The ruling on 17 May by the Cairo Court of Appeals for Urgent Matters banning the Ultras football fan clubs as terrorist groups has sparked heated controversy over the future of such groups in Egyptian political life. It has also stirred debate over the government's approach to the grassroots political forces that emerged during the 25 January Revolution. Government agencies, unable to absorb such groups or regulate their status, often simply opted to ban their activities, without assessing the potential social and political fallout from an overreliance on security measures and judicial solutions. The controversy is part of a broader political environment characterised by the importance of affirming the prestige of the state, on the one hand, and the need for creative solutions that do not exclude, by judicial rulings, influential segments of society from politics, on the other. It is crucial that the question of the Ultras be broached as rationally and objectively as possible, and that the debate remain free of vilification by Ultras opponents, as well as idealisation by those defenders who see the Ultras as a model of pure and youthful revolutionary zeal. The court's ruling was based on the results of a number of studies and research papers on the Ultras phenomenon. This was evident in the wording of the court's findings. The court weighed the importance of bringing to account wrongdoers among Ultras members who were said to have ruined the football atmosphere, disrupted public security and regarded their club as their prime sphere of allegiance, above their patriotic allegiance. The court also acknowledged that these entities were the first organised grassroots groups with a capacity to mobilise, and that they represent a class of youth inclined to rebelliousness, rejection of authority and capable of innovation. The judgement also hinted that the extremist Muslim Brotherhood made use of these groups, even if the organisation was not explicitly named. But perhaps the most significant part of the verdict was reference to a “distorted relationship between youth and the state.” The court said that the state needs to “reconcile” with youth and gradually re-assimilate them into society. There was no elaboration on what exactly was meant by these terms, or which categories of youth were intended. The government's problem in dealing with the Ultras dates from the creation of the Ahli Fans Federation in 2004. In 2007, they founded the Ultras Ahlawi group, at which point they began to display certain traits in common with similar, if rival, Ultras fan groups that had emerged at the time, including the White Knights of Zamalek Football Club, Green Eagles of Masri Club, Yellow Dragons of Ismaili Club and Ultras Green Magic of the Union Club of Alexandria. For the Ultras, the essential idea of these groups is that they embody a rejection of all forms of “paternalistic control”, whether in the context of family relations or in the broader framework of their interactions with the “agents” of paternalistic authority. In their lexicon, “agents” include the police, whom they refer to by the acronym ACAB (“All coppers are bastards”), and sometimes the heads of sporting clubs when clashes erupted between them and those authorities. Perhaps this attitude helps explain the frequent clashes with police, even before the 25 January Revolution, as well as why they were in the front lines of the clashes with security forces during the “Day of Rage” demonstrations on 28 January 2011 after the revolution erupted. They played an active role in managing the movement in Tahrir Square during the 18-day period of the revolution and participated in subsequent revolutionary activities during the interim period, most notably the “Correcting the Path” mass rally of 9 September 2011, which concluded with the storming of the Israeli Embassy, and the Mohamed Mahmoud Street demonstrations in November 2011. The state of antagonism towards the police was aggravated by the deaths of Ultras members at a number of sporting events. The most notorious were the Port Said Stadium massacre in February 2012, in which 72 Ultras Ahlawi members lost their lives, and the incident at the Air Defence Stadium in February 2015, in which 22 Ultras White Knights were killed. While the state did not consider the police directly responsible for these incidents, the deaths generated a sense of victimisation among the Ultras. This spirit was not dissimilar to the victimisation cult that the Muslim Brotherhood instils among its members and that is summoned up from time to time as a means of building a collective memory among members, both new and old. With respect to the Ultras, the danger of this spirit surfaces in times of football disasters when the police become “the enemy” and arrested Ultras become “victims and martyrs.” From the standpoint of the state, the lack of institutions capable of containing the youth and channelling their ardour into useful activities during their free time has driven large segments of youth, regardless of their class, educational or political affiliations, to search for alternative outlets for expressing their sense of belonging. Membership in the club and the peer group were the two most prominent alternatives. The first became the “alternative homeland” that sometimes took precedence over the actual fatherland, while the second became the “new nuclear family”, whose members shared the same zeal and desire to blast their voices to all around, as well as the same hatred for the institutions of government which they feel do not represent them. Both official and community organs have lost the capacity to formulate innovative ways to absorb these new sociopolitical forces and include them in the new public sphere. Despite the mutual dislike between these entities and government organisations, there are two possible scenarios for handling the Ultras question. The first engages an immediate exigency measure whereby the State Litigation Authority appeals the ban in view of its anticipated security consequences. There are precedents for this, the most important being the appeal filed by this authority against a ruling by the same court classifying Hamas as a terrorist group. Also in favour of this course of action is the fact that President Abdel-Farrah Al-Sisi, himself, lauded the Ultras' encouragement during the Confederation Cup finals in 2014. In addition, there is the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood, which has direct links with the leaders of these groups, will try to win them over to its ranks by playing on the values of the 25 January Revolution and the role of youth organisations in bringing down authoritarian regimes. In tandem with this course of action, government agencies should begin to introduce a complete package of measures and policies aimed at assimilating the Ultras fan clubs. Efforts in this regard could begin by launching a series of surveys and field research activities that could include convening focus groups on the values of the Ultras and the differences between members in Cairo or Alexandria and those of Ultras groups in other governorates. At the same time, a team of experts could be convened to study the political, social and security dimensions of the Ultras phenomenon with an eye towards formulating a comprehensive strategy for managing this issue. In this regard, it might be useful to draw on international expertise in sports legislation, especially with regard to the formulation of laws aimed at combatting stadium hooliganism and regulating the legal status of fan clubs. The second scenario is for security agencies to carry out the court ruling, enforce the ban on Ultras groups, prevent them from displaying their banners and emblems and prohibit them from entering stadiums in their capacity as Ultras members. However, enforcement efforts would run up against a number of general difficulties, due to the very nature of Ultras groups, which are essentially phantom organisations with no legal character or structure and (with the possible exception of their leaders, called “capos”), no permanent membership (unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, for example). In addition, enforcement would further strain the resources of the police and their capacities to maintain law and order in the streets. Most likely, the force of reality will lead to the restoration of peace with the Ultras, whether this is brought about by a State Litigation Authority appeal against the recent ban or by non-enforcement of the ruling because of its high political costs and the spectre of a surge in incidents of violence once spectators return to the stadiums. The writer is executive director of Tawasol Centre for Youth Research and Studies.
