Abbas Kadhim* argues that Moqtada Al-Sadr must be thankful to his rivals The eruption of the Al-Sadr volcano is, once again, scorching the city of Najaf and several other cities in the south, not to mention Baghdad's largest Shia stronghold, Sadr City. Far from being unexpected, this round of violence is not the mystery that some interested parties are trying to make it out to be. Certain circles in the government of Iyad Allawi and its apologists have used the sorry state of affairs in the Shia areas to advance an American-inspired hope to drag Iran into the fray of confusion in Iraq, while others are still clinging to the claim that Moqtada Al-Sadr is a hardliner who is impossible to appease. Bluntly speaking, both claims are misleading and far from the sound analysis of the facts on the ground. Let us examine the first claim. It is undeniable that Iran monitors the situation in Iraq with great interest, firstly as the country sharing the longest border with Iraq and secondly in its capacity as self- appointed champion of the Shia wherever they might be. It is also naive to expect Iranian intelligence agencies to refrain from conducting business in a country where others have already set up shop. But in doing so, Iran is no different than the rest of Iraq's neighbours, except for the fact that its relations with the US are less than amicable. One can recall that the only other country receiving similar attention -- albeit occasional -- is Syria, obviously for the same reasons. We must not forget that Iraq maintained an open border policy for a very long time after the collapse of the former regime. This policy facilitated the arrival of people of diverse political, religious and national backgrounds, including Iranians. Those complaining about the presence of foreign insurgents in Iraq but who stop short of accusing their respective governments with regard to the violence they commit should not be surprised by the idea that Iranian fighters, too, are present in Iraq. Given the strong Shia identity of many Iranian visitors to Najaf and Karbala, it is not inconceivable that some of them join the ranks of the Mahdi Army, especially when confronted with the attack on the shrine of Ali Ibn Abi Talib and fellow Shia losing their lives. But it does not logically follow that the Iranian government has played a role in this. The second claim is equally flimsy. Moqtada Al-Sadr's success in acquiring power is more a result of the failure of others to fill the power vacuum than his own charisma. There are many politicians in Iraq in the present, but no statesmen. So people desiring change will gravitate towards anybody who is not totally disillusioned by incomplete sovereignty. If the only test for legitimacy in Iraq is the withdrawal of the occupation force, then Moqtada Al-Sadr will be the last viable Shia leader standing. This is especially true as long as Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is not very keen on full engagement in the political process. This reality has confounded all other Shia leaders, regardless of their standing in religious circles. It is not merely a twist of fate that has made the champions of Islamic change team up with the most secular of elements against the rising power of Moqtada Al-Sadr. At this point, the Al-Sadr movement has many elements in its favour, the absence of Al-Sistani from the scene being one. For a long time Al-Sistani constituted an impediment to Al-Sadr's ability to assert his authority. The Grand Ayatollah is not likely to leave his hospital bed to pull any strings in the coming days. Politically, the government of Allawi is not gaining any popularity for two main reasons: firstly because of heavy-handed policies -- curfews and clampdowns have alienated many people without making a significant difference on the security front. Secondly, the government has not succeeded in distinguishing itself in any practical way from the regime that was in place before it took charge. This failure to gain popularity is not only affecting the government. All the individuals and groups who have or have had any involvement in its inception and composition are implicated in its shortcomings. They can neither criticise the monster they created nor do anything to make it look better. Contrary to their previous expectations, the interim government -- or privileged clique -- has garnered little sympathy at grassroots level. Meanwhile, angry young men have no meaningful occupation or even the hope of gainful employment in the near future. Thus they join the ranks of Al-Sadr, not because of his charm but simply because they have been shunned by all others. The leadership of the Shia community must travel the only path towards claiming a wider constituency and a complete return to the people. Failing to do so deprives the people of Iraq of any true alternative to the otherwise untenable support for Moqtada Al-Sadr. They must also realise that calling on the Americans to bomb holy cities on their behalf is not the way to garner support and cultivate favour ahead of future elections. * The writer is a PhD candidate at The University of California, Berkeley.
