Iraqi Shias seek political representation along sectarian lines, writes Omayma Abdel-Latif In a unique event, three members of the Interim Governing Council (IGC) arrived at Al-Sahn Al-Haydari -- Imam Ali's holy shrine -- to organise a sit-in protesting the damage inflicted on the mosque. The damage to one of the gates of the holiest shrine in Shia Islam had resulted from fierce fighting between the young Shia leader Moqtada Al-Sadr's Al-Mahdi militia and US-led forces. IGC members Ahmed Chalabi, Salaama Al- Khafaji and Abdel-Karim Al-Muhamadawi went to Najaf as part of a team to negotiate a ceasefire to weeks of fighting in the holy cities. They were involved in the process of negotiation in their capacity as members of Al-Beit Al-Shii (the Shia House) -- a term coined to describe an umbrella organisation of 20 Iraqi Shia political groups, both within and outside the IGC. The formation of such a confessional-based political organisation has put renewed focus on the fate of the country's religious majority. It also brought to the fore questions about whether or not the formation of such an entity would further stregthen the already existing tendancy among Iraqis of organising themselves along confessional or ethnic lines. After the fall of former President Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraqi Shias were vying to play a decisive role in shaping the political process as it unfolded in Iraq. Despite the fact that they were finally able to express themselves freely, and for the first time claim a share of power which matches their demographic weight -- 13 out of 25 IGC members are Shia -- they nonetheless were not given representation as a single, unified group. Iraqi sources told Al-Ahram Weekly that the leadership vacuum and the absence of a political compass following the fall of Hussein's regime bolstered the need among the various Shia groups to coalesce behind a united front. Al-Beit Al-Shii is "an attempt to create a collective leadership among the various Shia groups", said Adnan Al-Asaady, deputy head of Al-Dawa Party, one of groups party to the organisation. "The diversity of views among Iraqi Shias concerning the occupation, Iraq's political future, and most importantly the role of religion in politics have forced us to seek a centralised leadership," Al-Asaady, who is also deputy interior minister, told the Weekly in a telephone interview from Baghdad on Monday. But would not such a sectarian-based organisation exacerbate, rather than mitigate, sectarian divisions? Al- Asaady thinks not. He dismissed the idea that the organisation is directed against any political or religious force in Iraq, insisting that it does not encourage sectarian-based activities. "It is in our interest that Iraq does not turn into sectarian cantons," he said. He added that Al-Dawa Party has, in the past, struck alliances with Sunni political movements, like the Iraqi Islamic Party. The idea to create Al-Beit Al-Shii emerged when the IGC's Shia members started a trend of coordinating their political views over key issues. The figure who took the lead role in this process was none other than Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). He is believed to be the mastermind behind the creation of a body that unites Iraq's Shias. While Al- Asaady would not elaborate on how much influence Chalabi is exercising over the group, he nonetheless acknowledged that, "he played a key role in putting life into it." Indeed, it was Chalabi who led the delegation to Najaf and championed the mediation efforts between Al-Sadr and commanders of the US-led forces. Success in the negotiation process was crucial to the organisation's credibility, since it was its first collective effort of this kind. The organisation came under heavy pressure to interfere after a strong warning was issued by Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, in which he threatened to "stand up to the American forces if they conduct an all out attack on Najaf", an action the Americans were seriously contemplating in order to crush Al-Sadr's militia. However, a ceasefire agreement was reached. Muwafaq Al-Rubei, Iraq's national security advisor and founding member of Al-Beit Al-Shii, told reporters that the truce was the result of intensive talks held with Al-Sadr. In a letter addressed to "my brothers who are members of Al- Beit Al-Shii ", Al-Sadr said that he wanted to put an end to the tragic situation in Najaf, and therefore would accept most of the conditions. Al-Sadr nonetheless objected to having a joint US-Iraqi police force patrolling the streets of Najaf, demanding Iraqis only. Al-Rubei also insinuated that a deal could be struck whereby members of Al-Mahdi militia would join in state security apparatuses. In what was considered a victory for Al-Sadr, Al-Rubei pointed out that the Americans have shown themselves willing to give up on their demand to arrest the young Shia leader, and that both the US-led coalition and Al- Mahdi militia agreed to withdraw their forces from the holy cities. For the past week, however, while Al-Sadr kept a low profile and made no public appearances -- he was absent from the Friday prayers -- the fragile ceasefire was violated several times with each party blaming the other. Intermittent fighting claimed the lives of more than 30 fighters of Al-Mahdi militia and at least four American soldiers. But on Tuesday, Chalabi remained confident that the ceasefire still holds. He told a press conference that "we will remain in Najaf until the job is done," in reference to the mediation efforts which continued through the week. Observers say that one issue which could prove crucial to the organisation's survival in the coming period is how it deals with struggles within the Shia community. Intensified intra-Shia rivalries might render the organisation's reconciliation efforts futile. This week, signs of a growing risk of intra- Shia conflict showed when Al-Sadr and members of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) engaged in a war of words over the failed attempt on the life of Sadr Al-Din Al- Qubanji, the sheikh of the Imam Ali Mosque and a leading SCIRI member. Shortly after the attack on Friday, Al-Mahdi militia claimed that it arrested the man accused of trying to assassinate Al-Qubanji, but refused to hand him over to the SCIRI. SCIRI sources told the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper that within their organisation there are two factions divided over how to deal with Al- Mahdi militia. The first believes that the militia includes former Baathists and therefore should be eliminated. The other wing, however, thinks that it was in fact Al-Mahdi militia that has caused the Americans heavy losses in the south. "It is more or less a struggle between the exiled Iraqis who want to have a monopoly over the political process in Iraq, and those who stayed in Iraq and suffered under Saddam's wrath," Abbas Al-Rubei, editor-in-chief of Al-Hawza Al- Natiqah -- or "the vocal seminary", the mouthpiece of Al-Sadr's movement -- told Al-Hayat. It is precisely this internal struggle, as well as the policies of the new Iraqi government to which power will be transferred on 30 June, which will most likely define the agenda of Al- Beit Al-Shii. The task of the organisation, however, will be further complicated by the fact that traditionally, Iraqi Shias have not politically organised themselves along confessional lines, or even coalesced behind a single, atomised leadership. Observers say that given the struggles and diversity within Iraq's Shia community, it is still too early to conclude that Al-Beit Al-Shii can emerge as an organised political force which can claim to legitimately represent the aspirations of Iraq's Shias.
