Sanei, was also a prominent religious scholar, and his son followed in the family tradition. Following preparatory studies at a seminary in Isfahan from 1946 to 1951, Sanei transferred to the Qom seminary where he was soon awarded the title of Thiqat Al-Islam (trustee of Islam). In 1955, he ranked first in the advanced level examination, for which he was awarded the title Hujjat Al-Islam (expert on Islam) and received the commendation of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the leading Shia spiritual authority in the world until 1961. Sanei continued his studies at the hands of the top Shia theologians of the day, such as Grand Ayatollahs Borujerdi, Mohaqeq Damad and Araki, as well as with Imam Khomeini. In keeping with his record of outstanding achievement, he obtained the ijtihad degree, qualifying him as an ayatollah, at the age of only 23. In 1975, he began his formal career as a lecturer in divinity, in the course of which he attracted numerous disciples and followers, many of whom went on to become eminent seminarians and officials in the religious and post- revolutionary political establishment. A prolific writer, among Sanei's most important works are The Disciple's Beacon, The Essence of Thoughts, A Selection of Islamic Laws, One Hundred and Ten Questions on the Pilgrimage, and a ten-volume series on contemporary jurisprudence. In these and other writings, Sanei airs his progressive views, notably on the equality between men and women and between Muslims and non-Muslims. Sanei has also been an active supporter of the reformist trend. Before the presidential elections in June, Sanei invited the reformist candidate, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, to his home and honoured him with the praise, "you are the fruit of the life of Imam Khomeini in politics and the management of the affairs of society." Mousavi returned this high compliment with the words, "you are a great spiritual authority, for whom I have always had the deepest affection." Sanie became more resolute in his support for Mousavi and the reformists following the death of Muntazari and the mass turnout for the funeral ceremonies of the late Grand Ayatollah in Qom and elsewhere, which doubled as an occasion for reformist demonstrations. That Sanie had decided to fill the vacuum left by Muntazari was evident from the telegram that conveyed his condolences, which, in the tradition of the Shia religious establishment, carried far broader political and religious implications. It is little wonder, therefore, that this telegram should have triggered such a speedy response from pro-Ahmadinejad supporters within the religious establishment. The Association of Seminarians at Qom, which is closely connected to the Ahmadinejad camp, issued a statement declaring that Sanei lacked the qualifications necessary for the post of marja'iya (a spiritual authority in Shia Islam). This position was quickly supported in a sermon delivered by the hardline fundamentalist Ayatollah Ahmed Khatami in Tehran. However, Sanei was not without some prominent supporters of his own in the religious establishment. The pro-reformist cleric Ayatollah Tahiri, formerly responsible for delivering the Friday sermon in Isfahan, and the Society of Fighting Clerics, to which former Iranian president Mohamed Khatami and presidential candidate Karroubi belonged, upheld Sanei's credentials. When asked about the statement by the Association of Seminarians at Qom, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, residing in Iraq, responded that the association was not an agency that could designate religious authorities. The response of this eminent Shia figure can also be taken as an expression of support for Sanei. Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi and Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardibeli were even more explicit, stating that Sanei did indeed possess the necessary qualifications to serve as marjaa lil- taqlid (an authority to be emulated) and, hence, merited the title of Grand Ayatollah. Clearly, the dispute over Sanei's credentials has thrown into relief a fault line between Ahmadinejad's supporters and reformists in the Shiite religious establishment. The former are led by Ayatollahs Misbah Yazdi and Nouri Hamdani and the latter by Ayatollahs Zanjani Mousavi and Youssef Sanei. Among the more prominent religious figures to remain on the fence are Grand Ayatollahs Wasafi Kalbaykani, Wahid Kharasani and Jawadi Ameli. The rise of Youssef Sanie to the rank of Grand Ayatollah could give the reformist camp a stronger hand within the religious establishment than it has in the streets. The clerics may receive only a fifth of believers' profits to be spent on seminaries and religious affairs, which is next to nothing compared to the oil revenues at the government's disposal. However, their moral and political weight is proportionately much greater than their material weight. After all, the religious establishment is a fundamental component of the legitimacy of the Iranian regime and the political balance of the post-revolutionary order, which since its founding in 1979 has been based on an alliance between the hawza (seminary) and the bazaar. Only subsequently did the Revolutionary Guards become a third component of the Iranian regime, and their rise was reflected by the election of Ahmadinejad as president. RAFSANJANI AND THE UPPER ECHELONS OF GOVERNMENT: Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is unanimously regarded as the second most powerful figure in the Iranian regime after the Supreme Guide. Opinions differ only on the distance that separates him from the number one post. Rafsanjani has held several senior government positions since the 1979 Revolution. He served as speaker of parliament and two terms as president between 1989 and 1997. He is currently chairman of the Council of Experts, which is responsible for selecting, monitoring and dismissing the Supreme Guide, and chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, responsible for resolving conflicts between the country's various constitutional bodies. A member of the pioneering generation of the Iranian Revolution, Rafsanjani was always close to Imam Khomeini. Indeed, such was Khomeini's trust and confidence in him that he was put in charge of managing the Iranian war effort during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, even though he was neither president nor even prime minister at the time. Following Khomeini's death, it was Rafsanjani who orchestrated the succession in favour of the current Supreme Guide over more senior and more scholastically qualified ayatollahs. The complicated relationship between Rafsanjani and Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei goes back a long way. Both were close associates of Khomeini, and both were accused by Muntazari of conspiring to oust him as heir designate to Khomeini two months before the latter's death. Rafsanjani and Khamenei attained approximately the same degree of juristic education, both have held key administrative posts since Khomeini's death in 1989, and both steered the processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iran's regional and international relations following the Iraq-Iran war. Yet, Ahmadinejad's victory over Rafsanjani in the 2005 presidential elections marked a turning point in this historic relationship. However, like Sisyphus doomed to an eternity to push a stone uphill only for it to tumble down the other side, Rafsanjani -- against the predictions of many -- proceeded with grim determination to push his career out of the abyss until he attained the centre of the Iranian political fray once again. While his adversaries see him as a man driven solely by a lust for power and influence on behalf of his wealthy mercantile family and having tentacles in every corner of the state apparatus, less hostile observers regard him as an experienced pragmatist who is not only adept at navigating Iran's complex political terrain, but also pulls many strings behind the scenes. Unlike Mousavi, Karroubi or Khatami, Rafsanjani is able to influence the upper echelons of the Iranian state. Contrary to the reformist trio, Rafsanjani suffered no loss of presence when he parted ways with the regime. Because of his extensive influence in the establishment, he continues to have supporters in the ministry of foreign affairs and to carry clout in such sensitive ministries as the ministries of petroleum and international trade. Moreover, Rafsanjani is not an electoral or professional phenomenon. Rather, he is a creature of the Iranian state. Herein resides the quintessential difference between him and the reformist trio, a difference in part made possible by his extensive vested interests in the current order. Contrary to the three reformist leaders, Rafsanjani fully appreciates that president Ahmadinejad's strength in the current political equation derives more from the government forces that back him than from his popular support, real and extensive though this is. Because of this awareness, Rafsanjani's desire to see Ahmadinejad removed from power has not blinded him to the distinction between Ahmadinejad and the system as a whole. He therefore prefers a surgical approach to the elimination of the incumbent president, and he is known for the skill with which he can wield the political scalpel without causing dangerous side effects for the regime. Yet, Rafsanjani also faces a major problem, which is that Ahmadinejad also represents the Republican Guards, an institution that has become so tightly interwoven with the weft and warp of the Iranian state over the past five years as to defy Rafsanjani's micro-surgical skills. The task that Rafsanjani has set himself is thus much more complex and delicate, for any incisions his scalpel makes will immediately reverberate throughout Iranian political alliances much more profoundly than any demonstrations on the streets. The modern media can easily capture the din of demonstrations, the clamour of their suppression and the grimness of their bloody aftermath. However, the fate of the triangle of Iranian political power will be more heavily contingent upon Rafsanjani's ability to obstruct the Ahmadinejad camp and to seize more ground from which to extend his own influence. Ultimately, Rafsanjani has two avenues open to him. One would be to create a breach between Supreme Guide Khamenei and the Republican Guards that would give him the opening to cause a dramatic shift in the current balance of power. The other avenue would be to fail at this and thus find himself face-to- face with the Supreme Guide and behind him the Republican Guards more firmly ensconced in power than ever. However, the overall power balance in Iran will be determined by the sum total of scores in each of the three battles in the triangle of Iranian domestic power. Because of the dialectical relationship between domestic and external politics, foreign pressures will also be a determining factor. For example, the harsher economic sanctions that the Obama administration is seeking to impose on Iran could either work to shift the score in favour of the Ahmadinejad camp or in favour of the opposition forces, depending on how the sanctions affect the different social classes and how these in turn put pressure on Iranian political leaders and agencies. Iran is clearly on the threshold of a new political alignment founded upon new socio-economic bases, but it would be premature at this stage to try to predict the contours of this new alignment at present, or their repercussions in any detail.
