The reform of collective Arab institutions is now too important to brook anything but absolute honesty, writes Ibrahim Nafie The forthcoming Arab Summit, which will convene in Tunis at the end of March, will focus on ways to develop mechanisms of inter- Arab cooperation, as embodied above all in the Arab League. Fateful is not too strong a word for the summit: either it sets into motion measures for building a more dynamic and robust Arab League or it abandons that organisation to further buffeting by the political gales sweeping the region. Arab peoples have reached the point of near despair at the dismal performance of collective Arab action at both the political and economic level. The failure to avert the war against Iraq and to curb Israel's escalating belligerency against the Palestinians, in particular, have triggered increasingly bitter criticism. Regardless of the tenor of such criticism, one thing is certain. We can no longer sustain the status quo, and far more than cosmetic surgery will be needed if we are not to be forced to declare the bankruptcy of the institutions of Arab cooperation. At the same time, reforming the Arab League, especially after the attrition wrought by the forces of factionalism and fragmentation over the past three decades, cannot occur overnight. We must, therefore, be on guard against building up unrealistic expectations from the forthcoming summit. Fortunately, participants at that summit will have many proposals to draw from. The Egyptian initiative for the development of the Arab League calls for a considerable element of restructuring so as to generate more effective decision-making and follow-up processes and more effective channels for communication and coordination between its member bodies and between them and organs of Arab civil society. It also envisions the creation of an arbitrating body, an Arab Court of Justice and an Arab parliament. A second initiative --the Saudi "Charter for the Reform of the Arab Condition" -- seeks to generate conditions that will best enable Arab economies to take a more decisive role in the global economy. Under this initiative measures for strengthening inter-Arab economic relations, safeguarding of Arab peace and security and promoting domestic reforms in member nations will be passed by majority vote, binding on all members and implemented under the supervision of the Arab League Council. The Libyan Jamahiriya proposed amending the Arab League Charter to create an Arab Federation. Signatories to the amended charter would then adopt the measures necessary to formulate uniform foreign, trade and defence policies, and to create an Arab Common Market. Under the proposed federal charter decisions passed by a two-thirds majority would be binding on all members and those approved by simple majority (51 per cent) would be binding only on those that voted in their favour. Yemen, too, seeks to create a federation of Arab States, the member nations of which would work to achieve full economic integration, to promote avenues of cooperation between the federation and other regional groupings, and to unify the legal codes of member states in those areas pertinent to their collective aims and aspirations. The federation would have a Supreme Executive Council, a bicameral legislature and a number of ministerial councils, and it would create a Mutual Support and Development Fund, a Development Bank and an arbitrating body for trade disputes. In addition to the foregoing, many other constructive ideas have been forwarded by Sudan, Qatar, Algeria, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa has taken these numerous initiatives and proposals and recast them in the form of annexes which, if approved, would be considered to supplement or amend the Arab League Charter, as was the case with the protocol on the periodicity of Arab summits adopted in the extraordinary session held in Cairo in 2000. The annexes that the Secretariat-General has so far compiled from the above-mentioned proposals cover the creation of an Arab Parliament, Arab Security Council, Supreme Arab Court of Justice and Supreme Council for Arab Culture. Other sections pertain to the promotion of economic cooperation and development and cover the completion of the Arab Free Trade Zone by 2005 and the subsequent institution of an Arab Customs Federation, the structural enhancement of the Arab League's Economic and Social Council and the establishing of an Arab Investment and Development Bank. Copies of these draft annexes have already been forwarded to Arab foreign ministers for their opinions and observations, after first having been submitted to the Legal Committee formed in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Arab Summit in Sharm El- Sheikh. On 1 March the Arab League Council will convene for two days at the foreign ministerial level to discuss these materials preparatory to submitting them to Arab heads of state when they meet in Tunis at the end of March. Now that these many proposals have taken concrete form, there remains the most crucial problem of all: the need for Arab governments to summon the commensurate resolve. After all, it is the lack of such resolve in the past that has so hampered the ability of the league to settle minor problems before they escalated into fully-fledged crises that, in turn, worked to undermine the foundations of collective Arab action. The Arabs must acknowledge that the vital interests they have in common compel them to develop their common bonds and they must summon confidence in their ability to forge a unique and pioneering experience in regional cooperation. However, to realise this aspiration, Arab countries must be determined, persistent and practical. The foreign ministers who will be meeting in Tunis on 1 and 2 March shoulder a heavy burden. But let us be frank with ourselves and with the Arab people. The Arab League can only become what Arab leaderships resolve to make of it. The efficacy of its structures, procedures and subsidiary bodies can be no more than the sum product of their composite decisions and actions. The public should bear this in mind so as not to be deluded by the attempts of some leaderships to use the Arab League as a scapegoat to cover their own failings. The business of shaping the future of Arab cooperation is far too urgent a matter to brook facades, pretence or other shenanigans. It is urgent because at stake is the very future of a people whose institutions for collective action are the object of a vicious assault, preparatory to the implantation of a regional entity that will be anything but Arab.
