Was the French electorate's rejection of the EU constitution a surprise, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed Last Sunday, 29 May, 2005, marks a turning point in the history of the 21st century that will have long- term repercussions on France, Europe and, eventually, on the world at large. France's 'no' vote to the European constitution raises an issue of critical importance that goes beyond the procedural aspects of the referendum to the substantive issues that distinguish one nation in Europe from another. It is an issue whose impact is not limited to the present, but extends into both the past and the future. That is why it can be of interest to probe the ideas of independent opinion-makers with unorthodox approaches to the issue. Daniel Cohn-Brendit, a Green member of the EU parliament for Germany, who is better known as the leader of the 1968 student uprising in France, reproaches the opponents of the constitution on the left for creating what he believes is a false impression that the referendum represented a choice between a neo-liberal Europe and a social Europe. The 'no' camp succeeded, according to Cohn-Bendit, by cleverly exploiting the fact that Europe today does not correspond to the idea of Europe that French citizens think is, or should be, possible. The French people dream of a Europe that offers shelter against neo-liberal globalisation, of a European Union that prevents the migration of enterprises, job losses and social degradation. The left blames the EU for having failed so far to achieve this. But the real problem as he sees it is the alternative model for Europe that the French left clings to, which he calls the Guallist-Communist model. Dating from the 1960s, it relies on centralisation of power, a major role for state enterprises and on all-powerful state. Cohn-Bendit argues that this model cannot, as the French wish, be transposed to a European level. It does not even work in France itself anymore. He believes the lack of such a model has led to two sorts of reactions: on the one hand, a nationalistic retreat into the confines of the nation-state and an outright rejection of Europe -- the view that the extreme right endorses -- and, on the other, a social retreat advocated by parts of the left. This is what Cohn-Bendit calls a post-modern Napoleonic vision. The French invented the modern concept of the republic and, after 1789, exported it to the rest of Europe. Napoleon's idea was to impose the republic on Europe through military power. The post- modern Napoleons on the French left now assume the EU is -- or should be -- simply an extension of France. The left maintains the view that a re- negotiation of the constitution, if it were possible, could produce a text that counters neo-liberalism and opposes globalisation. But the political majorities in Europe today are emphatically more pro- neo-liberalism. A re-negotiation would produce a text that is much less supportive of the idea of a social Europe Cohn-Bendit believes that the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe is better than what it replaces and will not be made better by re-negotiation. When the French rejected the constitution on Sunday, they lost the things they really want: true European solidarity and a genuine European democracy -- in short, the creation of the European Republic. Another French analyst worried by the results of the referendum is François Heisbourg, the director of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research. He believes the vote leaves France in a diminished state, for the simple reason that for more than half a century French influence has flowed from Paris's role as a prime mover of the European integration process. By putting the process on hold, the 'no' vote has deprived France of one of its main assets as a major player on the world stage and reduced its effectiveness in ventures relying on European support, like the Middle East peace process or Western efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While a lower European profile might be greeted with relief by Washington, which would welcome the opportunity to pick and choose its favourites in a weaker and divided Europe, as it did in the early stages of the Iraq crisis, Heisbourg believes the overall effect will be negative for the US as well. After all, a disengaged Europe is not going to be of much help in a world where the United States has few other friends of similar economic and political power. In an interesting take on the issue, Dominique Moisi of the French Institute of International Relations, IFRI, warns that the likely result of the 'no' vote is that this century will go down in the history books as the "Asian century". The EU would probably become what he calls a Magna Helvetia (a big Switzerland), for a 'no' vote will not be followed by a new departure for the union, but by a combination of disarray and confusion, if not paralysis. At a time the pace of history seems to be accelerating, particularly in Asia, the French 'no' vote will lead the EU to sit by and watch as the train of history leaves the station without it. While the Western pole betrays internal divisions, the Far East will emerge as a relatively independent pole of its own. The US will no longer be the only superpower. The French who voted 'no' to the ratification of the EU constitution should not be surprised to see the present unipolar world order evolve not into a bipolar but into a multipolar world order -- not necessarily a bad thing.
