The revolutions did not come knocking on the door. Instead, they thrust their way into the Arab region, toppling some regimes while shaking others. Analyses have begun to take place in an attempt to examine this state of affairs, some choosing to see in the revolutions a new foreign conspiracy aiming at dividing what is left of the region, and others suggesting that the revolutions were the long-awaited results of frustrated pride and dignity and that they had been ignited by domestic forces. This article will address the common view, widespread not only among academics and politicians, but also amongst the Arab masses, which has started to question and lose confidence in the Arab revolutions. In order to keep readers abreast of the latest developments, the article espouses a nuanced approach in addressing a third view which considers scientific material that can serve as a platform to examine the existing theories of international politics in a region that has been described for a long time as idle and sluggish and unready to see lasting transformations. Many of those who believe the Arab Spring is part of a conspiracy have linked their views to the many remarks and articles of non-Arab intellectuals like Bernard Lewis and Thierry Meyssan. Such writings have given the impression that the Arab Middle East is in a process of transformation similar to that which took place in the wake of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. On the official level, many terms like “constructive chaos”, the “New Middle East” and the “Greater Middle East”, coined by mainly US officials, have led to further worry and distrust. For instance, in March 2004 the Bush administration adopted its “Greater Middle East Project”, the avowed goal of which was to encourage political, economic and social reforms in the Arab Middle East, in addition to Turkey, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. One could argue that the US vision was based on two main pillars: first, to reshuffle and reorganise the Middle East after seizing control of the New World Order in the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union; and second, to improve the image of the US in the Middle East after it had been smeared and distorted as a result of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq. Nevertheless, the project did not bear fruit and was a fiasco. Other projects followed, like the “New Middle East” project, introduced by the then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in 2006. This project was accompanied by the term “constructive chaos”. In his article “Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: the Project for a New Middle East”, which appeared from the Centre for Research on Globalisation in 2006, commentator Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya defines constructive chaos as generating “conditions of violence and warfare throughout the region — would could in turn be used so that the United States, Britain, and Israel could redraw the map of the Middle East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives”. A starker example of this approach was reflected in the map of the Middle East presented in the US military's Armed Forces Journal in 2006 and entitled “Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would Look”. As these projects came to nothing, US decision-makers started to think of a new plan that would replace previous ones and achieve the required results. The new approach would seek a new model that could be accepted by the Arabs and that would reject the stereotypes related to the old and traditional regimes. The rise of the Turkish Justice and Development Party in 2002 inspired this, moving the compass in the direction of what was called “moderate Islam”. After this, promoting the Turkish model in particular, and encouraging “moderate Islam” in general, struck a chord with the public dissatisfaction and aversion to corrupt regimes and became an international priority. “Moderate” Islamic movements, once deprived of their rights, their members expelled and even executed by their own regimes, lined up to present their credentials as the newly accepted models for change in the region and alternatives to the old-fashioned dictatorships, which appeared in the eyes of Arab people as merely stooges that were excessively attached to the West and dependent on the US. According to this viewpoint, the rise of the Arab revolutions demonstrated the carrying out of this new American plan by inserting democratically elected “moderate” Islamic movements in power in the Arab countries. The new Islamic regimes would be as good as the previous regimes in American eyes, yet they would also be more accepted by their people, and hence business and the flow of oil would be better secured. The warm relations between these Islamic movements and the US in particular, their members being hosted by the West when they were escaping from the oppression of the previous regimes, has bolstered such a way of thinking. I believe this treatment of the current state of affairs is broadly correct, yet it requires further investigation. Failing to take into consideration the various contexts of recent events will bring inaccurate results, and this consideration will also need to take into account a second set of views. Many people have seen in the Arab revolutions the expression of increasing frustration among Arab youth. This younger generation, which constitutes the majority of the Arab population, has inherited stories of glory and of the magnificent history of modernity, with its development and advances in civilisation, the arts, science and military might, without seeing these things reflected in reality These stories have hit the wall of a frustrating reality, as Arab young people have found their societies dependent on the West, experiencing successive defeats, and living amid bleak economic and social conditions. This condition was accompanied by the continuation of the oppression of the regimes and the lack of democracy and freedom of expression. The Arab rulers exaggerated their grip on power and their confidence, making the elections that were held in many countries into jokes or merely ironic exercises. The issue of the sons of the incumbent presidents inheriting power in what were theoretically republican regimes was also a source of bitter comedy. Most distressingly, Arab young people saw progress, development and success taking place in other countries, and they wanted the good economic and social conditions that other nations were experiencing for themselves. The existence of the Internet-hosted social networks and the developments in communications technology, meant that these things were no longer hidden, and the new Arab generations started to share their concerns, fears, ambitions and dreams through such platforms. Meanwhile, the ageing regimes were still busy with old-fashioned techniques of control and they were attempting to undermine the importance of such technology, described by one statesman as just “children's toys”. The moment of truth arrived, catching every expert, analyst and politician off guard, with the eruption of the Arab Spring, starting in Tunisia, a country otherwise known for its calmness and gentleness. The events in Tunisia were followed a few days later elsewhere, turning fantasies of change on the Internet into a reality that ushered in a new era that was quite different to the previous, distasteful epoch. In this view, there was no external role in encouraging the Arabs to change their regimes, and the change, when it came, was internally generated. A number of facts support this view. The first is the close relationship between the West in general and the previous autocratic regimes. Another is the western flip-flopping and hesitation that took place on the eve of the eruption of the revolutions. Michele Alliot-Marie, the former French foreign minister, had to resign after expressing her country's willingness to provide security assistance to the former Tunisian president Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali just a few days before he was forced to flee the country. The US position was also marked by confusion during the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. The BBC correspondent in Washington, Kim Ghattas, described the first reaction of the US state department as seemingly “caught unaware” by the events, with officials saying that they had not been briefed about Tunisia. Ghattas also said that the US administration had focussed mainly on the security advisories being issued to American citizens in Tunisia. However, despite the first-blush confusion, there was ample time for the foreign powers to restore their balance and to ride the crest of the revolutionary wave as they sought to evaluate and reassess their positions based on these new developments, the idea being to secure their interests and to cooperate with the still-emerging regimes. The US, along with certain other powers, has all the necessary resources to attract or coerce others. The new regimes could be attracted to the US by the latter's soft power, exercised through development projects, aid, cultural and academic cooperation, and scientific and technical support. Actions taken by the US to flex its muscles through the looming presence of military force could also make the new regimes consider their options and policies, while economic sanctions and embargos could also be used if necessary. However, former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton preferred the use of what she called US “smart power”, a mix of soft power and hard power, especially in the Middle East region. This was described by journalist Massimo Calabresi in his article “Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power”, which appeared in Time Magazine in November 2011. As events unfolded, a third group has found in the Arab revolutions or Arab Spring rich material for scientific study and investigation. The Arab revolutions could be a good way of re-examining old theories and a critical platform on which to initiate new theories of international politics. On the one hand, some have linked the events of the Arab Spring to the school of realism in foreign affairs, as per the interpretation of the state of chaos, the developing alliances and the use of force. Others, on the other hand, have explained the Arab Spring by using a neo-liberal approach to explain the role of soft power in some regional countries, the role of diplomacy that influenced the course of events, and finally the interdependence among the countries of the Arab Spring. A further approach has tried to validate the theory of revolutions through the trajectory of the Arab revolts. Other scholars have seen the role of theory as dovetailing with events and as being the most appropriate approach to explain the role of regional and global powers in their course. Novel approaches have attempted to interpret the Arab Spring in the light of new theories. For instance, some scholars, like Larry Diamond and Ali Sarihan, have seen in the Arab revolts a “fourth wave of democratisation” in reference to concepts developed by the late Samuel M. Huntington, even if the latter believed that the “third wave” was still ongoing. Others have considered the Arab revolts as being the third stage or third wave of the modern Arab revolutions, as was mentioned in a previous article in Al-Ahram Weekly on the Middle East and the Arab revolutions. One can say that the Arab Spring represented a glimmer of hope for the Arabs, even if the failure at times, the escalation of violence and bloodshed, and the sometimes unfavourable repercussions have led to a sense of frustration, a loss of zeal, and a questioning of the purposes, motives and goals of these revolts. Doubt has started to creep in and uncertainty has begun to vitiate hope, especially given the explicit and overt foreign scramble in the region after the transformations. Nevertheless, it would be naive and superficial to quash the motives of those who initiated the revolts, and there remains the possibility that the new leaders and regimes that have benefited from the energies of the Arab Spring will be able to serve their peoples better while maintaining good relations with others and dislodging the dichotomies that have long poisoned the Middle East.
The writer is a political and media counsellor at the Palestinian embassy in Ankara.
