The messages broadcast in the wake of Saddam's capture were as grim as they were wrong, writes Osama El-Ghazali Harb* Saddam Hussein's capture had enormous tragicomic potential. That this man, ruthless and arrogant, who spent much of his life lusting after power and luxury, ended up being dug out of a hole in the ground, is dramatic enough. And then there was the manner of his surrender, made possible only because his captors were American. Had he fallen into the hands of Iraqis his fate would almost certainly have been the same as that of the Iraqi royal family in 1958, or of Nuri Al-Said and Abdul- Karim Qasim -- people whose mistakes are nothing compared to those of Saddam. He would have ended as a mutilated corpse. Had he been captured by the Iraqis Saddam would probably have opted for suicide, not out of any sense of dignity but to avoid a brutal death. Saddam's penchant for cruelty towards his own people -- Iraqis and Arabs -- was fed by a disdain matched only by his eventual humility before foreigners (despite the torrent of slogans his propaganda machine churned over the years). One cannot but recall the way Saddam refused to take advice from Arab leaders. President Mubarak alone sent him dozens of messages ahead of the Kuwait war in 1990-91, and again before the invasion of Iraq. Arab emissaries went in droves to Baghdad, only to be haughtily rebuffed. This pattern of behaviour is consistent with Saddam's despotism. A century ago, Abdul- Rahman Al-Kawakibi, in The Nature of Despotism, wrote the following: "The despot, the moment he sits on the throne and puts the inherited crown on his head, sees himself transforming from a man into god, then looks again and realises the depth of his weakness... a despot is never more than a traitor and a coward who needs a gang to help and protect him." Harsh words, though ones that Saddam may still have time to confirm further. One cannot rule out that he will cooperate fully with US investigators and try to win them over by attempting to persuade them that his style of government was tailored exactly to the Iraqi personality, as well to Arab ambitions. Saddam's surrender was farcical enough, but it is not the mother of all farces. That dubious honour must be reserved for inability of many Arabs and Muslims to see the real significance of the Iraqi crisis, from Baghdad's fall on 19 April to the capture of Saddam near Tikrit on 14 December. Some Arabs saw Saddam's capture as an intentional insult to all Arabs and Muslims. Such a view implicitly assumes that Saddam was a symbol for Arabs and Muslims, that he was a legitimate leader supported by a majority of his own people, and that he was promoting the aspirations and goals of Iraqis and Arabs. But he wasn't. Saddam was never a role model or symbol for Arabs and Muslims. He never had any real legitimacy. His policies and actions, shorn of propaganda, flew in the face of Iraqi, Arab and Islamic interests. His arrest and trial will in the end be the same as the arrest of any criminal. It is a sign of respect for the law, which is neither insult nor humiliation. The real insult, beneath which we should all smart, unfolded well before Saddam's capture. It has to do with the political and social conditions prevalent in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world, conditions that allowed someone like Saddam to become vice president in 1968, then bloodily usurp the presidency in 1979. These conditions allowed Saddam, after assuming power, to make decisions that proved catastrophic for Iraq and all Arabs. He single-handedly turned Iraq from a leading Arab country to one of the poorest and most indebted. He is also responsible for the death, displacement, and exile of countless of his compatriots. What is humiliating is not Saddam's capture in 2003, but his remaining in power from 1979 to 2003. What is humiliating is that Arabs -- including intellectuals and writers, the supposed conscience of the nation -- accepted and applauded him. What is humiliating is that the Americans and British ended Saddam's regime and captured him while promoting their own interests and objectives. This was something that we, Arabs and Iraqis, should have done had we wanted to defend our dignity and interests. Some Arabs view what happened as a conspiracy against Saddam and Iraq, with Muslims and Arabs being the ultimate target. The conspiracy theory comes in many varieties, from Saddam being duped into invading Iran and Kuwait to his having been drugged in his hideout. Such views are at best insulting to Arab and Muslim communities and leaders. The latter come across as half-witted and gullible, easily led astray by anyone with bad intentions. What conspiracy theories do is shift blame to outside forces. But again this is not the case. Of course the world of politics is one of schemes and conspiracies, which may or may not work. Falling into traps and succumbing to conspiracies is not inevitable. There are ways to foil the ill intentions of others, but to do that we need to have functional societies, legitimate regimes and democratic governments -- ones that do not fall prey to conspiracies, ones that keep their eyes open. Conspiracy theories flourish alongside despotism, as reality blends with rumour and fact with myth. Citizens become accustomed to vagueness and the distortion of facts. Confidence is eroded and logical explanations discarded. But we cannot forever blame others for our problems, backwardness, faltering economies and lack of scientific or cultural achievement. Some Arabs view the fall of Saddam as a prelude to one of two scenarios: either resistance against the US-UK occupation will escalate, or other Arab regimes will be removed from power. Resistance against occupation is, of course, natural and warranted. And fears that Washington and London might be tempted to repeat the adventure elsewhere are also understandable. But these are hardly the lessons we should learn from Saddam's fall. Let us begin with the second possible scenario. To warn that the Iraqi model will be repeated in other Arab countries is to ignore the difference between Saddam's regime and other Arab regimes, for even if the difference is only one of degree it is significant. Nor do considerations such as sovereignty, dignity, and patriotism have to clash with the requisites of political reform and democracy in Arab countries. It is possible for Arab countries to maintain their sovereignty while seeking genuine political and democratic reforms. Reform is a domestic matter. It was demanded by local populations long before it turned into a foreign demand. And if Saddam's fall accelerates the pace of democratic reform in Arab countries, then what is the point of manufacturing fears over the bogeyman of US interference. The first scenario -- escalating resistance -- is posited more out of aversion to occupation than real concern for Iraq. The first priority now in Iraq is to rebuild the state and society in a way that enables the country to stand on its own feet, put its economy together, and introduce democratic reforms. The US destroyed the Iraqi state and political system and, before it leaves the country, should repair some of the damage it has done. No one can possibly pretend that the goal of reconstruction is helped by armed resistance or the killing of some foreign troops and many Iraqis. Such actions will prolong, rather than shorten, the occupation. Most of the resistance is being carried out by unknown groups, and Iraqis mostly denounce their actions. The only support the Iraqi resistance seems to get is from Arab outsiders. This is risky, for it may lead to a schism between Iraq and its Arab brothers. To reiterate, Saddam's capture was a farce, but not the mother of all farces. That will happen if we -- Arabs and Muslims -- forget the lessons, dwell on insults, embrace conspiracy theories, obsess over Iraqi resistance and US interference, fail to learn the consequences of despotism, and continue to ignore the damage done by the absence of freedoms and democracy. * The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly Al- Siyassa Al-Dawlia (International Politics), issued by Al-Ahram, and a member of the Shura Council.
