Voting, according to Iraq's most venerable Shia cleric, has become a religious obligation. Abbas Kadhim comments Deputies of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani have warned the Shia of Iraq of the risk of going to hell if they fail to participate in the January 2005 elections. This new approach to politics on the part of the Hawza is very curious. Mandating political participation in a system controlled by an oppressive regime is alien to Shia thought, unless the participant is certain of a positive outcome. The corruptness of the political process in Iraq is beyond doubt and a Shia participation is far from certain to beget any positive outcome. Hence, it is preposterous to threaten those who do not participate with hellfire. Furthermore, the Hawza seem to be content with the current election law in Iraq, despite the potential damage it could cause the political future of the country. Aside from its extreme vagueness, this law is designed to benefit a clique of party bosses and their foreign patrons. In defiance to common sense and practicality, Iraq, with all its political and ethnic chaos, is being lumped into one giant electoral district. Political parties will submit lists of candidates asking, for example, a voter from a village in the marshes of Nasiriya to expect that his interests are represented by people from, Baghdad, Kurdistan, Detroit, and London. If he has a problem with this farce, he can go to hell -- literally. There are two explanations for the Hawza's fervour about this election. The first is historical. The Hawza has often been blamed for the plight of its constituents over the past 80 years after their notorious fatwas demanded all Iraqis to boycott the elections of 1923. With the same extremist tones, the Ayatollahs of the time declared that if "anyone participates or helps in the elections [it] would be as if he fought against Allah, the Messenger and the imams. Such [a] person would clearly deserve the eternal torment in hellfire." The result was the elimination of the majority from any participation in the government. The Shia never recovered from this infringement, nor did they forgive the Hawza for betraying their legitimate claims. The bitterness grew after the same Ayatollahs decided to cancel their own fatwas and rubber- stamp the same elections which they had previously banned. The second explanation relates to the chances of certain political parties close to the Hawza in the elections. Given the approved setup, clergymen and politicians loyal to the Hawza will have the opportunity to submit a list blessed by the Grand Ayatollah and enter the legislature without having to worry about the rising popularity of rivals such as Moqtada Al-Sadr. The list is also meant to secure easy passage to parliament for a few questionable individuals who failed the test during the crisis of Najaf. The political background for the list will involve the Al-Daawa Party, the Supreme Council and other clergy associated with the Hawza. To say that withholding support for this kind of politician would classify eligible voters as enemies of the Prophet is nothing but an empty rhetoric. Having a legislature dominated by a combination of self-appointed extreme Shia leaders is not necessarily beneficial for the Shia community. Many of the clerics have already been in governmental positions over the past 18 months while others dominate the local administration in most parts of southern Iraq. Yet whenever a crisis presented itself they were nowhere to be found. Indeed, they have been part of a government that violated the most sacred Shia symbols and practiced some of the worst kinds of corruption. Even the destruction of the old city in Najaf and the damage to the Shrine of Imam Ali were not sufficient enough to generate one resignation or strong denouncement from these pretentious Shia leaders. There is no evidence that they would act any differently should they be elected to the next government. However, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani has surely made a few positive political accomplishments when he interceded personally to curb certain plots against a democratic Iraq. Among his commendable accomplishments are his demands that the writing of the permanent constitution must be carried out by an elected committee, his rejection of the transitional administrative law and his historic interception of a catastrophe in Najaf. Yet to this record he should have added a clear rejection of the election law and demanded a decent set of rules for what could be the most important political event in Iraq for years to come. The law in its present language -- vague and incoherent, an apparent translation of a foreign document -- does not provide independent individuals with a fair access to running for political posts. In addition, nothing in this law can prevent a recurrence of the travesty that accompanied the appointment of the current assembly. The next legislature will be called upon to make some very significant decisions. Among these are the writing of a permanent constitution, the status of foreign troops in the country, and the political identity of Iraq at the regional and international levels; not to mention the hot issues in the domestic realm. Any smell of illegitimacy would exacerbate these disputes and render a genuine settlement out of reach. At that point, the road to hell would not require a fatwa.
