Arab leaders should set aside this week's unfortunate events in Tunis and focus on the substantive problems facing all Arab nations, writes Ibrahim Nafie Angry official and public reaction to Tunisia's sudden and unilateral decision to indefinitely postpone the Arab summit reveals a convergence of official and public views on the need to hold the summit as soon as possible. Existing differences on a number of dossiers do not justify delaying the summit in a manner that was closer to cancellation than postponement. Just as Tunisia's mysterious and unilateral decision sent ripples of anger and puzzlement across the Arab world, Egypt's offer to host the summit was greeted with official and public relief. The statement issued by the Egyptian presidency to this effect was followed by a flurry of diplomatic activities. Over the past four days, meetings were held and views exchanged with a view to putting the situation in order. The reaction to the Tunisian decision and the favourable manner in which Arab leaders responded to the Egyptian offer were a convincing answer to those who question the usefulness of joint Arab endeavours, who highlight Arab differences, and who claim that these differences have reached such an intensity after which no coordinated effort is worth the trouble. It is no coincidence that Israel was the first to gloat over the Tunisian decision. No sooner the decision was made to postpone the summit than an Israeli official remarked that Tel Aviv has received the news with great satisfaction. The official saw the postponement as "a positive sign that the Arab world is changing and that animosity to Israel can no longer provide the Arabs with a common denominator". The Israeli official went on to claim that "Arab unity used to encourage extremism." He speculated that the postponement is linked to the crisis the Arab world is facing due to the US occupation of Iraq. The Palestinians, by contrast, were disappointed, fearing that Sharon's government would use this development to press ahead with its schemes to liquidate the Palestinian issue. Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian chief negotiator, said, "Israel may exploit the situation to escalate its attacks on Palestinians, threaten the life of President Arafat, and continue building settlements and the wall." I have a few things to say about Tunisia's decision to postpone the summit and its reaction to Egypt's offer to host. For one thing, Tunisia had no right whatsoever to act unilaterally and postpone the summit indefinitely, because it has not yet assumed the presidency of the summit. According to custom, the presidency is handed over to the host country after the start of summit. This had not happened. Therefore, the current president of the Arab summit, until such time that the next summit is held, is King Hamad Bin Eissa of Bahrain. Also, Tunisia had not engaged in any contacts or consultations about the postponement with any Arab country, including the summit's current president. Nor had it discussed the matter with the Arab League secretary-general, who was in Tunisia working with the foreign ministers on the summit's agenda. This is why Tunisia's unprecedented decision came as a surprise. The foreign ministers were proceeding normally with their meetings and discussions of the various dossiers the summit was to discuss. The ministers had even reached agreement on about 40 draft resolutions for the leaders to adopt. The remaining unresolved matters were either heading towards agreement or destined for submission to the leaders to decide upon themselves. As far as I know, there had been no differences expressed on the matter of reform. What some have asked for by way of amendments was simply that some clauses be removed from the reform document and adopted as ordinary resolutions. Attempts were also made to create problems or start disputes over issues that have been decided upon at the foreign ministers' meeting in Cairo, such as the "pledge document" -- a document which has already been approved and there was no reason to discuss it again or amend it, considering that all Arab countries have already had ample chance to debate it. I don't know how accurate is the claim that the Tunisian foreign minister had shown another Arab foreign minister a so- called Tunisia document, one he wanted endorsed without change. The document is said to be drafted by a major power, incorporating the basic points in its initiative for a Greater Middle East. The Tunisia document was not at any point delivered to Arab foreign ministers. And some of these ministers, speaking after the postponement of the summit, denied knowledge of the existence of the document. We need to put what happened in Tunisia behind us, for key Arab states have speedily and favourably responded to Egypt's offer to host the summit at the earliest possible opportunity. Talks are underway to hold the summit at an appropriate time. The quick response and the general reaction of Arab leaders who came to Cairo, or talked to President Mubarak on the phone, clearly indicate that the general Arab view is that the summit should be held. The summit should be held at the earliest possible opportunity and earnest efforts should be made to ensure its success. The pitfalls that led to Tunisia's decision need to be examined. We need to look carefully into what happened in Tunisia and sort out all the sticky matters in a spirit of cooperation, transparency and honesty. This involves setting a date for the summit, one that gives the foreign ministers the opportunity to discuss unresolved issues and prepare the necessary dossiers about them, a process that should be carried out as soon as possible. Perhaps the first week of May would be an appropriate date for holding the summit at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. One must note here that holding the summit at the Arab League headquarters has nothing to do with the presidency of the summit. When Egypt called for the summit to be held at the Arab League headquarters, it was not attempting to act as president of the summit, but simply to limit the damage and maintain the momentum of joint Arab endeavours at a time when it is crucial for Arab leaders to offer their views on a number of key issues, such as Iraq, Palestine, and the flood of reform and modernisation initiatives tabled by the major powers. I believe that Arab officials -- leaders as well as foreign ministers -- need to remember the principles and mechanisms underlying the work of regional organisations; perhaps even to study successful examples in this respect, such as the EU. It may also be useful to recall the aphorism, "if you can't have it all, don't leave it all." To elaborate, what foreign ministers do in their meetings ahead of summits is prepare dossiers and consensual draft resolutions. As for unresolved issues, these are left for the leaders to tackle, for they alone are empowered to do so. It often happens that when Arab leaders meet face to face they tend to sort out matters that were too thorny for their ministers to tackle. Joint regional efforts are a never-ending process. So matters that prove too hard for one summit to resolve can always be moved over to the next. This is why the regular summits are set a year apart, an interval sufficient for some states to adjust their position or contemplate compromises. We need a positive attitude, for joint endeavours are in the interest of all Arab states. Arab countries need to work together and believe in the value of their common work. It is in the interest of the Arabs to further their cooperation, to take it into another dimension, perhaps one similar to that adopted by EU countries, for example. I believe that it is in the Arabs' interest to forget the Tunisia episode, set a date for the Arab foreign ministers to meet at the Arab League headquarters, and give these ministers clear instructions to prepare the summit dossier quickly and in accordance with the proper principles of the working mechanisms of regional organisations. The summit should be timed to balance two considerations: good preparations and the need to speedily end the frustration felt in the Arab street over the postponement. The issues of Iraq and Palestine and the suffering of our kinfolks there should provide motive enough for Arab leaders to set aside personal differences and transcend narrowly defined interests, at least at the present moment. Arab leaders should come together and ensure the success of the coming summit, regardless of the outcome of the current consultations over the venue and presidency of the summit. The real issue is much bigger. We need the summit to formulate a clear vision, to come up with practical policies on the Iraq issue, on facilitating the transfer of power and sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and on helping the UN assume its just role in Iraq, a role so far usurped by the occupation forces. Furthermore, the suffering of the people of Palestine and the evil of Sharon's aggressive policies, of his schemes aiming to rip apart the Palestinian land and devour it, all require a cohesive and solid Arab position, one sending a clear message to the major powers. Last but not least, I reckon that the stream of initiatives prepared by numerous international powers to "reform and modernise the Arab world" obliges Arabs to formulate a response enunciating Arab needs and particularisms. We have to remain alert to the true goals these initiatives entail. One such goal is to dissolve the Arab world in a wider milieu, rendering the Arab League -- the house of all Arabs -- ineffective, making the "greater" regional option the only one available, whether we like it or not. President Mubarak has persuaded many European leaders to listen to Arab views on reform. Now world leaders are waiting to see what the Arab summit will come up with on various matters, including reform. This isn't a time for divisions, rivalries or bickering.
