Fateh Azzam* examines the reasons behind the forced removal of Sudanese refugees from a park in Mohandeseen In the early morning hours of December 30, thousands of Egyptian security personnel forcibly removed around 2,500 Sudanese refugees camped out in a small park near the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Mohandeseen. Tragically, around 27 refugees and asylum seekers were killed, more than half of whom were children and women. Thousands of protesting refugees and asylum seekers were transported to various holding centers in and around Cairo, and the majority were eventually released, leaving a few hundred still awaiting possible deportation. The event prompted much angry reaction around the world, created strained relations between UNHCR and the government of Egypt, and exacerbated an atmosphere of growing distrust between the Sudanese refugees/asylum seekers and UNHCR. Calls by national and international human rights organizations for an international inquiry into the killings were rejected by Egypt, and we're given to understand that the Prosecutor General has initiated an internal investigation. The event brought out the best and the worst in Egyptian society. Human rights organizations leveled charges of police brutality and racism and many civil society organizations rallied to the assistance of the victims, collecting blankets, food and funds to provide desperately needed support. The Mufti, Dr. Ali Gomaa issued a fatwa approving Sadaqah for all Sudanese refugees during Eid Al-Adha. At the same time, coverage in much of the Egyptian media was characterized by accusations of abuse of Egyptian hospitality by 'drunken' and disease-ridden refugees, and other xenophobic statements about refugees, 'non-Muslim kuffar' stealing Egyptian jobs who should be sent back where they came from. The negative public reactions were clearly defensive, confirmed pre-existing inclinations, and betrayed a lack of knowledge or understanding of the background to the particular situation of Sudanese refugees in Egypt. It is a complicated and nuanced issue, and this article hopes to provide some helpful information rather than a thorough explanation. THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL: Broadly speaking, asylum seekers flee their countries of origin out of a credible fear of persecution because of their race, nationality, political opinion, religion or their membership in a particularly targeted social group. They are at risk of serious harm at home and are in need of protection, which their countries of origin have failed to provide. This is the criteria by which they can acquire the legal status of "refugee" in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. To acquire this status, a Refugee Status Determination process (RSD) needs be conducted, which the Government of Egypt has relegated to UNHCR. This status differentiates between refugees and other migrants or aliens, and gives them particular temporary rights and privileges until such time as a durable solution is found for them. One problem is that not all asylum seekers qualify for the official recognition of 'refugee,' and consequently would not enjoy the same level of protection, rights and privileges. The status of refugee, however, is expected to be temporary and three durable solutions are possible for legally recognized refugees: voluntary repatriation, local integration in the host community, or resettlement to a third country. The latter two, of course, are not a "right" as such for refugees, and depend on the willingness of countries to admit and resettle them in their midst. Many refugees come to Egypt hoping for resettlement to third countries, but only a handful of (Northern) countries offer limited annual quotas for this purpose. In reality, only a fraction of recognized refugees will be resettled, and the percentage is decreasing. African refugees in Cairo can be recognized by UNHCR either under the 1951 Geneva convention or the complementary 1969 African convention on refugees, and Egypt is party to both. The African Convention expands the definition of 'refugee' to include those seeking asylum from civil conflict in their home countries; quite important for Sudanese refugees from the South and from Darfur. However, countries that offer resettlement will only consider those recognized under the Geneva Convention, and those recognized under the African Convention, therefore, are generally excluded. Add thousands more "closed files" -- those who are not accepted as "refugees" yet are still unwilling to return -- and you have a significant population of individuals and their families that are left with local integration or voluntary repatriation as solutions for their plight. Yet, local integration is not promoted by Egypt, and the government will vehemently reject it if discussed openly for a variety of reasons not least of which is economic. Survival and livelihood in Egypt is very difficult for refugees as the government, concerned with protecting its own labor force and with tretched expenditures in health and education, is not very generous with work permits and access to services in general. The situation has markedly improved for refugees in recent years, with better access to primary health services and education made possible by UNHCR assistance. But overall it is not a tenable long-term situation for most refugees, asylum seekers and closed files. Economic and social relations between the refugee community and some Egyptian communities, particularly in the poorer neighborhoods, periodically get tense and racism in the country is seen to be on the rise. There were periodic round-ups and arrests of refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom reported humiliating and racist treatment at the hands of Egyptian security. The frustration of Sudanese refugees with this situation has been deepening and rising over the past two years. Recall the demonstration in front of UNHCR in August 2004, where dozens of protesting refugees and police were injured, which should have served as a warning bell for everyone. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM: As of April 2004, soon after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM was signed, UNHCR-Cairo suspended RSD interviews for all Sudanese refugees. According to UNHCR, the decision includes immediate registration of Sudanese applicants as "asylum seekers" thus granting them temporary residence and protection, rather than risk rejection of their applications on the basis of a fundamentally changed circumstance in the Sudan. The suspension of these interviews was renewed every six months and remains in force. Thus, even legal recognition as refugees was no longer available to the Sudanese for more than one and a half years, and with it of course the possibility, no matter how slim, of resettlement. UNHCR also declared that it was willing to register and assist those who want to repatriate, but was "not promoting" voluntary repatriation as such. However, the refugees remained quite unsure about the peace process in Sudan, whether it would last or create enough of a change to reassure them about a return in safety and dignity to their country. The fragility of the peace was for a time brought home by the death of John Garang and the arrests that took place in the immediate aftermath, confirming the worries of political exiles about possible threats to safety upon return. The message to the refugees was fundamentally confused. UNHCR was telling them that it won't legally recognize them as refugees. At the same time, it's not telling them to go home, but will help them do so if it's voluntary. In the meantime, some assistance continues for minimal survival in Egypt, usually targeted towards the most needy and destitute, under temporary asylum-seeker protection which gives little by way of "rights" in Egypt other than the right not to be forcibly repatriated. Why has Egypt been loath to raise the level of rights and privileges Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers can enjoy in the country, if at least to make their lives more bearable and manageable as they await solutions? Officials often cite the assumption that should Egypt provide better services and living conditions, the 'floodgates' would open and too many refugees would descent upon the country. This thesis, however, is based on a mere assumption and deserves serious scrutiny and testing. Rather than exercise its obligations under the 1951 and African Conventions, the Government has to date left all matters related to refugees entirely up to the discretion and limited finances of UNHCR, while at the same time leaving the agency little room to maneuver in terms of what it can promise the people it purports to protect. This is the crux of the problem that led to the sit-in protest which began on September 29, 2005 until they were forcibly removed at the end of December. For the refugees, asylum seekers and closed files, there is no way forward (towards resettlement), no way back (towards what? an untested and fragile peace?) and a difficult situation in Egypt which is untenable in the long term. Many questions surrounding the forcible removal of the protest in Mohandeseen on December 30 remain unanswered. Why did the refugees reject several offers by UNHCR? Could UNHCR and the government of Egypt have offered them more? Why such excessive use of force in the removal? Why so little information and care in the immediate aftermath, when refugees were left wondering whether their relatives were in another detention center, in hospital or in the morgue? Could this tragedy have been avoided, and can it happen again? A thorough investigation should answer most of these questions, but the answers should point to the need for a fundamental review of Egypt's policies towards the desperate refugees in its midst, and of UNHCR's capacity -- financial and administrative -- to provide the needed protection and assistance its mandate promises. * The writer is director of Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo (AUC)
