Steering a steady course

Strength of character and perspicuity have powered two decades of foreign policy for President Mubarak. Nevine Khalil looks at the ebb and flow of diplomacy over the years
In Egypt, like in so many countries, the guidelines of foreign policy are drawn by the head of state. The president is the chief diplomat, deciding on what to do, where to go, and when. At the same time, he is the security valve of his diplomatic team, keeping his aides in check or giving them the green light to pursue a certain track.
In 1981, the nation was grappling with a shaky peace with Israel in a region made unstable by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mubarak's Egypt suffered the constraints of being ostracised by the Arab world. Over the past two decades, Mubarak has had to rely on his personal resources and strategic foresight to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, ensure the survival of Egypt's peace with Israel and promote stability in the region. Along the way, Mubarak has built up credibility for Egypt and nurtured numerous strong relationships with world leaders.
Moustafa El-Feki, who was a Mubarak aide between 1985 and 1992, cites three main "pillars" which form the foundation of the president's foreign policy. First, Mubarak believes in direct, bilateral dealings. "He doesn't like propaganda campaigns or proceeding without clarifying the situation on all sides," says El-Feki. Second, Mubarak maintains a "unique" relation to time. "He is not a pushy person and he doesn't like to take decisions quickly," says El-Feki. "He takes his time, reacting at the proper time and he is not reactionary." Finally, Mubarak is able to strike a balance between the fundamentals of foreign and national interests. "He never gives up on basics like the Palestinian cause. At the same time, he never forgets national interests," says El-Feki.
Drawing out the differences between Mubarak and his predecessors, El-Feki notes that unlike Gamal Abdel-Nasser, "who always kept an eye on his popularity and relied on his charisma, Mubarak is a realist who understands Egypt's exact role -- without exaggeration or underestimation." Noting that Anwar El-Sadat was "fond of taking shocking decisions and making sudden moves," El-Feki describes Mubarak's actions as "moderate, wise and steady." This does not, however, mean that you can second-guess him on policy. Some decisions may be surprising, but there is always a rational reason behind them. One character trait that has served Mubarak well with regard to foreign policy is his clarity of purpose. El-Feki notes that he "speaks his mind freely" and that he is "very straightforward and reliable. This boosts his credibility."
Egypt's overall strategy has been to get involved in the world agenda as much as possible, notably by keeping pace with several world blocs and key international organisations. While Egypt has kept its traditional ties to the Non-aligned Movement and the developing world, it has also signed up with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) among others.
El-Feki notes that "Mubarak has not committed any major mistakes in foreign policy," but the country's foreign policy has not been without its faults. It has been said that ties with Iran could have been cemented quicker, especially after a more moderate government took hold. And while the Sudan file is of close interest to the president, it needs to receive more attention "from other branches of the government," says El-Feki.
Egypt's decade-old call to hold a world conference on combating terrorism has long fallen on deaf ears, but the world is now suffering the consequences of not heeding Egypt's advice. Another setback for Egyptian foreign policy was the failure of its campaign in the mid-1990s to pressure Israel into signing the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite lengthy deliberations on the issue with world leaders and strongly worded statements on the importance of a nuclear-free Middle East, Israel was let off the hook.
Mubarak believes that Egypt should have a say, and be heard, in as many world forums as possible, and he prefers attending world gatherings himself, whether G15 summits or the annual World Economic Forum gathering. However, since the attempt on his life in Addis Ababa in 1995, he has stayed away from Organisation of African Unity (OAU) meetings due to security considerations. "We have a balanced foreign policy with all geographical groups," notes El-Feki, because Egypt "does not ignore any part of the world, whether big or small."
In the 1980s, Mubarak's priority diplomatic task was to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold -- a process which he executed with patience and determination. Had Egypt not managed to reclaim its place among Arab nations, the country's diplomatic weight and credibility would have suffered greatly. Mubarak made it clear, however, that he was not ready to sacrifice Egypt's interests by going back on its peace commitments to Israel in order to appease the Arabs.
By the end of the decade, the Arabs had decided to let bygones be bygones and reopening diplomatic channels with Egypt. In 1991, the headquarters of the Arab League was returned to Cairo from Tunis. "Mubarak was very patient, waiting for Arab countries to resume relations," said El-Feki. "He left it for them to take action without putting pressure on them. At the same time, he did not neglect them."
As ties with the Arabs warmed, Egypt treaded carefully around the delicate sensitivities of inter- Arab relations. El-Feki cites something of an "Arab complex towards Egypt -- a sort of political jealousy" as one obstacle Egypt has long had to face. But Mubarak was able to overcome these hurdles by showing "understanding of the Arab climate and treating small countries the same way as big countries," El-Feki said.
One need only recall Mubarak's historic visit to Beirut in May 2000, soon after Israel bombed Lebanon, destroying key infrastructure installations. It was the first visit by an Egyptian president to the Arab state in over four decades. While rushing to the aid of Lebanon and dispatching assistance to rebuild its power stations, Egypt was also sending a message to Israel: that it cannot pick on this small Arab neighbour without provoking Cairo's anger.
Following the 1991 Gulf War, the peace process was launched in Madrid propelling Egypt -- the pioneer of peace in the region -- to centre-stage. For the next decade, Egypt played counsel, facilitator and supporter to Arab and Israeli negotiators. Though the 1993 Oslo Accord was the result of secret Palestinian-Israeli talks, Mubarak had steadily supported the Palestinians in their negotiations with the Israelis. Cairo's main goal throughout was simple: to see progress finally being made on the Palestinian-Israeli track, regardless of who the facilitators were.
Following the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada a year ago, consultations between Mubarak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat were stepped up. At periodic, if not weekly, meetings, the Palestinian leader has kept Cairo abreast of the latest developments on the ground, as well as proposals on the table. Despite the close coordination between the two sides, Cairo has often said that it is up to the Palestinians to decide their own destiny.
"We only give advice, but it is the Palestinians who decide what is best for themselves," Mubarak has been repeatedly quoted as saying. Mubarak also promotes the Palestinian viewpoint with world leaders and public opinion, and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is always an item on the agenda of his meetings with foreign officials. "Arafat does not have the authority to give up Jerusalem, even if he wanted to," Mubarak has frequently asserted. "Arafat cannot be held responsible for every shot fired; not all his people will listen to him. They are frustrated by Israeli policies, and you cannot ensure a period of 100 per cent quiet."
Egypt's adamant support for the Palestinians has often left Cairo at loggerheads with Israel, especially during the tenure of Likud Party prime ministers like Ariel Sharon. The cool peace with Israel of the 1980s warmed gradually in the 1990s, when bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations were launched in Madrid between Israel and its Arab neighbours. After the Oslo Accord with the Palestinians and a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, regional cooperation appeared to be the next step for Israel.
The promise of those days seems to have plummeted, however. The Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors to Israel are absent from Tel Aviv, in protest against Israel's brutal repression against Palestinians. Many eyebrows were raised when Mohamed Bassiouni was recalled back to Cairo in November 2000. Mubarak has often said that he prefers not to recall an ambassador in order to "keep channels open" with other governments. But Israel's iron-fisted policies forced Egypt to take such a measure. Mubarak later appointed Bassiouni a member of the Shura Council, which means that the post of ambassador to Israel will remain vacant for some time.
The move has a precedent. Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv in 1982 in protest against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The move won Egypt favour within the Arab world and also made it clear to the Israelis that, despite the peace treaty, Cairo will not tolerate blatant Israeli violations of Arab rights.
In calmer days, Egypt signalled to Tel Aviv that "peace was not only between Israel and one person -- El-Sadat," says El-Feki. Mubarak was able to prove his credibility and fairness in dealing with the conflict, expressing concern for the safety of both Palestinians and the Israeli people and condemning the death of civilians on both sides. "He sincerely looks towards a comprehensive peace and a better future in the region," says El-Feki. "He is not against Israel, Israelis or Judaism. He is against the provocative, aggressive policies of some Israeli leaders, like Sharon." Mubarak strikes a balance between firmness and flexibility in dealing with Israel, adds El-Feki, "not making a big fuss about statements made by Israeli officials for domestic consumption. However, if Egypt's interests are threatened, he is resolute in his response."
Despite a cooling in relations with Cairo and sporadic high-profile disputes, most Israeli leaders remain keen to stay in close contact with Egypt, making it one of their first stops on their inaugural trips abroad. But the courtesy visit has yet to be returned, despite numerous pleas by consecutive Israeli governments. In 1996, Mubarak attended the funeral of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, but his time in Israel amounted to only a few hours. Mubarak has yet to visit Israel to hold talks with officials there and his standard answer when quizzed by Israeli reporters is: "I will visit Israel at the appropriate time, when circumstances allow for it."
Mubarak has long drawn the link between regional conflicts, such as the one in the Middle East, and the proliferation of terrorism across the world. He has counselled world powers that a resolution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would defuse tensions in the region and bring to an end much of the criticism of America's bias towards Israel.
Relations with successive US administrations have been based on "friendship, understanding and American acceptance of a certain margin of difference," according to El-Feki. These differences invariably arise on regional issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the impact of the Lockerbie affair on Libya and the stifling sanctions against Iraq. "The Americans respect what he says because he is in the region and has a better eye on events and regional changes," says El-Feki. "Their outlook is different, but each side respects the views of the other."
Cairo insists that the annual $2.1 billion in US aid to Egypt is not a key factor in drawing up policy, and Mubarak has frequently said that he never discusses the issue of aid during his meetings with US officials. "We cannot depend on aid forever," Mubarak has frequently noted. "What we want are investments and partnerships." El-Feki says that Cairo seeks to distance itself from the image of being compliant with US policies in return for US aid because this is a "very sensitive issue" for Egypt, especially since the greater part of this money is channelled back into the American economy and its industries. "We may need this aid, but we can also live without it," says El-Feki, adding that Egypt had paid "a high price for peace" with Israel. American assistance is Washington's gesture of showing "continuous support for the cause of peace in the region."
The US also stands to benefit by assisting Egypt. "Egypt is the stabiliser in the region and keeping friendly ties with Egypt serves American interests," continues El-Feki. Egypt's value and reliability in the 1991 Kuwait-liberation war were rewarded when the US dropped Egypt's military debt, which amounted to some $7 billion. The US, in turn, was in Egypt's debt, because by joining the US-led coalition against Iraq, Egypt urged other Arab countries to do the same. In character, Mubarak made telephone calls to some 45 key Congressmen with whom he had nurtured personal ties over the years to thank them for supporting the administration's decision to forgive Egypt's military debt.
Maintaining an equilibrium between principles and interests, Mubarak brought Egyptian troops back home "the moment Kuwait was liberated," says El-Feki, "because they were there for a certain national message -- not to serve the policies of other powers."
As a rule of thumb, Egypt is approached as a barometer in the region. Cairo is often used to sound out reactions and proposed policies. If Egypt is on board a coalition to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, other Arabs will be there too. If Egypt refuses to join a military coalition to strike against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that any Arab country would send troops there. "When a coalition is being formed, you come to Egypt," says El-Feki, "As a central power in the Middle East, [Egypt] gives you the political umbrella for Arabs and Muslims."
According to El-Feki, Egypt has always been "the gateway to the Middle East." He recalled that the Soviets came to the region in the mid-1950s through Egypt and left the region in the early 1970s, also from Egypt. The Americans, incidentally, also came through Egypt, soon after the Soviets left.
Mubarak has also led a drive to cement relations with the Far East, taking long trips to meet with leaders in China and Japan. In fact, one of Mubarak's first trips abroad, as vice president, was to Beijing, where he met legendary leader Mao Zedong. Today, Egypt seeks to learn from, and emulate, some of the economic strategies of one of the world's leading exporters. Egypt also maintains close relations with Japan and this friendship found expression when Mubarak embarked on a 36-hour round trip journey to Japan to attend the funeral of the emperor. "It was very important for the president to extend this courtesy to the Japanese people," said El-Feki.
Closer to home, Mubarak's "traditional dialogue" with European leaders, especially France's François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, as well as Germany's Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroeder, have been translated into "excellent" relations with these countries. According to El-Feki, these leaders, as well as others, listen to Mubarak because he does not mince words and is a reliable partner.
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