After a year of prevarication, Sudan accepts an enlarged UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, writes Gamal Nkrumah Tongues wagged over Darfur in Khartoum, Washington and New York throughout 2006. The verbal battle between the Sudanese government and the US, and by implication the United Nations, were at the heart of the year's hullabaloo concerning the Darfur crisis. Western diplomats made no secret of how gung-ho they were about ostracising Sudan. Washington trundled out its big-gun Bush administration officials to put pressure on Khartoum. US Secretary of States Condoleezza Rice, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendai Frazer, and US special envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios all visited the Sudanese capital. The stream of American bigwigs throwing their weight about in Sudan miffed the Sudanese authorities. Thanks in large measure to the People's Republic of China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council with vested economic interests in Sudan, US proposals to impose sanctions against Sudan were watered down considerably. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defended the rights of the people of Darfur. Humanitarian relief agencies and international donors rang alarm bells, pointing to gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity -- genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape of Darfuri women, wanton destruction of property and other atrocities. It was a typically mixed bag for Sudan in 2006. One Darfuri armed opposition group signed the 5 May Darfur Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudanese government in the Nigerian capital Abuja. Two major Darfur armed opposition groups refused to sign a peace deal with the Sudanese government in May -- the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) headed by Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Al-Nour. Meanwhile, Arko Minni Minnawi, leader of the rival SLA Minnawi faction, and now special presidential advisor to Sudanese President Hassan Al-Bashir, who signed the May peace deal with the Sudanese authorities, later fell out with Khartoum and there were incidents of internecine fighting between Minnawi's group and Sudanese government forces. The Sudanese government has come under the microscope. In October, Khartoum promptly dismissed the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Sudan Jan Pronk after he made remarks deemed insulting to the Sudanese army. This week, however, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir accepted the principle of a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force. In 2006, Sudan's neighbours were also dragged into its internal squabbles. Chad and the Central African Republic clashed with Sudan over Darfur. The fighting in Sudan's westernmost province spilled over into the two countries. In the east, Eritrea played an instrumental and more positive role in the signing of a peace deal between the Sudanese government and eastern Sudanese armed opposition groups -- the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Arab Free Lions. The Eritreans previously backed the two groups. Eritrea persuaded Khartoum that it should open up genuine diplomatic space within which to resolve the Darfur crisis. The Eritreans have expressed satisfaction with the way in which Darfuri armed opposition groups and the Sudanese government are approaching negotiations. On the domestic political front, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella opposition organisation grouping the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and other mainly northern Sudanese opposition parties, has lost momentum. The Umma Party, headed by former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadig Al-Mahdi, which had pulled out of the NDA, continues to play a vital political role in opposition. Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi's Popular National Congress (PNC) competes with the Sudanese government in the same political constituency and on the same political turf. Al-Turabi was the chief architect of the radical Islamisation and Arabisation campaigns aimed at politically marginalising southern Sudanese. His National Islamic Front was instrumental in arming pro-Sudanese government tribal militias in western and southern parts of the country. Al-Turabi is still widely regarded as a dangerous Islamist firebrand. His return to the Sudanese political arena was testament not only to the enduring popularity of Turabi himself, but also to the Sudanese government's softened position towards its opponents. Al-Turabi, considered Sudan's leading Islamist ideologue now insists that democracy is the only way forward. Al-Turabi's PNC signed a memorandum for peace and understanding in Switzerland with the SPLA in 1999 after Turabi broke ranks with Al-Beshir. Turabi languished in jail for years, and upon his release fomented trouble in Darfur, supporting the JEM and emerging as a champion of human rights, democratisation, political reform and women's rights. He poses as a defender of the Darfur cause. Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi have not tried to patch up their differences. Today both men have made much political capital out of negotiating with the SPLA. The problems of southern Sudan continue to plague the region and spread political poison throughout the country. There were high hopes in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the CPA. Nothing but an uneasy peace exists. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of the region is not working according to plan. Ethnic and political tensions hinder the reconciliation process. Fighting erupted between the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) and the SPLA in November. The violence was centred on the garrison town of Malakal, the provincial capital of Upper Nile. The SSDF waged a bitter struggle against SPLA hegemony over the southern Sudanese countryside and they were closely aligned with the Sudanese armed forces. It was once hoped that as the southern Sudanese factions settled their differences with the Sudanese authorities, armed opposition groups of Darfur would also choose the path of peace. Sudanese government forces support the SSDF even though under the CPA the SPLA is supposed to be a partner of President Al-Bashir's National Congress Party. The dubious partnership witnessed many moments of crisis in 2006. The Sudanese government still has some things going for it. One thing is oil. Sudan is today a major African oil exporter, earning much precious oil revenue. Consequently, the Sudanese economy is booming and international businessmen, mainly Asian, are flocking to Khartoum. East Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Malaysia have emerged as the country's leading trading partners. The Europeans, too, have taken a keener interest in Sudan. In Khartoum, European Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Javier Solana met with Sudanese First Vice President Salva Kiir and Second Vice President Ali Othman Mohamed Taha. Solana could not meet with Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Beshir. Topping the agenda was the security situation in Darfur. The Europeans are also eyeing business opportunities with a resurgent Sudan. Conventional wisdom is that the Darfur crisis must resolved if Sudan is to take its proper place among the emerging countries of Africa. After a couple of false starts, optimists believe that there are hopeful signs that the catastrophic humanitarian and security situation in Darfur can be fixed and political tensions defused. No chance, argue the pessimists. They have heard that song many times before. As 2007 opens, opinions remain divided on Sudan and Darfur.
