The Arab regional order may yet emerge strengthened by the Iraqi crisis, writes Ibrahim Nafie Without a doubt the Arab world is at an inordinately complex juncture following the US-British occupation of Iraq. It is also a fact that this is not the first time the Arab order has encountered debacles that some predicted would shatter its very foundations. The Arab defeats of 1948 and 1967, the inter-Arab rupture following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 were of such a magnitude. Yet, contrary to predictions, the Arab order has always emerged stronger than before. Perhaps the most salient common denominator in all these experiences is that the Arabs were spurred not only to combine their energies in order to overcome the immediate crisis but also to develop new mechanisms for enhancing cooperation in the long run. The year 1948 marked the beginning of the Arab revolutionary movement that swept away corrupt monarchist regimes and placed the Arab world squarely on the path to national liberation. Spearheading this movement was the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which channeled immense energies towards Arab national liberation and which also transcended the Arab sphere to converge with the national liberation and the non-aligned movement, thereby championing the peoples of the Third World. The energies unleashed by the June 1967 defeat were of a somewhat different order. Then the spirit of defiance was embodied in the Khartoum Summit, held the following month, in which Arab states resolved to support front line nations in their struggle to liberate their territories occupied by Israel, a goal that was partially achieved through another collective action in the October 1973 War. Each crisis added to the Arab store of experience in resolving differences that naturally arise in a regional order when a common vision is absent. In this regard the Cairo Summit in 2000 was a landmark, not only in overcoming the rifts caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait but in the institutionalisation of high-level cooperation through periodic summits. If the Arab order has shown in the past that it can emerge healthier and more robust, can it do the same in the face of the current crisis? I have little doubt that it will, given time. The more pressing question is how. Now is not the time to leave the Arab order to make ad hoc adjustments as it counters the ramifications of the occupation of Iraq and the push for an alternative Middle Eastern order. For while it is certain to survive the process of improving its performance will proceed too slowly to meet the aspirations of the Arab peoples and the unprecedented challenges that confront it. We must take the matter firmly in hand and devote all our energies towards giving fresh and dynamic impetus to the frameworks of Arab cooperation. In so doing we should draw on successful models for regional cooperation. Naturally, the EU springs first to mind. Although that project of regional integration began seven years after the Arabs initiated theirs, it leaped ahead at breathtaking speed to create economic unity, and is now considering the formulation of a constitution for the "United States of Europe" and the creation of a European army. Meanwhile, the Arab Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1950 remains no more than ink on paper. Whether the fault for this resides in the Arab mentality, in the complexities of our realities or in outside machinations, or a combination of all three, merits exhaustive study. One thing, however, is certain. As a first step towards rising to current challenges we must overcome negativism towards the Arab League. After all, the "Arab House" is no more than the sum product of the positions and attitudes of its member nations; it will work if they summon the will to make it work. This, in turn, demands that we focus our attention on the practicalities of improving the performance of the league, and keep our minds open, objective and realistic. To persist in setting idealistic, unachievable goals, such as those that are touted by certain leaders playing to the gallery, will guarantee that existing agreements remain unimplemented and our league will continue to stumble along as it is. Naturally, giving new impetus to the Arab League demands that we draw on the ideas and initiatives that Arab leaders have already put on the table. Not only will this spare great time and effort, it will ensure that all member nations have a say in shaping the frameworks for future cooperation. There are many avenues we must pursue in reforming the Arab League. Above all we must work to clear the air. A cursory glance at the successes and failures of the Arab order over the past decades is sufficient to drive home how closely that is tied to fluctuations in mutual confidence. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait so aggravated the confidence crisis as to precipitate a sharp inter-Arab rift, opening a breach exploited by various international and regional powers to muddy the climate further. The second avenue entails helping the Arab League do its job. It is no secret that some Arab countries lack the will, and perhaps the desire, to stimulate the league, and have even indicated a preference for alternative regional institutions. Nothing could be, and has been, more detrimental to the league's task of containing problems before they escalate to full- fledged crises. We have instances of Arab governments that refused to bring their disputes before the league, opting instead for other organisations; and of governments that were party to international crises that refused to let the league support them with ideas and diplomatic backing. Iraq is a case in point. Former President Saddam Hussein refused to bring his initiatives to the league, presenting them instead to the UN secretary-general, which greatly undermined the ability of the Arab League to handle the Iraqi crisis and ultimately worked against Iraq itself. Clearly, therefore, a prerequisite for reforming the Arab League is to establish once and for all that the league must serve as the Arabs' primary conduit for collective action. This said, there are several practical reforms that need to be instituted. One is to amend the Arab League Charter, specifically with regard to the outmoded principle of the unanimous vote as the basis for decision-making. It will also be important to contemplate ways to enhance the league's powers of collective diplomacy and to consider mechanisms for improving the General-Secretariat's capacity to follow through on and enforce resolutions adopted by the league. Containing and settling inter-Arab disputes is a third avenue towards giving new life to the Arab League. It is time that pending disputes over borders and access to resources, as well as the many rivalries over relative status, be resolved on the basis of impartial criteria and rational procedures. Above all, we must rid ourselves of that engrained habit of pretending tensions do not exist or claiming that differences have magically been ironed out. There is no inherent shame in having disputes. The shame is not to face up to reality and leave the problems to fester until they grow malignant. Again, we can make rapid progress in developing mechanisms for crisis management and arbitration by availing ourselves of the expertise other regional organisations have demonstrated in this field. As we set to work to rescucitate the Arab order we will have many principles to guide us. Some of these are in the Arab League Charter, others in the UN Charter. Prime among them are respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member nations, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of members and the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the same time, it must be stressed that we are not beginning from scratch. The Cairo Summit of 1996 approved, in principle, the creation of an "Arab League mechanism for the prevention, management and settlement of disputes". The proposal was then put to the Arab League Council for closer study, after which it was approved by Arab foreign ministers in 2000. It only remains for the project to be put into effect. To complement this, as a next step we should begin thinking about creating an Arab court of justice. There are also other ideas that bear serious contemplation. One is an Arab parliament, in which regard we could send a mission of Arab experts to study first-hand the structural, functional and procedural aspects of the European model. Another is to develop the organisational mechanisms to support Arab specialised organisations and to create viable channels linking the Arab League with civil society institutions. Before looking so far ahead, though, there is perhaps a more important consideration we should bear in mind. When we look at the accumulated experience and expertise of such regional organisations as the EU and ASEAN we find that the key to their progress lies in the fact that their projects for collective action took off from an economic platform. What happened was that they focussed first on cooperation in various economic activities, which generated an ever increasing scope of mutual interests. Then, at a certain stage, it became clear that defending these interests required closer integration in foreign policy and other fields. Certainly the economic platform has many advantages, demanding participating countries rise above political differences, identify viable projects that serve their interests and then give these projects a chance to develop. Once the returns become evident this will generate the public enthusiasm needed to embark on collective enterprises in the realms of politics and security. I have every confidence that if we remain determined and practical we will not only succeed in the realisation of our aspirations but also establish a new model for others to emulate.
