As the military dust settles, big questions on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border are begging to be asked, writes Ayman El-Amir With the jittery ceasefire in Lebanon holding and the deployment of the authorised 15,000- man robust international force in progress, both parties to the month-long war are hunkering down for stocktaking. The Ehud Olmert-led Israeli government and the Israeli army are under pressure for failing to make a military clean sweep of Hizbullah the way they used to do with Arab armies in past wars. On the other side, Hizbullah is being targeted by Lebanese minority- interest sniper-politicians for taking matters into its own hands and drawing the wrath of the over-equipped Israeli military machine. Politicians on both sides are trying to make capital of the war while the military is studying everything that went right, or wrong, for the benefit of the next confrontation. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the US has mobilised every willing European country in a heavy-handed deployment of men and materiel to ensure that Hizbullah does not challenge Israel again. Because of the dire situation in Lebanon and the desperate need for a ceasefire, the Arabs did not want to prolong the agony of the Lebanese people by demanding a linkage between the cessation of hostilities and a political settlement. The Lebanese government requested but failed to have the disputed Shebaa Farms placed under the supervision of the UN pending final resolution of its status. So the situation in Lebanon is back to the status quo ante that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice so persistently argued against, but with a difference: Hizbullah will be watched by two armies -- a Lebanese and European one -- potentially consisting of 30,000 men. What the Bush administration and Israel want more than anything now is to have another Security Council resolution for the enforcement of Resolution 1559, in order to disarm Hizbullah once and for all and put Syria on notice of mandatory sanctions if it tries to replenish Hizbullah's arms. Lebanon is more fragile than ever after the devastating Israeli offensive. The duress of the war has unified ranks and elevated Hizbullah fighters to the status of national liberation heroes. However, before the clearing of the rubble even started, Lebanese small-faction politicians started bickering, echoing pro-Israeli Western politicians, and some US-backed Arab leaders, who blamed Hizbullah for provoking Israel into a confrontation that wreaked so much havoc on Lebanon. Was it necessary and who authorised Hizbullah to fight Israel in the name of Lebanon, were among the questions. Only the urgent need for the repatriation of the displaced Lebanese population, the reconstruction of roads, bridges, houses and hospitals, the withdrawal of Israel and the deployment of an international force to beef up UNIFIL, is delaying the more animated squabbling some Lebanese politicians are yearning for. The trouble with Lebanon is that it is a small, peace-loving country delicately poised on multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian stilts, ready to fall down at the slightest jolt. Lebanon's politics is balanced on the interests of ethno-feudal lords that command fragmented followings and small militias to defend those interests. This has long precluded a genuine national debate and consensus, and has been Lebanon's Achilles heel since the Druze massacre of Maronite Christians in 1860. It has also given the world's imperial powers of the past, global powers of the present and regional powers in the area opportunities to manipulate Lebanese politics to their advantage. The just-ended war has fostered among most Lebanese a spirit of unity rarely experienced. Politicians who place the survival and prosperity of Lebanon above their narrow interests have a unique opportunity to build a national, non-ethnic-driven consensus. Hizbullah has made this possible. Israel, forever backed by the US, will never forgive Hizbullah the blow it dealt its image as a state and as the region's uncontested military bully. The war has created a singular momentum for reviving the peace process the US has frozen since 2000 when Ariel Sharon sold George W Bush and his neo-cons the concept that the fight against terrorism, not the Palestinian problem, is the panacea for America's troubles in the region. So, instead of seizing the opportunity to work out a political solution that would open the way for a wider peaceful settlement with Syria and the Palestinians, the US and Israel are preoccupied with how to outflank and destroy Hizbullah, using the UN, regional allies and domestic, sectarian Lebanese division to achieve their ends. For Israel, where the political contest between Benyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Olmert has given the latter a 60 per cent disapproval rating, there is a burning desire for revenge. Israel's military prestige and the standing of the Kadima Party need to be repaired. As the 34-day war demonstrated Israel's deficiency in fighting guerrilla warfare, the Israeli command is now recalling the 91st brigade of reservists for retraining on guerrilla warfare. An anti-guerrilla warfare Israeli training centre was created in 1997 to train reservists in combating Hizbullah but closed down after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon six years ago. For Hizbullah, which has maintained a low profile since the end of the war, the stakes are even higher. Politically, it will have to help build a consensus among different Lebanese factions on the need to maintain political unity as a substitute for ethnic rivalry. It would be naïve to pretend that implacable Israel will leave Hizbullah or Lebanon alone. It would also be cynical to believe that Hizbullah is redeemable for a peaceful Lebanon. Dismantling and crushing Hizbullah will always be the cherished goal of the US and Israel as a way to subdue Lebanon. Lebanese politicians of all shades should avoid this trap. Hizbullah has the paramount military responsibility of reviewing its weaknesses and rebuilding its strength. In all wars with Arab countries, Israel depended on air supremacy to achieve a quick victory. Hizbullah will have to acquire the means to neutralise the Israeli air force that had caused so much destruction and casualties during the war on Lebanon. Egypt had experience with that during the October 1973 War when its troops used the shoulder- fired Soviet-made Strella (arrow) missiles to shoot down Israeli jets. This provided ground- to-air cover for Egyptian troops as they advanced into Sinai beyond the coverage area of land-based anti-aircraft missile batteries. There is little doubt that the ultimate US-Israeli objective now is to strangulate Hizbullah and dismantle its infrastructure, either by mobilising international political pressure, economic blackmail or covert military operations. The deploying international force has a vague mandate that is subject to various interpretations by all sides. One possible way of defusing post-war tension is for Israel to accept mediation efforts for the exchange of prisoners and starting negotiations for the settlement of the occupied Shebaa Farms. However, if the Olmert government should face, and lose, a vote of confidence in the Knesset, a new hawkish government that would make the prospects of peace even dimmer could potentially replace it. Hizbullah has many odds lined up against it. The most mortal of them are domestic and Arab politics. It is caught up in the US definition of all movements of national liberation as "terrorist organisations", to which major powers, including the Russian Federation, are subscribing for domestic reasons. The luminous era of national liberation has been replaced by the global war on terrorism. However, during the month- long war with Israel, Hizbullah has demonstrated stamina, discipline and political acumen that should ensure its future survival.
