Not since its foundation in 1928 has the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt been beset with difficulties such as those it now faces. The primary challenge confronting the movement results from its very success, and it is my contention that after waiting for over eight decades, its power base has come to fruition at precisely the wrong time. The current situation in the region is not one that will foster a lasting popularity for the movement, and I foresee a number of factors conspiring against any continued buoyancy in their fortunes. Primarily, executive power in Egypt is not necessarily what may be perceived as civil governance: rather, it is grounded on notions that stem from the militarisation of governing. The foundation of the modern state in Egypt came about precisely through this militarised mode of leadership that commenced with the regime of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and was completed by the rule of Mubarak. Therefore, the absence of civil governance consolidated and normalised the militarised psyche of the Egyptian people. This was explicitly revealed in the trust accorded to the army by the people during the interim period following the fall of Mubarak. Thus, the adaptations to power undergone by the Muslim Brotherhood, represented by the personality of Mohamed Morsi, are not in line with the mentality of the majority, including many of those who voted for the Brotherhood. In Egypt there are two factors that traditionally determine the popularity of the political leadership: the first being the privileging of Arab concerns by the ruling elite; and the second relates to Egypt's relationship, and its fluctuations, with Israel. With regard to the former, the most notable concern being the case of Palestine, this is blatantly absent from the agenda of the current Egyptian administration, as the situation of the Egyptian people presently seems to fare no better than that of the Palestinians. In respect to the relationship with Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood finds itself having to tread a fine line of compromise. When they came to power, the Brotherhood were astute enough to know their rhetoric towards Israel would be closely monitored and thus any inflammatory speech — which would indeed have brought them popularity internally, could still inspire deadly consequences on the international scene. Thus the irony of waiting 80 years and nurturing a confrontational politics grounded on the principle of “if we do not govern, we do not wish to be governed,” their presence was always clouded by negative hues that needed to be countered. As they came to power, it seems to have dawned on them that if they were to continue operating through such mechanisms they would quickly lose legitimacy. The stewardship of the relations between Egypt and Israel is a constant imperative. This relationship has reached an unprecedented level of complexity. Historically, Israel fought a number of wars with Egypt, which gave rise to the peace treaty of 1979. The fall of Mubarak, while in many respects welcomed on the world stage, made the international community jittery about the possible nullification of the treaty. In fact when the Brotherhood took the reins, the treaty was not tampered with in any way and actually gained a renewed legitimacy. It became obvious to all that any anxieties in Israel and the United States were appeased by the unexpected and speedy concessions of the Brotherhood. From this we must conclude that relations between Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership are now quite harmonious. Unless of course, someone would like to argue that a section, or may be even a significant number, of the Egyptian people are not entirely in accord with their elected government on this subject. Any response to this premise would suggest that the Egyptian people rebelled but paid a heavy price for change, and in effect, the obsequiousness of the Muslim Brotherhood towards Israel and the United States exceeds that of the previous Mubarak regime, even at the peak of the “love affair” between the two sides. A challenge to the Brotherhood is coming from Ethiopia now by the building of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. And while this is in progress, the choices for the Brotherhood are limited. US Secretary of State John Kerry has announced the continuation of annual $1.5 billion support to Egypt. When we make connections with Israeli investments in Africa, and its investment in energy sources in Ethiopia in particular, the dilemma of the Brotherhood over the use of military power is evident. The Muslim Brotherhood is avoiding inflammatory militaristic speeches that could be construed as threatening to the international community. But Mohamed Morsi revealed his colours in a recent speech to his supporters in which he announced that while Egypt had no desire for war, it would defend its rights over the Nile water. He also declared that all options remain open to Egypt. Yet in reality Egypt does not have many options, and it certainly does not have the option of a war. There is no precedent for such a war — that could be called the water war — and hostility between Egypt and Ethiopia is not mature or entrenched enough to lead to such action being possible or supported. It is notable that Anwar Al-Sadat, who was the first to court the idea of war with Ethiopia, soon preoccupied himself in consolidating the peace with Israel, thereby leaving the issue of water to be dealt with by the current generation. The inflammatory rhetoric in Egypt emanating from the rank and file of the people along with the media, calling on the Muslim Brotherhood to engage in war to prevent Ethiopia from constructing the dam. It is a strange turn of events when it is the people rather than the leadership that calls for war. Prior to the Muslim Brotherhood being in office, the generals leading Egypt were the war personalities of the 1960s and 70s. Yet this mood is indicative of a general feeling that inherently relates to the location of Egypt on the regional map. During the reign of Mubarak, Egypt's compliance with the policies of the United States and Israel left it shaken but not defeated. Egypt's role within the region diminished and it was not able to take a major role in regional affairs and conflicts, and accordingly it would no longer have a political or strategic voice. Consider the Israeli killing of five Egyptian soldiers during the period in which the army ruled. Israel refused to apologise to either to the Egyptian people or to the Egyptian leadership. We can infer from this that the hostile rhetoric against Ethiopia is not necessarily — or not entirely — generated by the building of the dam. It does not hugely impact on Egypt's share of the Nile water. It is more a sign of an increasing general mood of national pride expressed through military aggression. But the Muslim Brotherhood is placed in a double bind by the “no-war dilemma”. The Muslim Brotherhood is all too aware that its popularity in the current atmosphere is not going to increase and the current grassroots war rhetoric will soon be transformed into further discontent over its policies. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood can only appeal to the popular mood by trespassing on the will of the international community. All indications are that the Renaissance Dam will go ahead whether Egypt approves or not. If the Muslim Brotherhood continues to act in a pragmatic fashion towards its neighbours the chances of conflict will definitely be lessened. With that, its popularity within Egypt will certainly be on the wane, and the Muslim Brotherhood will become a burden to the psyche of the Egyptian people. This all could be summed up by the statement that the dilemma of no-war will bring the Muslim Brotherhood down. That is not a call for war, but it is the makeup of the regional order. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot and would not be able to fight a war: it is too fragile and would soon stick out as an aggressor, and the Egyptian people are frustrated and disappointed with many factors, chief of which is that their “Tahrir” (liberation) revolution brought not much liberation, but rather a new system of oppression based on an increasingly divisive militant Islamist mentality.
The writer is professor of international relations and cultural studies at the American University in Dubai.
