The manoeuvring of Japan's political scene looks suspiciously like a performance of Butoh dance, concludes Gamal Nkrumah \\ Japan is a country for stimulating curiosity. The Japanese are notorious for adopting the " shikataganai " (nothing can be done about it) mentality as a way of saving face -- Japan's answer to France's c'est la vie, I suppose. Yet the Japanese clearly have no illusions about the challenges they face, and especially when it comes to contemplating life under the thumb of impuissant politicians, or worse Washington and the rising stars of Asia -- the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. Very little aggravates the Japanese more than crowing to the Koreans. This is even true it turns out when their Chinese rivals and their American associates are courting Korea as never before. South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak is seeking the hand of China, and at the same time is perfecting a playful come- on with United States President Barack Obama. "North Korea must cease its belligerent behaviour and demonstrate clearly and decisively that it wants to pursue a different path," US Defense Secretary Robert Gates summed up the Obama administration's position on Korea. In short what was historically silly is becoming sinister. Seoul is obfuscating over key issues that are imperative to Tokyo. The cantankerous cacophony of national lobbying for the much coveted position of the United States chief ally in Northeast Asia is rattling window-frames in the corridors of power in Tokyo and Seoul. Beijing has vowed to resist any such pressure. As Japan's new Prime Minister-elect Naoto Kan basks in his triumphal afterglow, he understands that he has a tough task at hand. There is more than one immediate reason for Kan to reject anything that smacks of kowtowing to America, yet he must step up special pleading in as dignified a manner as possible to reaffirm Japan's position as the premier American protégé in Northeast Asia. The resignation of ex-Japanese prime minister Yokio Hatoyama must be analysed in such a context. Hatoyama resigned as premier in a dispute over a US military base in Okinawa. Obviously, there were other pressing issues at stake. What is certain, however, is that Hatoyama's resignation was not an entirely domestic affair. His resignation does a fine job at demonstrating how macabre Japanese politics can be. Washington was in some way implicated. Japan stands at a critical historical juncture. It is forced as never before to demonstrate the strategic value of leading Asian powers within the parameters of Pax Americana. And there are those within Japan and overseas who see an inherent contradiction in Japan facing east and west at the same time. China and Korea are reasserting themselves as regional powers as never before -- at least since the end of the Cold War. The politicians detect visions of Japanese voters gibbering or swooning with disquiet. There are smoke signals of an epic tussle in Northeast Asia. Hatoyama's popularity ratings were put at 77 per cent in the immediate aftermath of his landslide electoral victory in August 2009. It plummeted to 50 per cent by December, slumping further to 40 per cent in February and by May 2010 had sunk to an all time low of 20 per cent. The pivotal question is why? Was it the state of the Japanese economy, or was it some geopolitical blunder, indecisiveness or miscalculation? The final straw for the beleaguered Hatoyama was when he was humiliated by Obama who forced him to accede to the US base relocation in the face of widespread opposition. Hatoyama won hearts and minds in Japan precisely because he pledged to press for the Americans to relocate the US Futenma military base from Japan's southernmost prefecture Okinawa, which also happens to be the country's poorest. Incidentally, Hatoyama also intended to end the unpopular refueling mission in the Indian Ocean designed to be part of Japan's contribution to the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. In January he did fulfil his election campaign pledge to end the eight-year refuelling mission, but ruffled feathers among his supporters at home by offering $5 billion towards Afghan reconstruction to appease Washington, much to the consternation of his fans. "Hatoyama is no De Gaulle. Rather, in failing to stand up to Obama, he has become Japan's Obama: a breaker of promises, a capitulator, a pawn of the Pentagon," aptly surmised Gary Leupp, professor of history at Tufts University and a Japan old hand. However, while Obama remains something of an enigma to most Americans, Hatoyama clearly turned into "a tremendous disappointment to his supporters [in Japan]," as Leupp observes. To begin with, Japan has a clear interest in fostering stability in Northeast Asia. Yet the turn east is seen by many as driven by interests more than ideology. Hatoyama was in favour of creating a European-style Asian economic community. Fine-tuning a free trade agreement topped the agenda at the recently held Japan- China-South Korea summit held in Jeju. Hatoyama, while courting Korea, could not acknowledge that Korea is fast replacing Japan as China's primary pro-US counterbalance. Neither can Kan. Hatoyama reaffirmed the pro-US arrangement arrived at by the previous conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government to keep American troops on Okinawa, much to the chagrin of the Japanese electorate. Kan, in all probability will follow suit, obliged to work with rival Asian powers China and Korea under American tutelage. What else can Kan do? Yet there are hopeful signs of closer cooperation, too. Japan, China and South Korea this week announced that together they will develop an original operating system in a bid to challenge the domination of Microsoft Corporation's Windows. The crux of the matter is that Japan is coming to terms with living and working with two rising powers, neighbours with tremendous economic clout. South Korea has a $45 billion annual trade surplus with the US, bigger than Japan's. China has replaced Japan as the world's largest economy after the US. Realpolitik dictates that Japan turns instinctively to its neighbours even at the expense of a special relationship with the US. Japan must strum a new tune. Japan is forced to striptease, to placate and bend over backwards to accommodate its rivals. And, its neighbours and the US are using strong-arm tactics. Japan has long learnt the hard way to toe the American line. When in April 1952 Japan regained its sovereignty by signing the San Francisco Treaty ending the state of war between Japan and the Allied Powers, it promulgated a pacifist constitution, and accepted the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty. ANPO, the treaty's Japanese acronym, remains the mainstay of Japan's foreign policy. It could not have done otherwise given the terror and trail of destruction it suffered at the hands of American military might culminating in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No other country has yet paid such a terrible price for challenging America. Many in Japan hoped that the US would loosen its grip on the country with the end of the Cold War. Sadly, that was not to be. "We would have rethought more seriously our role in the world, brought home troops in places like Okinawa. Instead, we did everything in our power to shore up the Cold War structures in East Asia," laments Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute and author of Okinawa: Cold War Island and the best-selling CIA neologism Blowback. The questions that Kan must answer, and that Hatoyama failed to, are: Can Japan both have its cake and eat it? Can Japan simultaneously continue to be the chief ally of the US in Asia "on an equal footing" as Obama put it during a summit with Hatoyama in Japan earlier this year and inch closer towards China and Korea? Must Japan choose between closer cooperation between China and Korea on the one hand and a lessening of its dependence for protection on the US? There are a few clues as to possible scenarios in the foreseeable future. Kan will keep Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. Kan also selected Yoshihiko Noda, widely seen in Japan and overseas as a something of a fiscal hawk, as finance minister. And, Satoshi Arai was chosen as the new national strategy minister. Party kingpin Ozawa could prove to be a headache for the new government if his meddlesome ambition is not contained. "Our first priority is to regain the trust of the people," Kan stressed. Still, what does being trustworthy entail? Japan stands poised for the Upper House elections in July. The most important task before Kan is improving Japanese economic performance. "Rebuilding financial health is essential for Japan's economy," Kan said immediately after he presented his papers to Emperor Akihito. Kan, Japan's fifth prime minister in three years, has to deal with Japan's huge public debt. Japanese debt ratio to its gross domestic product (GDP) is 138 to 100, compared with the US ratio of 135 to 100 and Germany's 30 to 100. Japan's national debt is twice the country's economic output. It is against this backdrop that the world awaits Kan's position on the proposed economic integration between Asian economic giants China, Korea and Japan. Serving as deputy prime minister and minister of finance since January 2010, Kan is in a perfect position to proceed with the plans of his predecessor for propelling the pace of East Asian integration forward. Two overriding concerns, however, cloud his prospects. First, US military presence in maritime Asia, with the island-nation of Japan a linchpin and its southernmost prefecture, Okinawa, as stumbling block. Second, and closely related is the question of Korea. South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak's bid to establish Seoul as a full geopolitical partner with the US in Northeast Asia is regarded with some trepidation in Tokyo. The US Seventh Fleet controls the waters of Maritime East Asia and there are 29,000 US troops permanently stationed in South Korea. The sinking of South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, complicates matters. The Cheonan incident is a storm in a teacup and China, in particular, does not want to see it impede progress towards economic integration with South Korea. Seoul, therefore, holds key cards. If Korean unification occurs in the years ahead then a powerful new economic and military entity is bound to emerge in Northeast Asia and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces will be no match to the resurgent Koreans. Moreover, Seoul is pushing for the Republic of Korea-US Free Trade Act (KORUS- FTA), and the Korean president pins his hopes on KORUS-FTA, much to the consternation of both China and Japan. The ball is now in Korea's court. The question of Korean unification poses serious implications for Japan. Even as Kan grasps the helm in Japan, North Korea is embroiled in a top leadership reshuffle. Choe Yong-Rim, Pyongyang's Communist party chief, replaces Kim Yong-Il as premier and the official responsible for economic policy. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, a former South Korean foreign minister, called this week for the "early resumption of six party talks to address nuclear issues and other outstanding concerns." What other "outstanding" -- and maybe disquieting -- concerns? The future of Korea makes life uncomfortable for Japanese politicians. The other headache for Japanese leaders is its tarnished image in much of Asia as a US client state coddled by its military arrangements with the Uncle Sam. Moreover, the status quo in the Futenma US base in Okinawa is untenable. The US military presence is deeply unpopular on the southern Japanese island especially after a series of scandalous incidents involving US troops stationed there culminating in the rape of a 12-year-old Japanese girl in 1995. It is the question of Okinawa that unseated the longstanding Liberal Democratic Party (formerly ruling now opposition) and that ousted Hatoyama from office. "It is true that I said that I wanted to relocate the facility outside Okinawa," Hatoyama conceded. "However, I'd like to apologise that the conclusion is not what the Okinawans wanted." Of course, there are no easy answers to Okinawa. The ex-prime minister took office less than nine months ago. Hatoyama wanted to move the US military base off Okinawa and even out of Japan altogether, but the US strongly objected on operational grounds. "Heartbreaking," Yukio Hatoyama concluded. "Our politics must break with money," Hatoyama said upon taking office. Hatoyama led the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) to a historic election victory in September 2009. "We must become completely clean in order to revitalise our party." Japan's national debt remains Kan's top priority. Kan is best remembered for his role in exposing the scandal involving HIV- tainted blood products in the 1990s. today, he promises higher taxes and spending cuts. Ominously, Kan's ascendancy coincided with the death of the classic Japanese dancer Kanzo Ohno at the ripe old age of 103. He perfected the Butoh style of dance with ghostly white rice- powder face make-up and even when incapacitated in old age, he still managed to entrance his audience with hypnotic hand movements. "Both strength and kindness were expressed through his works. He delivered hope through dance," an associate remembered his mentor. Can Kan do the same -- in politicking not in dance?
