Fair to be free

Mounir Zahran:
Fair to be free
He sees remedies to the world's ills in international democracy and development
as a basic right for all countries
Profile by Aziza Sami
The office, on the first floor of the Foreign Ministry building in Maspero, occupies a place along a file of similar rooms, high-ceilinged and overlooking the busy streets of Bulaq Abul-Ela. As we waited for the adviser to the foreign minister, who was tending to business in some other quarter, I perused the newspapers neatly placed on a low table in front of the leather sofa: Arabic and foreign dailies, and that inevitable reference for those concerned with international economic and political events: the Financial Times.
Ambassador Zahran has appeared too many times to count, in his capacity as President Mubarak's Personal Representative to the summit- level group of developing nations known as the G-15, and as a veteran diplomat with extensive first-hand experience in international economic and political affairs. The impression he gives is always that of an outspoken man, forceful in the decisive, detailed precision with which he enunciates his views of the devastating position developing nations can find themselves in as globalisation takes its course.
When he strode in, nothing detracted from these remembered impressions. A tall man of athletic build in his mid-60s, he was neatly dressed in a grey suit and a tie striped in similar hues. His affability invited conversation, but first, we were served lemonade and coffee.
Born in Cairo in 1935, he followed in his father's professional footsteps, graduating from Cairo University's Faculty of Law in 1956, then obtaining a doctorate in public law from Paris University in 1966. The influence of his days in France showed in the understated business card he presented, with bureau and domicile inscribed neatly in small italics. After a brief spell working as an attorney at law in Cairo, he joined the Egyptian diplomatic service in 1958, moving on from departments overseeing international economic affairs and research, to mediation efforts between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989-90 as President Mubarak's special envoy, and responsibilities as staff member and ambassador of the Egyptian embassies and missions in Paris, Washington, New York, Brussels, Casablanca and Geneva. In 1991, he became Egypt's permanent representative at the UN office and other international organisations in Geneva, a position he held for eight years, witnessing the Uruguay Round, which established the World Trade Organisation. In '93, '94 and '95 respectively, he was chairman of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's Committee on Trade and Development, the GATT Council of Representatives, and GATT Contracting Parties. In 1995 he was chairman of the UNCTAD Committee on Trade and Development, and vice- president of UNCTAD's board. It is therefore not rhetoric but a close perusal of the legalities of the GATT and the Uruguay Round, the political exigencies that created them, and the developing countries' commitment to trade liberalisation that shape his views. His professional trajectory has led him to address not only economic issues, but also the position of Egypt and other developing countries on disarmament, labour and human rights; he chaired various UN committees dealing with these issues during his tenure in Geneva, presiding on the 1993 conference on disarmament..
He closely follows developments within the G- 15, the group of developing nations from Africa, Asia and Latin America that have held 11 meetings at summit level, and in which he has played an active role since being appointed as President Mubarak's Personal Representative to the group in 1995. Egypt headed the group twice, in 1997 - 1998, and in 1999-2000. "Since its inception, we thought the creation of a group based on economic conasiderations, by engaging in South-South cooperation first, would consolidate the developing nations' position versus the advanced countries and facilitate North-South dialogue," he explained. After the Ninth Summit, Zahran, as President Mubarak's special representative, initiated contacts with the "sherpa" of the G-7, Chancellor Schroeder of Germany, on financial matters. Several encounters ensued; from them emerged a work plan focused on a comprehensive employment strategy, which was incorporated in the ILO programme for the year2000-2001, and the Copenhagen World Social Summit Review in 2000. "Education, training, closing the digital gap: there was a useful outcome, as a result of the interaction with the developed countries, with Japan, which hosted the G-8 Okinawa summit, pledging $15 billion to help the developing countries cope with technological advancement in information and communication technology (ICT)."
We met on the Tuesday preceding the World Trade Organisation's Fourth Ministerial Conference, launched in Doha, Qatar, on 9 November. The atmosphere was charged: public opinion inside and outside the US was split by disagreements, which seemed to be growing wider, over the causes and remedies for the events of 11 September.
The question imposed itself. Would globalisation -- free trade and open borders as envisioned by the US and the other Western economies -- be undermined by those events?
He believed not. "You must de-link between these events and the concept of globalisation, although of course they definitely will have an impact on the [process] of globalisation itself by leading to uncertainty as far as economic growth, trade, tourism and the financial system in general are concerned. Also, the mobilisation of services for war is leading the defence industry to flourish. This said, the coalition against terrorism will have a positive impact, in the long run, on the Western economies, provided the root causes are dealt with."
But in the background of the "strike against terror," are levels of investment in the developing countries -- Asian economies excepted -- not dismally poor already? He responded: "I was speaking of the overall, macroeconomic picture. But if you take North-South relations, then of course these have not been positive. Even before 11 September, as preparations were being made for the Doha conference, the developed countries had started pushing for a new round of multilateral negotiations without giving sufficient attention to the grievances of the developing countries -- and this at a time when the latter are yearning for a fair trade arrangement, a correction to the multilateral trading system that can redress the imbalances created by the Uruguay Round and the ensuing multilateral trade arrangements, which govern the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, intellectual property, and trade-related aspects of investment."
One of the three white telephones on a side- table close to his desk rang. There was no mobile phone in sight. It was an overseas call bringing news of a close family member who was receiving treatment. He summed the situation up quickly, openly, then, although one could perceive his concern, returned quickly to his train of thought.
"Since the multilateral trading system was put in place, and as a result of the Uruguay Round, the developing countries have found difficulties in implementation. There are 28 multilateral agreements governed and supervised by the WTO all in all, of which most of the difficulties have not been addressed. This is why, grosso modo, in 1999 the third ministerial conference in Seattle failed. Since then, the international community has had time to find out the reasons for that failure, and prepare well for [Doha], where a new environment should be in evidence: more transparent, with more participation by developing countries, in decision-making within the WTO."
What did he think would happen at Doha? He was careful in crafting a response. "I am not speaking on behalf of Egypt here, since the Egyptian delegation at Doha is led by Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Youssef Boutros Ghali, and he will speak on its behalf. I am reading the overall picture, however. We still have to test the political will of the developed countries at the meeting. In the preparatory process for the fourth ministerial conference, I could see that the political will is earnestly needed to settle the implementation difficulties by developing countries was not right. Starting in 1998, the developing countries drew up an inventory of the various difficulties facing them, 97 problems according to the WTO's documentation, and presented proposals [for their resolution]. Since then, most of [these proposals] have not been addressed -- except by being 'referred' to various WTO committees and subsidiary bodies..."
The solution the developed countries had suggested to the developing nations was a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, Zahran said. "Some of these proposals implied a change of the rules. Nevertheless, alongside that, the developed countries placed on the agenda new issues that were of interest to them, including the negotiating of a multilateral investment agreement dealing with competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation. Moreover, ever since the end of the Uruguay Round, the developed nations had been trying to insert on the WTO's agenda the question of core labour standards, among other issues, some of which were not included -- because even amongst the developed nations themselves, consensus was lacking on some matters. The end result, however, was that the Uruguay Round presented a package. When the developing nations expressed reservations about some [aspects], saying they needed time to determine whether they would benefit from them, the developed countries said 'sign now, and later we will help you with implementation through technical and financial assistance in issues such as intellectual property rights etc'." These promises, however, boiled down to nothing: assistance was a hollow promise, "lip-service, really, meaning seminars and round table discussions."
Nor did the promise of increasing the official development assistance (ODA'S) needed by developing countries to help fulfil their obligations under the WTO materialise; in fact, "the opposite took place." ODA plummeted from $60 billion at the time of the 1994 Marrakech WTO ministerial conference to $47 billion at the end of the century. The substantial drop in oil prices in 1998 further diminished developing countries' revenues and, since the prices of goods and services utilising oil were maintained at the same levels, "gains accruing to the developed countries, according to OECD reports, were assessed at $60 billion -- which by far exceeded the ODA levels made available to the developing countries at the time."
Now, Zahran says, the developing countries will pay twice to achieve the same goal: making the rules more equitable. "They will be asked to make new concessions in a new round, with most of the problems of implementation still unresolved."
A few months ago, a fervent interchange had taken place at the Egyptian Council for Foreign Relations between Zahran and a WTO official. The bone of contention: democracy and transparency within the WTO. Is he a critic of the organisation? He responded thoughtfully. "I believe in the WTO. But there are rules that must be corrected to institute trade that is not only free, but fair as well. Before being free, it should be fair. The rule is that every member state within the WTO has a vote. Article 9 of the WTO agreement says that the organisation shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under the GATT in 1947, except as otherwise provided. Where a decision cannot be reached by consensus, the matter shall be decided by voting. But what has happened so far is that the developed countries are reading half of the rule and do not want to recognise the other half, which mentions voting. They do not want to hear about it because they think that voting will allow the developing countries to impose their will, and so they have prevented any voting within the organisation. They have clung to the principle of consensus, extending matters in order to reach such consensus. But when consensus means that one country can paralyse the whole system by vetoing an agreement, then this cannot be considered democratic."
A few days later, the United Nations General Assembly would be convening its 53rd session in New York. I ventured onto delicate terrain. Having worked so closely with the UN and its multitude of agencies, what did he think of Osama Bin Laden's condemnation of the UN? It was extreme, radical; yet people on the street, whose responses CNN had relayed so vividly, showed disillusionment with the organisation's ability to advance the cause of developing countries, and specifically Arab rights in the Middle East conflict. Was the UN's legitimacy, so far taken for granted, in jeopardy? Did he not feel a sea change?
"UN reform has been the preoccupation of developing countries for a long time. It is a question my colleagues, [former Egyptian representative to the UN] Nabil El-Arabi and [current representative] Ahmed Abul-Gheit, have been dealing with for several years, since the 1990s. We are not against the UN: on the contrary, we want to have a healthy UN, with a sense of ownership. But the system has weaknesses, and we want to improve it. The UN was one of the by- products of World War II. Circumstances have changed since then, which is why we need to reform the UN system on matters including Security Council membership and the use of veto powers. With such reforms, the resolutions of the UN and Security Council would be more democratic, and, once adopted, would be implemented. The desperate need for such reform could be the reason for the reactions you saw in the media. Reform is necessary to give the community of nations the sense that the UN belongs to all of us, not a few who are imposing their will on the rest of the world community. What we need is democracy at the international level."
The crowd thickened on the streets of Abul- Ela as the day wore on. He held up a small blue booklet published by the G-15 in June 2000, and read out article 25 of its joint communiqué, which had gone unheeded until less than two months ago. "The member-states welcome the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and Financing of Terrorism by the UN General Assembly, and urge all states to sign and ratify it to ensure its early entry into force." He read on. "We support Egypt's initiative for convening an international conference to address terrorism and cross border organised crime as called for by the UN General Assembly." He stopped reading. One more recommendation, yet another plea for concerted action among all nations, as yet unimplemented. "You can quote me on that," he said.
What, though, has been his greatest concern? "Human rights," he said without hesitation. "I have seen how, at the international level, the developed countries do not deal with human rights fairly in relation to the developing countries. It was politicised all through and used as an excuse for political intervention. Just as in the cases of disarmament and the right to self-determination (compare East Timor and Palestine), attitudes betrayed obvious double standards."
The human rights principle needs to be defined, he feels, "as a question not only of civil and political rights, but of the collective right of developing nations to development, which has been given very little space on the agenda of the Commission for Human Rights. Most of the reports submitted to the commission are on civil and political rights. When it comes to the right to development, the developed countries, whether they vote against or abstain, do not want to commit themselves. How can we interact with them when they do not recognise a basic right that is of extreme importance to countries of the South?"
photo: Randa Shaath
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