The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon requires delicate handling, writes Ibrahim Nafie There is no shadow of doubt that Syria has begun a complete withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon. In his address to the Syrian parliament on Saturday President Bashar Al-Assad declared his government's commitment to withdrawal in principle. On Monday, following a meeting of the Supreme Syrian-Lebanese Council in Damascus, the two sides issued a joint statement announcing that Syrian forces would withdraw to the Beqaa Valley -- the first phase of a complete withdrawal -- and that the joint military committee would be given a month to draw up an agreement specifying the duration of the phase, the size and location of Syrian forces and their relations with Lebanese authorities. The statement also affirmed the two sides' "non-selective" commitment to the provisions of the Taif Accord and to UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Following this the joint military committee charged with supervising the force withdrawals convened. We thus have an official and public Syrian pledge, an agreement over general principles and mechanisms of phasing and a commitment to the principle of full withdrawal, which is understood to include all Syrian intelligence operatives as well as troops since anything less would fall short of the provisions of Taif and Resolution 1559. The Supreme Syrian- Lebanese Council could not be expected to do more given that the practicalities of redeployment and timing have to be worked out by specialised committees which have already begun to hammer out the details. Another indication of the sincerity of the Syrian pledge is that it has already reduced its forces in Lebanon from 40,000 to approximately 14,000. However, it is important to bear in mind that withdrawal requires close coordination between Syria and Lebanon. Syrian camps have to be dismantled and forces and materials relocated to assembly points before transferring them to the Beqaa, which in turn has to be established as a final staging point before troops return to Syria. In Syria many preparations have to be made to absorb the homecoming troops. More importantly, the withdrawal has to be phased so as to permit Lebanese forces to fill the void created by the departure of Syrian forces. As the recent assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri so tragically illustrated, political tensions in Lebanon are explosive. To compound the dangers there are armed groups, such as Hizbullah and other Palestinian militias, that are beyond the control of the Lebanese armed forces. It is vital, therefore, that Syrian and Lebanese officials work together closely so as not to leave Lebanon prey to a collapse into violence and chaos, which appears to be the direction in which some forces would like to see Lebanon head. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon will require delicate handling if Lebanon's security and stability is to be safeguarded, and this requires time. It should be further borne in mind that Syrian forces were originally brought into Lebanon as part of the Arab effort to end a protracted civil war. Given this mantle of Arab legitimacy Syrian forces can hardly be viewed as an occupation army, certainly not in the sense that Israeli forces in southern Lebanon were, and the Syrian withdrawal should not, therefore, be construed in the same light as the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. In spite of demonstrable sincerity on the part of Damascus to completely withdraw, not to mention the precariousness of the political situation in Lebanon, Washington hastened to criticise the statement issued by the Syrian-Lebanese Supreme Council. "The US will not be satisfied by partial solutions. It wants to see deeds not words and Syria knows what it must do," a White House spokesman said. In addition, German Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement calling upon Syria to withdraw its military and security forces from Lebanon "as soon as possible". Such pressures serve neither the security and stability of Lebanon nor the region as a whole. Syria knows what it has to do, it has taken the decision to do it and is now in the process of translating that decision into a plan of action that realities in Lebanon dictate must be worked out jointly with the Lebanese government. Even so, Syrian officials have offered additional assurances, reaffirming their understanding that a full withdrawal includes security and intelligence operatives and that withdrawal must be completed before the Lebanese legislative elections scheduled for May. Unfortunately, I doubt whether such reassurances will silence the critics. The current campaign against Syria has less to do with scepticism over its sincerity on the withdrawal issue than it does with the opportunity to use this issue as a pressure card to force Syria into concessions on other unrelated issues and, for some, to humiliate Syria as much a possible in the bargain. I only hope that the Lebanese opposition is aware of this dynamic. The people of Lebanon have every right to demand the withdrawal of Syrian forces, a thorough investigation into the assassination of Al-Hariri and proper guarantees for fair and free parliamentary elections. Although Syria has given every indication that it is working to meet these demands the Lebanese are also entitled to do what is necessary to ensure that Syria stays on course. In doing so, though, they must be wary of the designs of those regional and international powers that remain as ready as ever to pounce on divisions in Lebanese society and turn them to their own advantage.
