Jordan reluctantly takes up a role in the West Bank which evokes grim reminders of its difficult pre-1967 relationship with the Palestinians, writes Lamis Andoni Pressure from the United States and Israel for Jordan to assume a security role in the West Bank has re-fuelled historic fears among Jordanians and Palestinians alike that the so-called "Jordanian Option" -- an Israeli concept that encompasses Jordanian representation of the Palestinian people to the implied consequential transformation of the kingdom into a substitute homeland for the Palestinians -- will be revived. Palestinian and Jordanian officials have carefully avoided expressing their mistrust, partly to prevent blowing up a crisis that is already brewing, but also because both leaderships are under tremendous US pressure to comply with Israeli demands. The besieged Palestinian leadership feels that it is in no position to publicly question Jordan's role, partly because it would not want to make the Jordanian government -- which is already dependent on US financial and political aid -- more vulnerable to Israeli and American pressure. For their part Jordanian officials have been reluctant, even in meetings with Palestinians, to disclose the real extent of their projected role in the West Bank. A full-blown crisis could compel Jordan to tighten restrictions on Palestinian movements across the Hussein Bridge, a crucial outlet for Palestinian people and goods to the rest of the world. "Arafat is extremely frustrated. Jordanians are not saying much while we are mostly getting unconfirmed reports from the Europeans, Israelis and non-official Jordanian sources of scenarios for a direct Jordanian security involvement in the West Bank," a Palestinian official based in Ramallah said. Jordanian officials have repeatedly insisted that for the time being Amman's role would be confined to training Palestinian security forces, something which it has been doing since 1994. But the officials have also indicated that they would consider other options if requested by the Palestinians. Such statements, which enable Jordan not to appear defiant in the face of America's wishes, are highly misleading considering the besieged Palestinian leadership and Israel's desire for it to submit to its demands. Thus it was no surprise that -- despite inter Palestinian divisions and dissatisfaction with Arafat himself -- all PLO and non-PLO groups, ranging from Fatah and leftist factions to Hamas and breakaway PLO groups, were openly critical of the security roles played by both Jordan and Egypt. In a strongly worded statement, ten Palestinian groups urged Egypt and Jordan not to engage in any moves that would help Sharon. The statement said that the security role projected for these two countries suggested "the Palestinian people are the problem rather than the unfair occupation of our land". Many Palestinians, as well as some Jordanian analysts, believe that Amman and Cairo should be careful not to be used by Israel to redefine the conflict as one in which the Palestinian "threat "or "terror" -- words used by Israel and America to describe Palestinian resistance -- should be contained. The potential influence of the collective statement, combined with Yasser Arafat's influence and the dissatisfaction of Palestinians living in Jordan -- which make up half the population of the kingdom -- has alarmed Amman. The attitude of Palestinians in Jordan is not merely influenced by the PLO. Opposition to Jordan's security role has spread beyond the country's 11 refugee camps, a factor affecting the security of the country. Unlike a decade ago, where Jordanian nationalists feared a Palestinian takeover of the kingdom -- a fear that persists today -- many Jordanians strongly object to Jordan acting on behalf of Israel to end the Palestinian Intifada. Many are convinced that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has no intention of ending the occupation. And with the construction of the apartheid wall, the annexation of large settlements of the West Bank and the de facto siege of Gaza, Israel will, in effect, manage to "strangle" the Palestinian people, prompting a slow exodus to Jordan and preempting the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. "We shall not be party to denying the Palestinian refugees their legitimate right to return to their homes in Ramallah, Jaffa, Nablus or Hebron," wrote Tareq Masarweh in the leading Al-Rai newspaper. Massarweh's view reflects a commonly held belief that the US and Israel want to use both Egypt and Jordan as a tool to undermine Palestinian national rights, ensure their compliance by force and cause civil strife in Palestine and Jordan. "This security role does not serve the Palestinian people; it is an attempt to guarantee the success of the Sharon plan by undermining Palestinian unity, exonerating the occupation army of [its task] by placing the responsibility of confronting the Palestinian people on Arab armies." wrote Fahed Al-Fanek, again in the mostly government owned Al-Rai. Al-Fanek, who in the 80s and 90s was known for his blatant rejection of a Jordanian role that would lead to Palestinian domination of the kingdom, is again projecting broad fears of a Jordanian- Palestinian confrontation that would serve Israel and could easily spill over into Jordan. The shift of emphasis by nationalist Jordanian commentators is partly a result of the collapse of the Oslo peace process, outrage at Sharon's plan and implicit anger at the Jordanian government's support for the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is also a result of a fundamental change in Israel-American strategy, which has completely excluded Arab parties, not to mention the Palestinians, from negotiations to determine the future status of Palestinians. Seen in this light American-backed Israeli stipulations for Egypt and Jordan to assume security roles in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank do not aim to find or create alternative Arab political representation for the Palestinian people. That particular issue was already resolved when the US publicised President Bush's declaration, effectively giving Washington and Tel Aviv the right to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through bilateral agreements. By fully endorsing Sharon's plans -- of unilateral redeployment from the Gaza Strip, the annexation of the largest blocs of West Bank settlements into Israel and denial of Palestinian refugees' right of return -- Washington is basically giving Arabs the task of ensuring Palestinian compliance by enforcing security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. To some, this formula echoes British colonial policy of the late 19th century that formed the social and political landscape of Palestine and Jordan. "The US wants Jordan to assume the same role of the [former] British colonial institutions to block Palestinian independence, enable Israeli plans and weaken Arab resistance. Washington is using blatant blackmail [by exploiting Jordan's fear of instability spilling over from Iraq and Palestine] to force Jordan to comply [with their demands]," says Mowafak Mahadeen, Al-Arab Al-Youm columnist and avid student of Jordanian history. The irony, off course, is that by heeding Washington, Jordan may be in more danger of undermining its stability. For the time being, however, Jordan seems to be keeping its options open. King Abdullah's declared priority since succeeding his late father in 1998 is not to reclaim Jordan's representation of the West Bank but to do whatever "it takes" to ensure the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom east of the River Jordan. An objective that was promoted under the vague "Jordan First" slogan -- an all- encompassing phrase used to justify and silence dissent against Amman's pro- American policies.
