Israel's prime minister has reduced the terms of debate to precisely that: it's my plan, or it's more settlers, writes Azmi Bishara Sharon is not Charles de Gaulle. He is as far away as ever from the conviction that Israel must recognise the national rights of the Palestinian people and withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, let alone recognise the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Nor do his proposals point vaguely in that direction. Nothing he has done or said suggests he is undergoing a metamorphosis into a de Gaulle. Far from it. He has initiated a scenario aimed at promoting and entrenching the immutable tenets of Israel's colonialist policies, including bolstering the "settlements in the West Bank that Israel will never relinquish in the framework of any permanent solution" -- assuming a permanent solution is ever reached. Sharon believes that a historic opportunity has presented itself to implement his scenario, and that Israel must grasp it. Among the most salient traits of this not-to-be-missed opportunity is Washington's increasing meeting of minds with Israel over the matter of the Palestinian leadership. Following Camp David II, and then, especially, 11 September, Washington has to agree with Tel Aviv that there is no Palestinian partner for the peace process and it, therefore, now sanctions Israeli unilateral action rather than the roadmap. The US, moreover, put its newfound convictions in writing in Bush's letter of guarantees, effectively stating a position on any solution that dovetails with that of the Israeli right. Sharon regards this letter as an Israeli victory that cannot, under any circumstance, be squandered. After all, no one knows what the future has in store for the US: Sharon knows only that the current dispensation in Washington is eminently suited to him and his ilk. He is, therefore, determined to press ahead with his plans, regardless of the results of the Likud referendum, and regardless of the decision of his party's central committee. He is equally determined to ignore the Israeli left and those Arabs who unilaterally assert that his plan is part of the roadmap. In fact, he has cautioned his ministers against using the term roadmap. He is also heedless of the recent threats issued by the settlers. Sharon told the Israeli press in several interviews on the eve of the Jewish New Year that he suggested his plan after the US had pressed Israel to restart negotiations with Syria. Such negotiations, Sharon said, would end with Israel giving up the Golan and are, therefore, to be avoided. But since he presented his plan the Americans have not mentioned the possibility of reviving negotiations with Syria. Sharon's plan is to disengage demographically from as many Palestinians as possible and, simultaneously, from the smallest amount of land in Gaza, the northern West Bank and, eventually, the cities of the West Bank. Another reason he sees an opportunity at hand is that the Palestinians have rejected -- rightfully, I would say -- the conditions he set for disengagement. They rejected these conditions because they fail to come close to the standards of relative fairness and equitableness necessary for anything that could reasonably pose as an agreement. But then they proceeded to other disorganised forms of opposition that cannot possibly be conducive to the formulation of a unified counterproposal or liberation strategy. Sharon is no doubt gratified that a large portion of the Arab world, in its eagerness to kowtow to the US, faults the Palestinians for refusing Israel's conditions for demographic disengagement, which pose as a settlement, for their failure to produce a leadership or for their deliberate obstruction of the emergence of a leadership that would agree to Israel's terms for such a settlement. The above have combined to lead Sharon to the conclusion that the time is ripe for the unilateral implementation of a scheme he has been contemplating and advancing since the mid- 1980s. Once the government approves a restitution bill for settlers who are to be withdrawn from Gaza and the northern West Bank he will have what he will take as an official stamp for his plan. As an experienced opportunist, Sharon anticipates that the mere proposal of compensation and delineation of specific sums of money will alter the tenor of the debate. The settlers' opposition will disintegrate as an advance on the compensation plus an incentive sum are paid to every settler who agrees to move to Galilee or the Negev, and every one of these will inflict a moral setback on the settlers' ideologically motivated battle. Sharon is therefore in a rush. He wants this restitution law to pass even before the government, and then the Knesset, vote on the disengagement plan in October and November, and he wants settlers to be receiving payments before withdrawal begins and immediately before settlers are scheduled to be evacuated. Sharon is not only the settlers' godfather, he is also the father of IDF meddling in politics. As an adventurous military officer he leaked information and statements to the press attacking the political leadership for its cowardice and wavering. The army and the settlers have always been the rungs he used as he climbed the political ladder. So, when settlers today oppose him and threaten violence he will not be deterred. He knows that most of the settlers realise that there is no future in the Jewish settlements in Gaza, which will remain an enormous prison camp for its Palestinian inhabitants long after the disengagement. However, Sharon remains firm on keeping settlers in the West Bank. He is unmoved by the uproar over dismantling the settlements in Gaza, by the accusation that he is promoting a policy of transfer against Jews, by the possibility of a momentous rift in Israeli society and by the likelihood of acts of civil disobedience and perhaps violent protest. These, after all, are merely prerequisites for holding on to the settlements in the West Bank, and not just in the tiny area of Jenin. The uproar over Gaza is the first line of defence for the settlements in the West Bank. The hue and cry will help garner US and international support and understanding on this issue, for how many battles can Israeli society tolerate over the next two decades and how close can it draw to the brink of civil war? Such prospects would never propel Sharon to abandon his plan, but they will keep the Americans from making demands. Not only is Sharon's plan unilateral -- it has, for all practical purposes, cast the roadmap into the rubbish bin -- it is also a long-range plan. This is a plan that anticipates the emergence of a Palestinian leadership that will accept Israel's conditions for a settlement after having had to accommodate to Israel's unilaterally imposed dictates. Meanwhile, the Israeli left is Sharon's reserve army in his battle with those within Israel's body politic who are more right than their prime minister. And all he expects of the Arab world is for it to consider him a moderate -- relatively speaking, since, after all, everything in life is relative and a question of proportion -- and to stick up for him in what has become the only game in town, i.e. the game of the Israeli right. In Israel it seems that those championing a disengagement from the largest possible number of Palestinians while giving up the least amount of land have won their two-pronged battle against those clamouring for continued direct control over the territories, including Gaza, and against those advocating waiting for an agreement to be reached with the Palestinians. But how does this look from the Palestinian perspective? The resolution of the Israeli battle above has inflamed the controversy that has been taking place in Palestine for more than a decade, from Camp David through the Bush and Sharon proposals for a Palestinian state which insist on the need for a Palestinian leadership to take them up. This controversy centres around whether or not "to pass up, again, on the historic opportunity to create a Palestinian state", in the phrasing favoured by those who have internalised the Zionist rhetoric that insists the "Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity". What Sharon and Bush are offering is a Palestinian state on condition the Palestinians concede everything else. It's a package deal: a state in exchange for relinquishing the right to return, the pre-June 1967 borders, the dismantlement of Jewish settlements and Jerusalem. Is it any wonder that those who support this package deal regard Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as an opportunity to settle the it's-now-or-never debate once and for all. And, just as Israel has reduced the alternatives to either Sharon or the settlers, the Palestinians have had their alternatives reduced to either the package deal or suicide bombs. It is an either/or proposition that conforms perfectly to the spirit in which the world is being run today. Going for the first option is to concede to the Sharon plan, if in modified form, while opting for the second unwittingly helps Sharon to advance his cause inside Israel and abroad. The Palestinians' only way out of this trap is to create a unified national leadership, representative of all resistance factions. The mere existence of such a leadership automatically nullifies that artificially imposed dichotomy by posing a national alternative that stands for justice for the Palestinian people and the national struggle against occupation and apartheid in accordance with a long-term unified strategy. An added benefit is that this alternative will expose Sharon for what he is, which is not de Gaulle. When the Israeli dispute over the settler issue flares into a full-scale clash the Palestinian people, and all those who support their legitimate rights, will need to rally their wits and energy to belie the claim that Sharon is de Gaulle and to put paid to the contention that the only alternatives they have are the Sharon scenario for creating a walled-in Bantustan or more settlers.
