By Al-Ahram Weekly's special correspondent on Iraqi affairs "The year 1998 will witness the collapse of the [United Nations'] economic embargo," boasted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in his Army Day speech on 6 January. In a tone of flagrant defiance, he challenged the United States' determination to maintain sanctions as a key instrument in its policy of containing his regime. But by the end of the year, that hopeful prediction seemed to have been a prayer to the whims of fortune rather than a genuine assessment of the situation. And it was a prayer which brought the Iraqi people nothing but bad luck. Indeed, for much of the year, both the West and the Arab world were preoccupied with Iraq's repeated, yet fruitless efforts, to end the sanctions that were imposed after Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The year began with a campaign of scathing criticism aimed at the United Nations' commission charged with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM). The commission's experts were accused of spying for the US and Israel. Another crisis ensued in February when Saddam refused to allow the inspectors to search his palaces, triggering a standoff which was only averted when a deal was brokered by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Again in August, Saddam booted the inspectors out, and in October he suspended all links with UNSCOM, only to back down two weeks later and let them back in under the threat of force levelled by the US and Britain. The last straw came on 10 December, when Iraqi soldiers banned the UN inspectors from entering an office of the ruling Baath party in Baghdad which they suspected of being used as a hiding place for prohibited weapons. That was enough to set off another crisis and to give Washington the pretext it was looking for to launch its long-awaited military action. In many ways, Saddam's repeated acts of defiance made it seem as though he was gambling, constantly calling his enemies' bluff. But he seems to have misread US President Bill Clinton's problems with the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Russian, Chinese and French support in the Security Council, and a new level of solidarity and sympathy in certain quarters of the Arab world, as an accumulation of favourable conditions that would together give him the advantage. This approach, coupled with the Clinton administration's failure to forge a coherent and effective long-term policy towards Iraq, tempted him to conclude that the US was reluctant to use force against him. So he pressed ahead with his demands for an immediate lifting of economic sanctions, oblivious of the consequences. In one showdown after another, Saddam seemed to be doing surprisingly well, as the United States compromised rather than resort to force to make him comply. Probably his most significant victory after the February crisis was the pledge he received from Annan that the Security Council would start a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance record which would clear the way for the lifting of sanctions. But the Americans were never likely to let Saddam dictate the rules of the game as he sought to manipulate them through UNSCOM. That would have left them isolated and losing a battle they were determined to win. The February standoff was a turning point in Washington's strategic thinking about Iraq, resulting in a major shift in its containment policy which had been in place since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Up to that point, Washington was using a combination of UN economic sanctions, vigorous inspections, threats of military strikes and active diplomacy to contain Saddam's regime. But in early November, Washington dropped that faltering option. "Up to now, we've had diplomacy backed by force. Now we need to shift to force backed by diplomacy," announced Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This new strategy set the Clinton administration on a collision course with a defiant Saddam. It was only a matter of time. Washington seized its chance to act when UNSCOM chief Richard Butler's last explosive report was published on 15 December, charging Baghdad with non-compliance with the terms of the inspection mission. When American and British missiles started to rain down on Iraq two days later, not only Saddam's dreams of lifting the sanctions in 1998 were left in tatters, but also his power base within Iraq. Yet one lesson from the last year is that to describe Saddam's tactics as brinkmanship is a gross understatement. The question now is what comes next, after last week's massive air strike, and given the probability that Saddam will never again provide the cooperation needed for the inspectors to finish their task. The problem with Saddam, as the crazy games of the last eight years have illustrated, is that he cannot distinguish between a crisis and an opportunity. He has blown too many chances by his continuous insistence on obstructing the inspections even as Arab and international sympathy with the suffering of the Iraqi people was growing. It is now crystal clear that the US is no longer after his weapons of mass destruction. Rather, their aim is to hound him out of office. The new strategy of getting rid of Saddam is no longer a secret. As National Security Adviser Samuel Berger made clear last week, Washington is gearing up to achieve that objective. Yet Saddam himself will probably be the last to notice. Why should he bow to reality now, after declaring himself victorious in the last stand-off, despite the fact that US and British missiles have wreaked havoc upon his elite Republican Guard, his intelligence and security forces and his command and control systems? As in 1990, when Arabs demonstrated against the US-led international coalition that was built to kick Saddam out of Kuwait, the Iraqi leader seems likely once again to miscalculate the nature of the sympathy he has garnered during this latest confrontation. He also seems set to misunderstand Russian and Chinese diplomatic bickering with the US and Britain and take that as a sign that these two countries are ready to go to war in defence of his see-sawing with Washington and London. No one knows how far Iraq may be today from another military stand-off with the US. The only thing we can know for sure is that the two nations are not about to forgive and forget. There will be yet more ill-judged confrontations, as long as Saddam continues to believe he can end the crippling sanctions through rhetorical threats. Last year's slogan of forcing the Security Council to lift the embargo before 1998 was out proved as hollow as it always sounded in his mouth. Yet, undeterred by past failures to deliver the future his people deserve, Saddam has already issued his pledge for 1999, through the editorials of the government-controlled newspapers: "It's the Year of the Last Showdown!" Perhaps this time, he's finally got it right.
