By Ibrahim Nafie President Clinton's visit to Israel and to the areas already subject to Palestinian self-rule has important implications for the future of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, not least because it represents an indirect recognition of the Palestinian right to an independent state. The visit, and the US sponsored Wye River agreement before it, could well reflect a fundamental reformulation of the American role in the peace process. The US administration, it seems, has decided to become more directly involved in the peace process than ever before though there is no guarantee that, in effecting such a transformation, the US will automatically relinquish its thoroughly pro-Israeli bias. The key to understanding shifting US attitudes to the peace process and Clinton's personal stance as epitomised by his recent visit is to be found in US domestic politics. Naturally, the issue that looms foremost in this arena is the Monicagate scandal. There are conflicting analyses of how this issue has shaped Clinton's recent policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Some contend that the pressures that have been building up in the House of Representatives to force Clinton to step down render him incapable of effectively influencing the peace process or, for that matter, of implementing effective policies on any other issues. Others hold that the scandal will play into the hands of the Netanyahu government in Israel. If Clinton, they say, evinces stronger support for Israeli positions in the peace process during his current visit and, in so doing, wins the approval of the Israeli government and the extreme right, that may inspire the American Jewish lobby to intervene with Republican congressmen to ease up the pressures on Clinton. My view, however, is that domestic scandals are likely to reshape President Clinton's policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in a more positive way. Media reporting of the scandal has been so hysterical that as far as his position in Congress is concerned Clinton has little more to lose. The last thing he needs is to become embroiled in more lukewarm solutions and compromises that would only precipitate further losses. Quite to the contrary, his image at home is in dire need of an important foreign policy victory and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is one area in which he could score such a success. An important consideration, in this respect, is that as outgoing president he is free of any electoral considerations beyond ensuring that the next Democratic presidential candidate is not overly compromised. Regardless of how the Monicagate scandal plays out, Clinton, like many previous presidents, is likely to be anxious to secure his place in history. Progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, however, has been an uphill battle. Netanyahu is clearly intent upon holding on to as much occupied Palestinian territory as possible. In the Wye Plantation talks he grudgingly agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from just nine per cent of the West Bank, and only then on the condition that four per cent of that territory be converted into a nature preserve. Israeli withdrawal from the minuscule area Netanyahu conceded is also contingent upon a lengthy list of incapacitating demands upon the PA. In addition, Netanyahu has severely embarrassed the US administration on numerous counts. Not only did he reject a US initiative that had originally been based on Israeli proposals, Israeli officials, along with pro-Israeli members of Congress, pressed the Clinton administration not to announce the initiative publicly. During the Wye River talks, Netanyahu threw up so many obstacles over the most petty issues that Clinton openly expressed frustration with Israel's negotiating style. There was no doubt, however, that Clinton was determined to push through an agreement at Wye River. American policy towards Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 1998 rested upon the notion that the continued freeze had weakened US credibility, not only in the Middle East but internationally. Progress in the peace process, it was thought, would help strengthen US influence in the Middle East and, simultaneously, contribute to weakening the position of extremist Islamist groups and such radical regimes as Iran and Sudan. Washington also realised that continued stagnation would not only strengthen the hand of the extremist Islamic groups and radical regimes but, perhaps, lead the region into a cycle of tension and instability. Though the Wye River agreement created a US-Palestinian-Israeli partnership through the joint committees that have been formed to supervise security matters and on which the CIA is to represent the US, this does not mean that Washington has relinquished its pro-Israeli bias. Rather, it suggests an attempt to balance its support for Israel with the exigencies of its international role. And we could see signs of this shift during Clinton's visit. Clinton, while stressing his country's "full commitment" to Israel's security, urged both the Israelis and the Palestinians to work towards peace. He attempted both to coax the Israeli right into a less rigid position and dissuade the Palestinians from embarking on any unilateral action such as declaring a Palestinian state next May. While this shift is, on the whole, positive, it is not enough to counteract the Netanyahu's stalling tactics. And the possibility that the Palestinians might declare a state in May has sent Netanyahu and the Israeli right into paroxysms of anxiety when there remain enormously sensitive issues to be treated in the final status negotiations. If the Americans are to check Netanyahu's delaying tactics -- they are the main threat to the peace process after all -- they must adopt a firmer policy, particularly now that the peace process is approaching its most sensitive phase -- final status talks. Certainly, Israel's land grabbing tactics bode ill for any successful outcome to final status talks. They might also consider activating the Syrian-Lebanese track of the negotiating process, which have also stagnated as a result of Israeli intransigence. Yet, regardless of the course of US diplomacy, forthcoming developments in the region will prove the crucible in which Washington's ability to exercise its responsibilities as the sole super-power will be tested.
