The Arab revolutions that erupted two years ago voiced the aspirations of the Arab peoples for a better future in which justice, freedom and human dignity would prevail after decades of tyranny and degradation. These people had not been lured into revolution by foreign enticements or promises of reward at home. They were inspired by love for their homelands that had been plundered under the clutches of corruption and nepotism, by sympathy for fellow beings whose human rights had been systematically abused, by the quest for a dignified life that had long been inaccessible to the majority of the people under regimes whose cronies and sycophants held a monopoly on advantage and privilege. The long reign of greed and injustice had generated a massive tide of seething anger that burst into the open when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in front of a municipal building in Sidi Bouzeid, Tunisia. In performing this ultimate act of frustration and despair, Bouazizi had not realised that he would ignite a conflagration that would consume despots in Tunisia and other Arab countries. But that is precisely what happened. The people arose. They filled the public squares with their demands for freedom. And iniquitous regimes toppled one after the other like autumn leaves. A spring had dawned with the promise of profound changes that would usher in the realisation of long-cherished Arab aspirations. Two years have passed since then, and the fruits of that spring have proven very paltry, especially when compared to the lofty dreams that had carried the revolutionary torches. It was hoped that the new ruling regimes would strive to restructure the old systems of government and manage the process of democratic transformation, as part of a larger process of the reconstruction of the state in the framework of national unity, popular consensus and the rule of law. In other words, the expectation was for the construction of a modern democratic state in the manner of those that arose in Eastern Europe. That state would then oversee an economic revival, in the manner of the emergent economies of South and Southeast Asia, which would bring rapid improvement to the standards of living of the people, reduce poverty levels and achieve social justice. Otherwise put, it was hoped that the new regimes would respond, if only to relative degrees, to the revolution of Arab hopes and expectations that was triggered by the Arab Spring revolutions. Sadly, developments on the ground unfolded in the totally opposite direction to aspirations. While it is true that Egypt took some major positive steps (there were generally fair and honest legislative and presidential elections and the army returned to its central mission of safeguarding national security), the revolution fell prey to dissension and division among the revolutionary forces. The chief contributing factor to the success of the Egyptian (and Tunisian) Revolution was the unity that had bound all participants in Tahrir and other revolutionary squares. Once that crucial factor vanished, disintegration and discord set in, and friction mounted as rivals competed over power. In Egypt the main contenders were the Islamists, as represented chiefly by the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, and its Salafist allies, and the liberal/secularist opposition, while a large segment of the revolutionary youth wrung their hands over their dreams that had gone up in smoke. The situation then took a more dangerous turn when the president issued his constitutional declaration in November last year, aggravating the mounting polarisation over the drafting process of the new constitution and the very substance of that constitution. By the second anniversary of the 25 January Revolution, the country was ablaze in demonstrations, rioting and violence of unprecedented levels. It was as though a huge fireball was leaping from Cairo to Alexandria, from Tahrir Square to Qaed Ibrahim Mosque, from Mahalla Al-Kubra to the cities of the Suez Canal, and from the presidential palace to the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Muqattam. Nor could the various national dialogue initiatives achieve a breakthrough that would halt the spiralling violence. The forces of partisanship, inflexibility and mistrust were too strong. Meanwhile, counterrevolutionary forces took advantage of the security breakdown to achieve their ends, bringing Egypt, the pivotal country in the region, to the verge of the condition of a failed state and total collapse. The situation in Tunisia is not much different. There, too, division and conflict prevailed among the revolutionary forces when it became increasingly clear that the ruling coalition, led by the Islamist Al-Nahda movement was bent on asserting complete control over the political system. Even when Hamadi Al-Jabali, Tunisian prime minister and secretary-general of Al-Nahda, moved to form a coalition government of independent technocrats as the only way to save the country from collapse, Al-Nahda rejected this and Al-Jabali was forced to resign on 19 February 2013. But the next government that was formed, under the premiership of Ali Al-Arid, was accused of being little more than a reproduction of the former ruling coalition, even if some sovereign ministries were neutralised, and the opposition insisted on a national salvation conference. Meanwhile, the government remains unable to confront the radical Salafis, who have been increasingly involved in acts of intimidation and violence. The Syrian revolution has reached a crossroads. The revolutionaries have failed to topple the regime of Bashar Al-Assad which is heavily supported by Russia, China and Iran while Western powers have remained reluctant to intervene military on behalf of the revolutionaries, as they had done in Libya, for fear that intervention would precipitate a major regional war. Thus, what initially began as a peaceful revolution escalated into civil war due to the Syrian regime's recourse to excessive violence. The result was the destruction of the Syrian state, and more than 70,000 dead and around a million displaced persons. In Libya, the central government is still unable to extend its control over the country and implement its policies, against the backdrop of the ongoing controversy over the political isolation law intended to ban members of the former regime from political life. In the latest developments on this front, groups of demonstrators clamouring for the implementation of that law have besieged the National General Congress headquarters, rioting broke out elsewhere in the country, there was an assassination attempt against the chairman of the congress, and Libyan citizens have begun to call for the army and police to intervene in order to stem the armed militias. Such developments indicate that rather than moving forward towards the realisation of the aims of the revolution, Libya is turning circles in place. Yemen has not departed from the general rule of the other Arab Spring countries. It still has to contend with such major challenges as the need to reconstruct the army and national security agencies in ways that guarantee their political neutrality. Recently, the Yemeni president called for a national dialogue preparatory to establishing the general principles of the constitution before elections are held at the outset of 2014. On the political level, as a whole, the countries of the Arab revolutions are characterised by intense domestic conflict and dismal performance in the management of the process of democratic transformation. Socially and economically they fare equally poorly. The chief demands of the Arab revolutions were primarily economic. Arab peoples sought an end to unemployment, higher wages, and a halt to the rising prices of essential goods and services. In short, they sought socio-economic justice. Again, realities unfolded in the diametrically opposed direction. Deteriorating security conditions have had a dire impact on numerous economic sectors, most notably foreign investment, tourism, banks and the stock markets in Egypt and Tunisia, and the oil sector in Libya. With the decline in levels of production, economic growth rates have plunged. This situation, in turn, has generated a major fiscal crisis that has taken the form of shortages in liquidity and mounting budgetary deficits. At the same time, there are continual energy and fuel shortages and unemployment rates are soaring. In the hope of alleviating the gravity of the crisis, Egypt sought to renew its talks with the IMF in early April in order to close a deal on a $4.8 billion loan, in spite of the tough conditions that Egypt will be compelled to meet. The Tunisian government, for its part, has not only been unable to produce solutions to the problem of mounting unemployment, it has also failed to introduce effective job reforms and to improve the level of public services. In Syria, the economic and physical infrastructure of the country is falling apart to the extent that it is no longer even possible to speak of something called a Syrian economy, while the search of large segments of the people for bread has become part of the struggle of life and death. In general, governments in the countries of the Arab Spring revolutions appear to totally lack an economic vision for their crisis-ridden countries. The upshot is that these countries that had accomplished the enormous feat of toppling despotic regimes now find themselves floundering in the quagmires of political dispute and strife, and the vicious cycle of poor government performance, worsening economic crisis, and resurgent popular anger and frustration. Surely such drastic deterioration could have been overcome, if not averted, had the spirit of national consensus or “national coalition” been allowed to prevail and lead these countries to safety. The Arab order has also been a victim of the current instability in the countries of the Arab Spring revolutions and the consequent decline in their ability to influence the region and the world. As a consequence, these countries have become vulnerable to growing penetration on the part of such regional powers as Iran and Turkey. The two are on opposing sides in the Syrian question. The former has long been campaigning to expand its influence in the region via the “Shia crescent”, whereas the latter is striving to expand its influence, but through the deployment of its sources of “soft power” in the hope of recovering an element of its previous status and prestige in the countries of the former Ottoman Caliphate. The revolutions of the Arab Spring have also given rise to new modes of interaction between the Gulf countries and the countries of the Arab Spring revolutions. “Engagement” has been used to summarise the various ways Gulf countries have responded to the revolutions, some of which included pre-emptive measures, in the form of political, economic and social reforms intended to forestall the spread of the revolutionary “virus” to those countries. At the same time, certain developments after the revolutions have led to tensions or at least a cooling of relations between Egypt and the countries of the Gulf. Egypt's rapprochement with Iran has been cited as a source of the problem, but so too has sympathy on the part of those governments for former president Mubarak. The dispute that erupted over the alleged presence of a Muslim Brotherhood “cell” in the UAE also stirred up unprecedented tensions between Cairo and that country. Fortunately, however, such tensions were never of the magnitude that could threaten the strong and special relationship that binds Egypt with the countries of the Gulf, the resilience of which was demonstrated during the Forum for Intergovernmental Communication, hosted in Sharja on 25 and 25 February. During the activities of that forum, UAE officials could not have made their esteem for Egypt and the Egyptian people clearer while Egyptians living and working in the UAE made it equally clear that they would be disturbed by anything that might mar close relations with the UAE. Still, we are left with the question as to why the harvest of the Arab Spring has been so meagre, in spite of the toppling of oppressive regimes, the awakening of the peoples who had broken through the barrier of fear, and the increased ability of public opinion to steer events. As difficult as it is to identify all the answers, we can touch upon some. One has to do with major differences in the outlooks of the political forces that, once the unifying goal of overthrowing the regime was accomplished, scrambled to take advantage of what they regarded as the historic opportunity to achieve their own particular objectives and apply their particular vision on the ground. Few of these forces were prepared to compromise in what became a zero-sum game, the effects of which soon became apparent in spiralling political polarisation and mounting violence. At the same time, it became apparent that economic collapse was the direct consequence of political instability and that only through the restoration of political stability could these countries embark on the path of economic recovery and the realisation of revolutionary demands related to socio-economic justice. Certainly, there are outside powers with a vested interest in the perpetuation of political and economic instability in the countries of the Arab Spring revolutions, so as to keep them malleable and subservient to the interests of these outside powers. Simultaneously, the forces of counterrevolution are definitely at work, doing their utmost to aggravate the crisis and thwart the Arab revolutions. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that only two years have passed since the Arab Spring revolutions erupted. That is a very short time in the average lifespan of revolutions, even if to the collective consciousness it appears an eternity, especially in light of the many and huge sacrifices that were made for the revolutionary cause. The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya published by Al-Ahram.
