The head of the Israeli Army revealed nothing but cant in recent interviews: Israel's malign intentions towards its neighbours are unaltered, but not unassailable, writes Azmi Bishara The kibbutz-born Israeli chief-of-staff is reputed in Israel for his diligence, his aversion to ostentation and his reluctance to mix with politicians. That a journalist such as Yaron London of Yediot Aharanot should testify to this is indicative of an Israeli nostalgia for the Igal Alon and Rabin generation of graduates of the elitist Palmach units produced by the organised agricultural communities in Palestine before 1948. In his political upbringing, Moshe Ya'alon belonged to the right wing camp of the Labour movement, receiving his schooling in the erstwhile Ahdut Ha'avoda youth movement. Founded by Alon, this movement produced the founders of the secularist All of Greater Israel Movement that preceded Gush Emunim. This generation of the military succeeded in making a smooth transition into politics, turning their early agrarian settler life, military service and political activities into the major sections of their CVs. It was Ya'alon's brainstorm to inflict collective punitive measures on Palestinian civilians as a ploy for recruiting them against Hamas operations in Gaza. In an interview with Yediot Aharanot on 13 August, the IDF chief offers a completely candid assessment of the success of this policy, pointing to the protests appearing here and there around Gaza cautioning against firing missiles and to several incidents -- according to the information he had received -- in which the inhabitants of Beit Hanun, where the policy of collective punishment has been sustained with particular intensity, have actively prevented Hamas activists from firing Qassam missiles. Selective quoting from this interview has stirred a groundless jubilation, which, in turn, drowned out a number of frank and crucial statements, such as his admission to the Israeli assassination of Ghaleb Awali on 21 July in southern Beirut. The interview with Ya'alon concentrated on the effect of the Gaza disengagement plan and the role of the IDF. Ya'alon maintained that force alone would not suffice to fight terrorism; diplomacy was also required. He also criticised the disengagement plans for Gaza, although he later retracted his criticisms. It was then that the interview took a curious turn. After establishing that while politicians had the right to make decisions the military had the right to alert politicians to the potential impact of their decisions on security, the IDF chief-of- staff said that the Israeli army was prepared to and could defend new borders established through political negotiations. When pressed for more detail, he said that in theory it was possible to reach a peace agreement with Syria in accordance with which Syria would regain the entire Golan Heights. This agreement would take into account the security component and the army would be able to defend the new borders that were established accordingly. This statement became the banner headline for the interview in Yediot Aharanot, immediately after which it became the banner headline in Arab media, which is forever on the lookout for any hint of an Israeli bent towards peace. Nevertheless, news of the bloodbath in Najaf on that appalling day overshadowed what many hoped to portray as a peace message to Damascus or as a criticism of Sharon's policy of silence on Syria. Apart from the fact that it was issued in the context of Sharon's silent treatment towards Syria and expectations of what US pressures on Damascus might bring, the statement on the Golan, in reality, contains nothing new. This was always the position of the Israeli military establishment on Golan. At the time of Barak and Netanyahu, then chief of Israeli Military Intelligence Uri Saghi campaigned to revive negotiations with Syria on the basis of returning the Golan in exchange for peace. Contrary to general impressions, Sharon has never represented the Israeli military establishment. Their disdain for one another was mutual, although perhaps he'd have a chance of fitting in now if he were young again. However, Rabin and Barak, who were the most prominent representatives of this establishment in government since the founding of Israel, did, at various junctures, declare their approval of a complete withdrawal from Golan to the borders of 4 June 1967. What was always missing was the ultimate political resolve. According to prominent Israeli journalists, such as Raviv Drucker in his book, Hara-kiri, on the rise and fall of Barak, Barak eventually altered his position on the Golan. In the Wye River negotiations (December 1999-January 2000) he started out with a clear intent to negotiate on the basis of a full withdrawal from the Golan but soon retracted his position when he caught sight of public opinion polls. In his narcissistic memoirs (narcissism as the neo-moralists -- coined to rhyme with neo-conservatives -- are so kind to inform us is not necessarily a bad trait, but that's another subject), Bill Clinton confirms the Syrian account of this development and belies that of Barak, almost in so many words. No one bothered to apologise to Syria, especially those commentators who let their antipathy towards Syria make them lose sight of the fact that Syria is the victim of armed aggression, with a large chunk of its territory under occupation and that it is weighed down by national and regional responsibilities with regard to how it handles this situation. They simply do not want to mention Syria in any positive light. Maybe some of these would blush with shame were we to remind them of their claim -- uttered with a certain schadenfreude or, perhaps, pride in having their opinion on Syria's boundless Machiavellianism confirmed -- that Syria was prepared to accept less than the boundaries of 4 June 1967 and that its tedious insistence upon returning to the point where negotiations had left off was a sham. But then, sticking to firm principles and positions is boring, whereas shifting positions and internal wrangling and bickering among the members of negotiating delegations provide an endless source of entertainment, as well as undepletable fodder for those who have nothing to write about. In all events, no one apologised to Syria for having cited verbatim stories and translations from Israeli newspapers, accredited by many Arab commentators, regardless of their ignorance about the newspaper, the writer and the context, blaming Syria for the collapse of the negotiations. Yet, it wasn't Syria that was the object of Clinton's anger that fateful day in Geneva. Rather the resentful glare of all, including Clinton and Albright, was directed at the "champion of peace", Barak (who was not there, of course). At least the Arabs did not reproach Syria, as some of them reproached the Palestinians for having had the audacity to turn down the "deal" Barak offered in Camp David. According to Itamar Rabinovich who headed the Israeli negotiating team in the days of Rabin and Peres, the greatest breakthrough in the negotiations occurred in August 1993 with the issuing of the deposit, which he terms the "non- Paper". Syria regards this document, whose existence is recognised by the US, as the point at which negotiations with Israel must be resumed. In 1999, Barak agreed to abide by it. Rabinovich mentions further progress on the Syrian-Israeli track in 1995. Nevertheless, Peres called a halt to these negotiations following a wave of bombings in February and March 1996. It appears that the bombings themselves were merely a pretext; Peres and his advisors had certain qualms regarding Syria's regional role and simultaneously felt that they could make quicker progress on the Palestinian track, operating under the mistaken presumption that progress on one track undermines progress on the other. Ultimately, however, the issue boiled down once more to the lack of political resolve and domestic political considerations inside Israel. In contrast with this wavering, we have, for example, the "Grapes of Wrath" invasion of Lebanon and the assassination of Yehya Ayash, which were Shimon Peres's way of proving himself to Israelis following the assassination of Rabin. It was as clear then as it is today that the resolution of any Israeli-Syrian negotiations entails the restitution of the Golan to Syria. Sharon was put in such an awkward position by the peaceful overtures made by the Syrian president in an interview with The New York Times in December 2003. When pressed by a parliamentary committee as to why he had ignored the initiative, he was forced to respond that he had chosen to remain silent because the resumption of negotiations with Syria meant returning to pre-June 1967 borders. If he had to enter into negotiations with Syria, he added, they would have to begin at zero. Although Israeli officials have always known that the Golan has to be returned to Syria, they officially annexed this territory to Israel in December 1981, and proceeded to construct 23 settlements that are currently inhabited by no more than 20,000 settlers. To a portion of Israeli society, especially the Russian immigrants to whom the apples, cherries and crisp air of the Golan evoke memories of Europe, the Golan is part of Israel. Perhaps they think that as long as the religious fanatics have the right to demand the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel, they as secular Zionists have the duty to demand the annexation of land that has no religious value or associations. Undoubtedly, if they set eyes on the even more splendid heights of Bludan, a short drive northwest of Damascus, they would vote by an overwhelming democratic majority to annex that as well. So, Ya'alon offered no startling revelations regarding the Syrian track. Nevertheless, his remarks were taken as a peace gesture towards Syria and it is probably only a question of time before someone faults Damascus for failing to return the complement. Moreover, in the midst of this commotion few paid attention to his anti-Syrian remarks. Of course he issued the customary charges regarding the sweep of the terrorist network from Iran to Syria and Lebanon and regarding Damascus's support for Hizbullah and the Palestinian resistance. But then he gave us something new to think about. When Yaron London asked him provocatively why Israel did not use agents to harass President Al-Assad like the CIA is reputed to have done in many countries, Ya'alon responded indignantly, "who told you we don't?" The journalist pressed further: "But I don't see busses blowing up next to the Republican Palace in Damascus." To which Ya'alon countered, "why use bombs? There are gentler methods." Hard to believe, isn't it? It is harder yet to believe the silence that greeted an utterance that even a CIA chief of the 1950s would never have let slip from his mouth. CIA chiefs let Hollywood screenwriters let their imaginations roam over what CIA operatives got up to in those countries of the world whose governments met with Washington's displeasure. Not Ya'alon in his press interview, which leaves us agape and leaves little to the imagination. If he had been American, producers of espionage drama would have protested that he was driving them out of business. As for the Israeli scandal regarding the lack of any security reason for holding on to the Golan there is nothing new in this either. It has long been an open secret. Nevertheless Israel has obstructed every political agreement, either because the government felt that it could never get the support of the Israeli people (as though democracy gives Israel the right to annex any land between Pakistan and Morocco as long as the majority of the Israeli people vote for it) or because, even in the Rabin era, it expected more from Syria than just "normal" peaceful relations. Of course there will always be Arabs who agree. After all, they would argue, why should Syria be prevented from changing its role and joining the American camp so that it could work to spread stability and democracy just like the current government of Iraq? Ya'alon's remarks in that Yediot Aharanot interview might be useful when it comes to reminding Israeli public opinion that the IDF is capable of imagining Israeli borders without the Golan, and they might also be useful when appealing to global public opinion, since he stated unequivocally that Israel has no security justification for holding on to Golan. However, it is not useful to allow his remarks to drive us to ecstasy over some "new" Israeli position, as some thrilled over Sharon's deceptive approval of the roadmap. There is no new position, not even a budge. On the other hand, the chief-of- staff's other admissions do betray Israel's malicious intentions towards Syria and Lebanon and a willingness to resort to open conspiracy (if there exists such a creature it would have to consist of a heavy dose of chuzpah ) to realise these intentions. The US and Israel are working their way up to another war. It might be in a year, it might be in 10, but the Iranian question is the way. Every interview and every statement by Israeli and US officials seem to point in that direction. The details are not always important. What is important to the strategists is building up Iran as the focal concern in the region as they did with Iraq. If Syria is threatened in the process, its only possible response is to cling to fundamental positions on national and Arab issues (even the Israeli chief-of-staff recognises Syria's right to Golan). It will have to step up and expand a political and economic reform process that will mobilise the social, economic and political creativity of Syrians towards the development and consolidation of the state and society, and it will have to strengthen its alliance with the whole of, not just part of, Lebanese state and society. Syria should be looking for allies not collaborators, and there are a lot of them around. If Syrian and Lebanese public opinion at home and abroad is visibly seen to stand united in the face of potential aggression, no power will be able to begin to pull it off. Then, perhaps, Israel will begin to see the futility and danger of its policy of waiting and plotting. This applied before Ya'alon's interview and it still applies.
