On Monday, US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer handed over "sovereignty" to the Interim Government of Iraq in a furtive ceremony, two days ahead of schedule. Not the stuff that independence days are made of. How sovereign is Iraq; what kind of future does the ongoing process offer for that shattered nation; and most significantly, how can a genuinely free, democratic and prosperous Iraq be created? Al-Ahram Weekly, in these special pages, invited Iraqi journalists and intellectuals to provide some answers Who will rule Iraq? Aziz Jabr Shayyal* assesses the political fortunes of the different Iraqi groups and the prospects for state building 9 April 2003 was nothing short of a tidal wave. It swept away an entire state, from its institutions of government, value structures and instruments of repression to its infrastructure and social systems. The occupation of Iraq was as total in its devastation as the conquering hordes of the Middle Ages. What confirms this analogy for me is that Iraq exhibited the same preexisting conditions for collapse -- a country has to be crumbling from within in order to be ripe for the grabbing. From the moment they, the Baath rule, came to power it steered the country on an unwavering course to disaster. In spite of their pledges to rest their authority on the people and to institute those mechanisms of government that would provide for effective popular participation they proceeded in the opposite direction entirely. Although the temporary constitution of 1970 explicitly upheld the principles of freedom, equality, justice and respect for human rights, application subverted these principles entirely and entrenched a flagrant dictatorship that effectively alienated society from the political process. Indeed, the one party system that arose not only alienated the regime from the people but also from the members of their own party, as the murder, torture and other forms of brutal repression it adopted exempted no one, whether from the opposition, the ruling party or the general populace. Today, we must work to build a government on new foundations. One of the most important components of this foundation is national unity, around which have revolved most of the crises that have plagued Iraqi society. The crises of identity, legitimacy, immersion, assimilation and distribution are all mutually interdependent articulations of the crisis of national unity, which, in turn, is at the root of a full gamut of severe chronic ailments. -- A corrupt political elite, the criteria for access to which has no bearing on superior merit, but rather on considerations of wealth, influence and ethnic or sectarian affiliations. -- Incompetence and corruption in the three branches of government, perpetuating and aggravating illegal and immoral activities such as tax evasion, electoral fraud and human rights violations. -- Political instability and a succession of political regimes whose legitimacy was not based on the consent of the citizenry. -- Fragmentation of the general social structure and the aggravation of the problem of political and social assimilation. -- The absence of popular participation in the political process and the marginalisation of groups capable of leading society. Such phenomena underscore an important fact, which is that political underdevelopment is one of Iraq's salient traits. A closer inspection of the political map in Iraq drives home the magnitude of what is involved in building a new system of government. Take, alone, a sampling of the many political parties with often conflicting interests and ideologies rivalling to sustain and extend their political influence. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by Ahmed Chalabi, is becoming increasingly mired with problems at home and abroad, at home because of growing popular outrage at news of the shady ties and practices of the party's leaders, abroad because of the cutoff of American funds due to misinformation the party had given the Americans before the occupation, especially in regards to Iraqi WMDs. The INC, founded outside Iraq, is pursuing sometimes contradictory policies in its attempt to gain a grassroots foothold inside the country. It is also known to possess well-trained militias. Like the INC, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), led by Iyad Allawi, prime minister of the current interim government, was founded abroad with US funding and support. As a result, it is often at the mercy of US policies and thus exhibits frequent discrepancies between the party charter and the actions and statements of its leaders in regards to domestic policy and the occupation authorities. The INA also has armed militias, in addition to many of its members having been enlisted in the new Iraqi army and police force as well as the party chief/prime minister also doubles in his role as the security minister. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was created outside Iraq by a number of Shia political parties. Although SCIRI attempted to bring on board some Sunni parties its invitation was rebuffed. Initially it was adamantly opposed to US policy in Iraq, yet SCIRI has shifted tack following the London Conference held by Iraqi opposition in December 2002 and began cooperating with the US on many levels, which greatly helped occupation authorities neutralise the Shia areas in southern and central Iraq. Although the party also possesses an armed militia (the Badr Brigade), it was severely shaken by the assassination of its leader, Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim in August 2003. So far it appears that his successor has little chance of filling his shoes. Al-Hakim was a widely revered spiritual leader among the Shia, a quality his successor does not possess. Another Shia party, the Islamic Daawa ( Hizb Al-Daawa ), enjoys broad support among religious Shia technocrats because of the intellectual legacy bequeathed by the late Mohamed Baqir Al-Sadr. However, the manoeuvrings of outside powers and internal ideological wrangling have triggered a number of ruptures within the party, greatly diminishing its influence. The breakaway factions have attempted to mend their fences in order to restructure and revitalise the party so as to enable themselves to regain its lost popularity. The fact is that in spite of the ideological and political glosses, factional leaders have given in to their decision to secede from the party. At heart the struggle is over party leadership and prospects of potential political gain from outside forces, whether Iranian or American. At the other end of the ideological spectrum lies the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), one of the oldest political parties in Iraq. Although it originally had a broad base of support, years of persecution, the lack of leaders inside the country and numerous internal divisions combined to erode its influence. The fact that this party has a curiously close relation with the Americans also diminishes its potential impact on the formation of a new political authority. In the mind of the average Iraqi citizen this relationship undermines the party's political and ideological credibility and gives it a strong whiff of corruption. With regard to Iraqi Kurds, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have been, for nearly two decades, the major representatives of the Kurdish nationalist movement. Both parties possess armed militias that have assumed over the past ten years the outward mantle of a standing army and police force. The aspirations of the leaderships of both parties are no longer restricted to the Kurdish area; both insist that they are owed a considerable debt for the part they played before April 2003, when the Kurdish area served both as a safe haven for Iraqi opposition elements and as a base for intelligence and reconnaissance operations. Among the objectives that Kurdish leaders are striving for is a guarantee of key positions in government. Such aspirations are legitimate if grounded in the principle of equal citizenship. However, the fear is that they will be turned to narrow Kurdish nationalist interests, as was suggested by the law of national administration, an article of which gave the Kurds the right to veto decisions affecting the interests of the majority. A notable, if minor, exception to the above can be found in the National Conference for an Independent and Unified Iraq (NCIUI). This initiative brought together the leaders of a range of smaller Shia, Sunni, Christian and Kurdish parties with the purpose of formulating rules and principles for the creation of a nationally united government that would be representative of all sectors of the population without resorting to the type of denominational/ethnic quota system as that applied in the creation of the Interim Governing Council (IGC). In the opinion of the NCIUI members, such quota systems are ultimately divisive and have no precedent in Iraq. In addition to the established parties, there are a number of forces and movements which are having a major impact on political developments. These include the Islamic Democratic Movement, the Fadila Party, the Organisation for Islamic Action, the Royal Constitutionalist Movement and Muqtada Al- Sadr movement. These, along with other local parties, have been excluded from the current decision-making structures in the country. The preceding overview of official Iraqi political parties points to a number of impediments to the creation of a truly democratic government for a unified Iraq. Firstly, in promoting the current denominational/ethnic approach to the distribution of power, the established parties are, in effect, working to advance their own interests. The monolithic state party that characterised the former regime may no longer be an option, but the advancement of narrow partisan affiliations at the expense of higher national interests will only perpetuate the abuse of civil liberties that the Iraqi people have suffered from for so long. Secondly, no attempt has been made to approach what we might term the opposition parties or groups. Instead, the ruling parties have let occupation forces set the tenor for their attitudes towards the opposition. Perhaps the experiences in Falluja and Najaf best illustrate this point. Not only did Iraqi officials remain silent until after occupation forces killed, arrested and destroyed the homes of thousands of Iraqis in these cities, some even adopted the occupier's terms, such as "terrorist" and "incitement to violence and dissension", to refer to the resistance. In spite of the presence of a large opposition, the persons the occupation has placed in authority claim the right to speak on behalf of "the people" and do so in international forums. The fact that they have no concrete way to substantiate the extent of their popular support has the taint of that famous referendum conferring upon Saddam Hussein 100 per cent of the popular vote. Are we soon to be assaulted with similar popularity ratings for persons whose appointments were not founded upon any democratic process and who are not answerable to the public under constitutional provisions for accountability? Clearly Iraqis are still relegated to that corner where they can consent to political appointments made from above, spray paint their protests anonymously on the walls, or, as most Iraqis have done for far too long, merely stand silently by on the sidelines. The foreign component as epitomised in the occupation authority is another major obstacle to the creation of a viable, democratic political authority in Iraq. The temporary coalition authority retains the upper hand in the current political game; no voice can be heard above that of the American governor-general and his team of aides and troops. Iraqi officials, let alone the ordinary citizen, have no real power of protest against the actions of an American soldier as long as the guns are pointed at their throats. The Americans began with a horrible mistake -- the invasion and occupation of an independent nation and a founding member of the UN and the Arab League -- and then compounded it with every step they took since 9 April 2003. In decimating all institutions of government, they unleashed chaos in every aspect of life. Every prohibition, regardless of how repugnant to our society's customs and mores, is now sanctioned and protected by the occupier's guns, confirming the general conviction that the aim of the invasion was to reshape Iraqi society in accordance with an American-made blueprint, rather than to rid the country of WMDs and other such pretexts that have since been belied by the Americans themselves. Moreover, the social engineering project, like many similar abortive experiments in the Third World, is destined for failure because it begins at the top with the expectation that change can somehow filter down, while ignoring the many facets of society that urge for reform. Even then, the Americans are unable to get it right. They have implanted an alien governing authority, most of the officials of which are émigrés from Iraq that took up residence primarily in the UK and the US, and most of whom the Iraqi people eye with mistrust. But if this authority is unable to win hearts, it has the means of force and repression to impose a government that lacks popular and constitutional legitimacy, thus presenting the country with a de facto reality no different than that that existed since the establishment of the contemporary Iraqi state. That the American authorities have assumed control over the key economic affairs of the country underscores the fact that the present interim government will be expected to serve as the guardian of US interests. That government will not have the power to draw on the national budget, it has no programme for national investment, and it will not have the power to sue the US and its allies for compensation for the damage and destruction caused by their invasion, or even the power to demand this right. With American support and, perhaps at Washington's behest, the current government is working to divest Iraq of its Arab nationalist and pan-Islamic affiliations. Dozens of intellectuals and politicians have been recruited into the campaign to cast aspersions on these affiliations, and hardly a day goes by without some article or televised commentary suggesting that all of Iraq's woes emanate from the politics of pan-Arabism and without some appeal to Arabs to stop meddling in our affairs on the grounds that "the people of Mecca are more familiar with the lay of their own land," as the saying has it. Simultaneously, there is a concerted attempt to fragment Iraq's national identity, which no one had ever regarded as anything but Arab and Islamic, on the basis of distinct ethnic and/or sectarian identities that in reality had never been in dispute with one another. The persecution that had long been visited upon the Iraqi people had always been equitably distributed. No particular segment of the population was deprived from its share of oppression, as the regime owed its existence solely to the person of the ruler, his extended family and those opportunists who thrive under that type of repressive atmosphere. The contention that one or another group was singled out for maltreatment is, thus, not only false, but insidiously divisive, which is why Washington is harping so relentlessly on this issue. But, while American interests may stand to benefit, this form of polarisation only serves to promote narrow partisan and family interests over national interests, thereby undermining the development of a civil society founded upon the bond of common citizenship. Washington wants an Iraqi government that meets the requirements of that administration's project for the reform and democratisation of the Arab world and the forging of a Greater Middle East. Such a government could never be anything but an extension of those earlier projects under the monarchical and republican orders in which democratic processes and culture were manipulated or subverted for the purpose of falsifying popular support for the regime and perpetuating itself in power. True participatory democracy will never survive under a system in which acceptance into the democratic polity discriminates between supporters and opponents of the American project and in which full independence, sovereignty and equality among nations is not a legitimate demand. Building the rational foundations for a system of government, in which the law is sovereign above all regardless of tribal, sectarian or ethnic affiliations and which provides for effective checks against the abuse of power and the potential subversion of the system to create new dictatorships, clashes with the aforementioned internal and external impediments. On the other hand, it should be possible to overcome these problems by bringing them to the attention of the public and, generally, by working to develop a participatory political culture and to entrench the contemporary values of transparency, accountability, dedication to the national welfare, and impartiality and integrity in government. This, however, can only come about under the aegis of a national authority elected through free and fair elections and by supporting the institutions of civil society, especially those concerned with human rights. What Iraq needs is more democratic institutions, the legitimacy of which rest upon a democratic constitution that has been written, discussed and ratified by a constitutional assembly elected through free and fair public elections. Building a modern democratic state entails adhering strictly to the principle of legitimacy, which means that all officials must abide by the rules of law and that citizens have the right to enforce this through recourse to a just and autonomous judiciary. Furthermore, at all times we must continue to stress and promote the fundamental meaning of true participatory democracy, as opposed to democracy that supports the vested interests of Washington and its cliques at home. Towards this end, too, we should abandon the attitude that "we know Iraq better" and work to interact more closely with our Arab and Islamic environment, especially our immediate neighbours. Enhancing our regional bonds as well as our international bonds will have an important impact on our maneuvrability in forging the type of government we aspire to. Europe in particular can be a useful ally in countering US-British designs on Iraq and the region, to which testifies the distinguished stance European leaders took in the recent G8 meeting. Ultimately, however, the task of building a viable democratic government is contingent upon the will of the Iraqi people, regardless of how great the pressures and outside influences. Only if this will exists can we create the institutions for building a future Iraq in which human rights flourish and the will and dignity of the Iraqi people are respected. * The writer is director of Baghdad centre for Human Rights.
